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n ÔThe terrible conflicts that herd people under falsely unifying rubrics like ÒAmerica,Ó ÒThe WestÓ
o r ÒIslamÓ and invent collective identities for large numbers of individuals who are actually quite
diverse, cannot remain as potent as they are, and must be opposed. We still have at our disposal
t h e rational interpretive skills that are the legacy of humanistic education, not as a sentimental piety
enjoining us to return to traditional values or the classics but as the active practice of worldly secular
rational discourse.Õ (Edward Said, Orientalism 25 Years Later, CounterPunch, 4 August 2003). 
n Edward Said died on 25 September 2003
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The ISIM Newsletter is published by the
International Institute for the Study of
Islam in the Modern World (ISIM). The
ISIM Newsletter represents a forum for
scholarly exchange; we invite original
contributions which deal with culture,
society, politics, gender, religion, arts,
research issues, and current debates
relating to contemporary Muslim
societies. Please see the ISIM website for
the style sheet. Responsibility for the
facts and opinions expressed in this
publication rests solely with the authors.
Their views do not necessarily reflect
those of the Institute or its supporters.
The ISIM Newsletter is free of charge.
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During a recent visit to Tunis the French president Jacques Chirac explained
the notion of l a  c i t  (secularism) in a meeting with students of the local Lyce
Franais. He pointed out that the French, given their tradition of secularism,
feel harassed by the assertion of ostentatious markers of religiosity. There-
fore, in the eyes of the French, the wearing of veils in public schools is con-
ceived as a hostile act and, as such, is unacceptable. But he expressed his
conviction that Islam is compatible with French secularism, even though cer-
tain readings of Islam may be problematic. He explained, for instance, that if
a Muslim woman refuses to be treated by a male medical doctor she is, in
fact, contesting national regulations that are rooted in
French civilization and this is not to be tolerated. Accord-
ing to Chirac the French are not so much prone to im-
pose their values on others, rather they refuse to have
their own culture contested. The French president was
speaking to a sympathetic audience of Tunisian, French
and other international students, but his message was also aimed at the
home public on the eve of the publication of a report dealing with the m o d e
dÕemploi de la l a  c i t  in the context of the proliferation of religious, mainly Is-
lamic, signs in the public domain. 
In Western Europe the increased presence of Islam is the subject of heated
debate in which Islam is often seen as being incompatible with European cul-
ture. The national context of the debate varies and in some countries, like
France, the government is more interventionist than elsewhere (Peter, p. 2 0 ) .
But the debates in Europe are becoming remarkably similar in content, particularly after 9/11
when questions increasingly concentrate on issues regarding ÔrealÕ and ÔgoodÕ Islam as opposed
to supposedly less constructive readings of Islam (Bonnefoy, p.22). Today, members of govern-
ment and parliament in France and elsewhere are actively engaged in defining the ÔproperÕ be-
haviour of Muslim citizens and with some regularity they transgress the sacred boundaries of
separation between state and religion.
The debate coincides with the state-sponsored formation of representative Muslim councils in
several countries. Representatives of Sunni mosque and welfare organizations tend to dominate
these new bodies. It remains to be seen to what extent these new councils represent Muslim
communities because many Muslims in Europe have little or no dealings with these more formal
organizations, and quite a number of them have developed their own informal groups, such as
those on the internet. 
Beyond doubt it is the veil, whether the face-veil or headscarf, that represents the principle Ôos-
tentatiousÕ religious marker. Continuous incidents around veiling have put this practice at the cen-
tre of public apprehension. Apart from what veiling may reveal about gender relations, issues of
veiling and measures introduced to discourage or ban (certain types of) veiling touch upon a num-
ber of other concerns, such as access to education and individual liberties, integration and cultur-
al authenticity (See Herrera and Moors, p. 16 and Fazila-Yacoobali, p. 63 on the recent debates).
Veiling is clearly not only a contentious issue in Europe; it is being debated in many Muslim coun-
tries where degrees of veiling are being negotiated and states implement policies that both im-
pose and discourage veiling. The politics of veiling are highly complex, as was demonstrated dur-
ing the Nobel Prize winner Shirin EbadiÕs recent visit to Europe. By her unveiled appearance at a
Paris press conference in conjunction with her emphasis on her Muslim identity, she ÔÉ subtly im-
plied that religious identity is a social construction, and that every member of the community has
the right to participate in its definition. She is, therefore, pushing for a more inclusive and pluralis-
tic definition of what it means to be Muslim and implying that the definition of religious identity
cannot be monopolized by a government or the religious establishment.Õ (Shahrokni, p. 6). In an
interview with a Dutch daily Ebadi expressed her concern about debates on the veil in Europe,
commenting that forbidding veiling is no less problematic than prescribing it. 
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E d i t o r i a l
D IC K D O U WE S
The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the
Modern World (ISIM) conducts and promotes inter-
disciplinary research on social, political, cultural, and
intellectual trends and movements in contemporary
Muslim societies and communities. The ISIM has been
established by the University of Amsterdam, Leiden
University, Utrecht University, and the University of
Nijmegen in response to a need for further research
on contemporary developments of great social, polit-
ical and cultural importance in the Muslim world from
social science and humanities perspectives. The ISIMÕs
research approaches are expressly interdisciplinary
and comparative, covering a large geographic range
which includes North Africa, the Middle East, Sub-Sa-
haran Africa, Central Asia, South and South East Asia,
and Muslim communities in the West. Broad in scope,
the ISIM brings together all areas of disciplinary ex-
pertise in anthropology, sociology, religious studies,
political science, and cultural studies.
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The central function of the ISIM is to conduct and promote research in
contemporary ÔMuslim societiesÕ. The term refers to both a ÔparticularÕ
culture and a geographical area of the world, albeit one which is dis-
persed across the Middle East, South and South-East Asia and Africa.
While the term may offer a common identity for scholars working on
countries ranging from Morocco and Iran to India and Indonesia, it can
also invoke a sense of anxiety and hesitation. It is not just that as an an-
alytical category ÔMuslim societiesÕ may be vague and therefore lacks
coherence, but some may fear that it can cause more intellectual harm
than benefit. By employing such a broad category are we not in a sense
Ôre-orientalizingÕ Muslim societies and cultures, constructing homoge-
nous entities where they do not exist? Is it valid to speak of, say, ÔChris-
tian societiesÕ or ÔBuddist societiesÕ? Does the category ÔMuslim soci-
etiesÕ not imply that we consider religion, i.e., Islam, as the defining fea-
ture of these societies? Finally, would this category not exclude, and
otherize, the non-religious and non-Muslim from membership in Mus-
lim majority nations? While such questions address legitimate con-
cerns, I would like to suggest that ÔMuslim societiesÕ can serve as a use-
ful analytical category. 
The terms ÔIslamic worldÕ or ÔIslamic societyÕ, used in singular abstract
forms, may indeed imply that Islam is the central factor that shapes the
dynamics of these societies. ÔIslamic societyÕ becomes a totalizing no-
tion which is constructed by others to describe Muslims and their cul-
tures. It tells us the way others imagine how Muslims are and even how
they should be. This worldview has partly been perpetuated by some
Muslims such as Islamists, who likewise construct a unitary Islamic
l a n d s c a p e .
In contrast, ÔMuslim societiesÕ, understood as plural and concrete enti-
ties, allow a self-conscious Muslim majority to define their own reality
in an inevitably contested, differentiated and dynamic fashion. Here
the emphasis is not on Islam, but Muslims as agents of their societies
and cultures, even if not of their own making. And ÔcultureÕ is perceived
not as static codes and conducts but as processes, always changing,
flexible and contested. These are the societies in which aspects of
Islam, interpreted and adopted in diverse manners, have influenced
some domains of private and public lifeÑincluding the realms of
morality, family relations, gender dynamics, law, and sometimes (but
not always) politics and the state. ÔMuslim communitiesÕ outside Mus-
lim-majority countries contain perhaps a more complex social dynam-
ic, since Muslims are compelled to negotiate their identities within the
prevailing non-Islamic legal and normative structures. What make
them ÔMuslim communitiesÕ are the diverse ÔMuslim identitiesÕ the
members hold.
Yet ÔMuslim societiesÕ are never monolithic as such, never religious by
definition, nor are their cultures simply reducible to mere religion. In-
deed, national cultures, historical experiences and political trajectories
have often produced different cultures of Islam or religious percep-
tions and practices across different Muslim nations. In this sense, each
ÔMuslimÕ (majority) country is comprised of an ensemble of people with
various degrees of religious affiliations ranging from political Islamists,
actively pious, ordinarily religious, seculars or non-Muslim minorities.
Indeed, the degrees of religious affiliation among these groups may
vary at different historical conjunctures. 
The commonality and differentiation embedded in the category of
ÔMuslim societiesÕ allow for drawing fruitful parallels, and conducting
comparative studies across both time and space, as well as between
Muslim and non-Muslim societies. For the relentless process of global-
ization, while it may accentuate differences, also produces similar
structures and processes between nations, so that social phenomena
in Latin America, for example, may find parallels in Asia. Equally, many
common features relating to social structures, consumer cultures and
commoditification can be traced between Muslim and non-Muslim so-
cieties. Such comparative exercises can greatly enrich our understand-
ing of the social, political and cultural dynamics in different parts of the
world. 
Some might argue that the fluidity and differentiation embedded in
the category ÔMuslim societiesÕ could diminish its intended analytical
purpose. This might be a valid argument if we assume that comparable
categories such as the Middle East, Europe and Latin America enjoy the
social, cultural or economic cohesion that is desired, imagined, or in-
tended. But obviously they do not. The latter also represent heteroge-
neous realities. Of course, the category ÔMuslim
societiesÕ does not represent a bounded geo-
graphic ÔareaÕ as in Middle East or East Asia, for
the obvious reason that some 59 Muslim majority
countries with one billion Muslims are dispersed
in pockets of lands that stretch from parts of
southern Europe throughout Asia and Africa. But
like the ÔMiddle EastÕ, ÔSouth AsiaÕ or Europe, ÔMus-
lim societiesÕ are also internally diverse in terms
of languages, national cultures, peoplesÕ religious
commitments and economic capacities. The
point is not that these categorical ÔareasÕ or re-
gions are not internally varied, but rather that the
common concerns shared within these regions
are perhaps larger than those shared between
them and other regions or areas. While there
might be differentiation within Latin America, it is
surely less so than the variety one may find between Latin American
and, say, Asia. The same goes for the category ÔMuslim societiesÕ. The
latter holds enough coherence to allow us to pose interesting analyti-
cal questions. To what extent, for instance, does Islam play a role in
constructing peopleÕs identities? 
An area of study devoted to ÔMuslim societiesÕ may enjoy two advan-
tages over conventional area studies. First, area studies have tradition-
ally been associated with western foreign policy interests. The catego-
ry of ÔMuslim societiesÕ, however, permits these societies to define and
characterize themselves, even if in a contested fashion. Secondly, in
academia area studies are counterposed to ÔdisciplinaryÕ orientations. I
am hoping that ÔMuslim societiesÕ may offer a fertile scholarly ÔfieldÕ in
which a productive tension between the comparative advantages of
area studies and disciplinary frameworks can generate both an empiri-
cally rich and theoretically innovative research outcome. The study of
ÔMuslim societiesÕ becomes a plausible field to interrogate such themes
as ÔMuslim cultural politicsÕ, Ôreligion and the public sphereÕ, Ôproduc-
tion of Islamic knowledgeÕ, Ôsocio-religious movementsÕ, or Ôreligion,
society and violenceÕ. Scholarly endeavors of this nature not only help
us address crucial empirical questions, they also assist us to contribute
to theoretical debates on, for instance, Ôpublic sphereÕ, Ôproduction of
knowledgeÕ, ÔviolenceÕ, Ôcultural politics and representationÕ, Ôreligion
and politicsÕ or Ôsocial movements and social changeÕ. The study of
contemporary ÔMuslim societiesÕ is, therefore, distinct from the tradi-
tional field of ÔIslamic studiesÕ which has developed its own particular
focus and methodology. 
Asef Bayat is the ISIM
Academic Director
and ISIM Chair at
Leiden University
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The Use and Abuse of 
ÔMuslim SocietiesÕ
I am grateful to my ISIM colleagues, Martin van Bruinessen, Dick Douwes, Annelies Moors
and Abdulkader Tayob for their insightful comments. 
N AZ A N IN  S H A H R O KN I
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Shirin Ebadi, an Iranian lawyer and
human rights activist, was little known
outside Iran before being awarded the
2003 Nobel Peace Prize on the 10t h o f
October. Inside her country, however,
she is widely recognized for her work
around issues of social justice and
human rights. As an academic she has
written several books1 and journal arti-
cles on human rights in general, and
on the rights of children, women and
refugees in particular. She is also widely regarded as a civil society ac-
tivist and was a founding member of the NGO, Association for Support
of ChildrenÕs Rights in Iran. As a lawyer Ebadi has been involved in nu-
merous cases related to the violation of childrenÕs and womenÕs rights.
Her most notorious case involved an eight-year-old girl believed to
have been abused and killed by her father and stepmother and led to
the revision of the Iranian Child Custody law. She also worked on vari-
ous political cases relating to a series of 1998 murders of secular intel-
lectuals, and on the case of a student who was killed during student
uprisings following raids on dormitories at Tehran University by para-
military and vigilante groups in July 1999. Her efforts in publicizing
those behind the raids on dormitories led to her and her colleagueÕs ar-
rest and imprisonment on charges of forging evidence and spreading
lies in June 2000. 
The international recognition bestowed on Ebadi has re-invigorated
the fight for human rights and democracy in Iran. Since her Nobel Prize
was announced activists have convened numerous meetings of every
size to discuss Ôthe next stepÕ towards creating a more open society.
Awarding the Peace Prize to this Iranian woman lawyer has implica-
tions for human right activists far beyond the borders of Iran. 
Being Muslim
In its October announcement, the Nobel Committee expressed plea-
sure in awarding the Nobel Peace Prize Ôto a woman who is part of the
Muslim worldÕ. In almost all her interviews Ebadi has underscored her
Muslim identity and emphasized that Ôyou can be Muslim and support
democracyÕ. The fact that the Peace Prize has
gone to a Muslim woman, and the fact that Ebadi
identifies herself as a Muslim even though she
does not don the veil, is highly significant. Firstly,
the monolithic image of Muslim women, despite
reams of postcolonial writings to the contrary, is,
at least momentarily, cracked. Notwithstanding
occasional exceptions, ÔWesternÕ mass media has
continued to portray Muslim women as passive,
oppressed and trapped within rigid discriminato-
ry structures assumed to be intrinsic to Islam.
Muslim women are largely conceived of as pow-
erless, choice-less victims, who, in order to be
emancipated from their painful shackles, need
help from a saviorÑusually in the form of a non-
Muslim westerner.2 By awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to a Muslim
woman from the Muslim world, in acknowledgement of her efforts to
promote democracy and the rights of women and children in Iran, the
world is presented with a new, high profile image of a ÔMuslim womanÕ
as an agent of change rather than as a victim of tradition.
Yet EbadiÕs unveiled appearance at
her Paris press conference in conjunc-
tion with her own emphasis on her
Muslim identity has left many per-
plexed and asking: ÔWhat kind of a
Muslim is she, if not wearing the veil?Õ
In this sense, Ebadi has unsettled the
familiar assumption of a unified, fixed,
and, at least in the case of Iran, state-
defined religious identity. Her brief ap-
pearance and statement subtly im-
plied that religious identity is a social construction, and that every
member of the community has the right to participate in its definition.
She is, therefore, pushing for a more inclusive and pluralistic definition
of what it means to be Muslim and implying that the definition of reli-
gious identity cannot be monopolized by a government or the reli-
gious establishment. The significance of her action was not lost on
conservatives in Iran who were, and continue to be, infuriated that
Ebadi claimed to be Muslim but did not wear a veil. 
Secular orientations
It is not only conservatives who disapprove of EbadiÕs approach, for
many secular Iranians in and outside Iran have also been annoyed and
disappointed by her emphasis on her Muslim identity. Indeed, Ebadi is
well known as a secular activist. Against the odds she has defended
many secular writers and intellectuals prosecuted for their views and
has been an active member of the Iranian Writers Union which is well
known for its secular orientations. She supports the separation of reli-
gion from the state and believes that in a democracy the legitimacy of
political power is not sanctioned by sacred texts or official religious be-
liefs, but by popular consensus. With regard to Iran she has said, ÔIf the
present regime does not reform and evolve into one that reflects the
will of the people, it is going to fail, even if it adopts a secularist pos-
t u r e .Õ3 However, recognizing the essential role of Islam in Iranian cul-
ture and daily life, she tries to promote democratic interpretations of
Islam and has said, Ôthere is no contradiction between fundamentals of
Islam and ideals of democracy and human rights.Õ4 Ebadi realizes that
having secular political orientations does not imply hostility towards
religion or the displacement of religious identity from the public
sphere. Her short statement speaks volumes in terms of the debates
among all those Muslims who wish to legitimize the identity of secular
Muslims, just as secular Jews and Christians are recognized. This is im-
portant in a context where proponents of political Islam, particularly
since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, have redefined the popular
meaning of secularism to mean Ôanti-religionÕ. Shirin Ebadi transcends
the reductionist dichotomy of religious verses secular; she has
breached some of the barriers separating different forces and voices
for democracy and freedom of thought. Her nuanced stance has great-
ly annoyed conservative state officials who were taken aback by the
entire situation surrounding EbadiÕs Nobel Prize. 
Women in Iran
The Western media frequently portrays Iranian women as victims of
fathersÕ strict controls, husbandsÕ harsh treatments and the stateÕs re-
strictive laws. Rarely do the complexities of gender ideology in Iran get
covered. Indeed, being a woman in Iran can be challenging and diffi-
cult, however this is only one aspect of an Iranian womanÕs life. The fate
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The 2003 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to
the Iranian human rights activist Shirin Ebadi,
signifying the first Muslim woman to receive
a Nobel Prize. The international recognition
bestowed on Ebadi has re-invigorated the
fight for human rights and democracy in Iran
and elsewhere. It has also provided a much
welcome change in the international image
o f ÔMuslim womanÕ as victim of tradition to
active agent of social and political change.
Shirin Ebadi
Transcender of
D i v i s i v e B o u n d a r i e s
Éhaving secular
political orientations
does not imply hostility
towards religionÉ
of Zahra Kazemi, the Iranian-Canadian journalist murdered while in
custody, of Afsaneh Noroozi, sentenced to death for killing the man
who attempted to rape her, and of thousands of others trapped within
the undemocratic and inhumane threads that are part of the fabric of
Iranian society are real. But the untold stories of all those women who
are agents of change are also real. Shahla Sherkat, editor of the month-
ly Iranian feminist magazine Z a n a n, Samira Makhmalbaf, a filmmaker
who has won numerous international prizes, Elaheh Koolaei, a female
MP pushing for bills benefiting women and supporting democratic re-
form, represent only a few of a large number of culturally, socially and
politically engaged women. These stories do not belong solely to well-
educated, middle class women. There are many women from less-priv-
ileged, more traditional segments of society, even in the rural areas,
whose names are not known but who have breached the seemingly
impassable through enormous will, determination and innovation.
Zinat Daryaei who is from an isolated village in the south and who
obtained only a few years of education, became a health worker and
community reformer.5 Farkhondeh Gohari who lives in a low-income
neighborhood in the south of Tehran turned her small hairdressing
room into a library for neighborhood women. Sedigheh Sedighi, an
elected councilor in a small town, has established a sewing workshop
to create jobs for local women and turned her old family home into a
girlsÕ elementary school. Such women and many like them also repre-
sent the reality of Ôbeing a woman in IranÕ, yet they are consistently ig-
nored not only by the international community and the media, but also
by their own government.
The awarding of the Peace Prize to an Iranian woman has forced the
media to recognize that Ôbeing a woman in IranÕ is complex and to pay
attention to the role of girls and women in public life.6 Moreover, the
fact that Shirin Ebadi is a civil-society activist who has lived her life
among ÔordinaryÕ people has another significant impact. As a grass-
roots activist she has the ability to connect the different and some-
times contradictory experiences of Iranian women. 
Since her Nobel, Ebadi has been attending meetings organized by
groups as diverse as The Iranian Bar Association, student organizations,
the Parliamentary womenÕs caucus, NGOs, local government authori-
ties and the Iranian Artists Association. She continues to transcend gov-
ernmental verses nongovernmental, professional verses nonprofes-
sional and traditional verses modern divides. Her capacity to move be-
tween seemingly opposing arenas is helping to form networks which
can serve to facilitate the creation and reconstitution of public spaces
where diverse groups will be able to interact and engage in meaning-
ful dialogue. Ultimately, this can promote inter-group tolerance and
understanding which facilitate a shift from less-than-productive
counter-state politics to constructive, practical strategies for support-
ing the non-violent transition to democracy.
By awarding the Peace Prize to Shirin Ebadi, the
Nobel committee has promoted a broader, more
inclusive definition of peace-building which in-
cludes the recognition of and respect for human
rights; the use of non-violent means for resolving
political and social disputes; and the substitution
of competition with cooperation to promote
inter-group tolerance and mutual understanding.
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1 . Two of EbadiÕs books available in English
are: The Rights of the Child, A Study of Legal
Aspects of ChildrenÕs Rights in Iran ( T e h r a n ,
1994 with the support of UNICEF); and
History and Documentation of Human Rights
in Iran (New York, 2000).
2 . Lila-Abu-Lughod, ÔDo Muslim Women Really
Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections
on Cultural Relativism and Its OthersÕ,
American Anthropologist,104(3): (2002)
7 8 3 Ð 7 9 0 .
3 . Interview with Gulf News on Oct. 30, 2003.
4 . I b i d .
5 . For a detailed discussion see, Nazanin
Shahrokni, ÔBaa Zinat Dar SalakhÕ, Z a n a n,
September 1999 (55) and Homa Hoodfar,
ÔVolunteer health workers in Iran as social
activists: Can Ôgovernmental non-
governmental organizationsÕ be agents of
democratization?Õ, WLUML Occasional Paper,
No. 10, December 1998.
6 . For example see: The Economist, 18 October
2003 and The Christian Science Monitor,
1 4 October 2003.
Shirin Ebadi addresses a news conference in Paris, 10 October 2003.
Nazanin Shahrokni is an independent researcher and a
journalist working closely with Zanan (a monthly feminist
magazine in Iran). She is currently at Concordia University,
Montreal, Canada, collaborating with Dr. Homa Hoodfar on
ÔWomen and Electoral Politics in the Middle EastÕ. 
E-mail: nshahrokni@aol.com
Current Issues
IB RA H I M K AL IN
8 I S I M N E W S L E T T E R  1 3 /  D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 3
The 21s t World Congress of Philosophy
was held in Istanbul, Turkey, from 10-17
August 2003 and inaugurated by Turk-
ish President Ahmed Necdet Sezer. An
impressive number of philosophers, so-
cial scientists and scholars came to-
gether from about eighty different
countries. The main theme of this yearÕs
congress was ÔPhilosophy Facing World
ProblemsÕ. Officially founded in 1948,
The World Congress of Philosophy
which organizes a general meeting
every five years, is the largest associa-
tion of philosophy in the world and has an honored history of over a
century. 
At face value the fact that the CongressÕs first meeting of the 21s tc e n-
tury was held in the Islamic world is more than symbolic. On one hand,
it confirms philosophyÕs appeal as a potential universal discourse. On
the other hand, the choice of world
problems as this yearÕs theme points to
its desire to represent a discourse that
has something to say about urgent
problems of the world. When analysed
carefully, however, neither of these
claims can be said to have been real-
ized at the Congress The world prob-
lems highlighted at the Congress in-
cluded poverty, immigration, civil war,
terrorism, exploitation of labor, envi-
ronment, human rights, democratiza-
tion, civil liberties, multiculturalism
and the consequences of globaliza-
tion. Various analyses were offered
from different points of view. Partici-
pants called for a collective and global
effort to confront world problems and
condemned the rise of American uni-
lateralism and hegemonic power rela-
tions. There was a palpable sense of
anti-American (or rather anti-Bush)
sentiment at the Congress. Although
at times this sentiment verged on sim-
plistic reductionism whereby most of the present evils of the world
were attributed to American power, the speakers were also critical of
the deeper causes of world problems faced by both Western and non-
Western societies. 
Philosophy facing its own legitimacy crisis
Contemporary philosophyÕs attempt to address world problems can
be seen as a response to the legitimacy crisis of modern thought. The
vacuum created by the devastating attack of postmodernism, now
waning as a philosophical vogue, forced practitioners of all schools of
thought to question their own legitimacy. Modern thought has been
further rendered dysfunctional and practically meaningless by the un-
controllable power of capitalism, transnational corporations, global-
ization, hegemonic power politics, genetic engineering, consumerism,
the de facto culture of nihilism, and the trivialization of all thinking and
culture. Philosophy, in the broad sense
of the term with a moral vision, has had
very little impact on these develop-
ments. As many philosophers have ad-
mitted, there is no indication that the
situation will change in the foresee-
able future. In some important ways
the World Congress of Philosophy re-
sponded to this crisis in philosophy by
calling on philosophers to address
world problems by both thinking
about, a n d taking moral positions on
them. 
This sincere and earnest desire to address world problems in a global
context, however, was marred by the lack of analyses and perspectives
that could lead to a global ethics in confronting todayÕs problems.
Putting aside sessions on specific topics in philosophy and critical the-
ory, the overwhelming majority of discussions on political issues did
not go beyond the East-West and
South-North dichotomies. Nor were
there any perspectives that interpret-
ed the world from a non-European or
non-American point of view. Blaming
the West for the misdeeds of the mod-
ern world and then taking a conde-
scending approach towards non-West-
ern societies, though well intended,
simply reinforces the conception of the
world as revolving around a center, i.e.
Europe and the United States. 
Constructing the world from a non-
Western perspective that will allow
multiple actors to play a central role in
the current system of relations is a real
challenge for the oft-repeated multi-
culturalism of our day. Frankly, one
would have hoped that someone
would have at least raised this issue at
the Congress, but no one did. Perhaps
one major reason for this absence is
that despite some earnest efforts, the
concept of multiculturalism is still used in a primarily Western context.
In Europe ÔmulticulturalismÕ refers primarily to a mode of religious and
cultural coexistence confined to the Judeo-Christian tradition. In the
case of the US, it is a matter of internal politics with no real and con-
crete applications outside Pax Americana. In the final analysis, the cen-
tral actors of world affairs in both the political and intellectual senses
of the term are relegated to Europe and the US. Inevitably, this leads to
the widespread suspicion that multiculturalism, when it is invoked at
all, is an intra-Western rather than inter-cultural concept. 
The meaning of multiculturalism 
Last May Habermas and Derrida, the two most prominent and cele-
brated contemporary European philosophers, published a letter con-
demning American unilateralism and the invasion of Iraq. The letter
authored by Habermas and signed by Derrida takes the Iraq issue as
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For the first time in its history the World
Congress of Philosophy met in a Muslim
majority country. The meeting venue was
more than symbolic for it confirmed
philosophyÕs potential to be a universal
discourse. Similarly, the choice of this yearÕs
theme, ÔPhilosophy Facing World ProblemsÕ,
points to the desire and potential of
philosophy to engage in urgent problems
o f the world. When analysed carefully,
however, neither of these claims can
b e s a i d t o have been realized. 
The World Congress of 
Philosophy and
Islamic Thought
The vacuum created by
t h e devastating attack of
postmodernism, now waning as
a philosophical vogue, forced
practitioners of all schools of
thought to question their
o w n l e g i t i m a c y .
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the surfacing of a deeper problem in world affairs. At face value the
problem is the limitless ambition of American neo-conservatism and
its relentless efforts to subdue any alternative power, be it political,
economic, or cultural. But the deeper problem, Habermas and Derrida
tell us, is the waning of European civilization as we know it. To counter
irresponsible American pragmatism, the philosophers urge Europeans
to go back to the ideals of the Enlightenment that gave Europe its pre-
sent identity and self-consciousness and made it a Ôuniversal system of
cultureÕ. What is remarkable about this proposal is that it is not only
based on a concept of Europe that is fixed in space and time, but also
ignores the present realities of multiculturalism in Europe. In drawing
out a roadmap for the future of Europe
the two philosophers say nothing
about the presence of non-European
and primarily Muslim minorities in Eu-
ropeÕs midst. There is no indication
that Habermas and Derrida want to see
Europe as a truly multicultural entity
beyond the limits of Judeo-Christian
tradition on the one hand, and secular
European culture, on the other. 
At the Congress, many pointed to
the fact that multiple actors are shap-
ing world culture and politics, but we
are yet to see a full-fledged analysis
that is both cogent and compelling.
The Congress represented a unique
opportunity for philosophers to devel-
op a discourse that goes beyond pro or
anti-Americanism to a context of gen-
uine multiculturalism. The fact that the
Congress convened in a Muslim city
that boasts of being a meeting place of East and West, tradition and
modernity, old and new, did not help the cause because neither Euro-
pean nor American philosophers demonstrated substantial knowledge
about the Islamic world. Those participants from the Islamic world had
an annoyingly insignificant presence and didnÕt make their voices
heard on a larger scale. 
So, where is Islamic philosophy?
The virtual absence of Islamic thought at the Congress, made all the
more ironic since it was being held for the first time in a Muslim coun-
try, was a missed opportunity. There are many reasons why this turned
out to be the case, the most notable pertaining to the present state of
Islamic philosophy and its study in modern academia. The first prob-
lem is related to the question of multiculturalism I referred to above. In
spite of many sincere attempts on the part of both Western and non-
Western philosophers, the word ÔphilosophyÕ by itself still refers to
Western philosophy. When we use the term in the context of other tra-
ditions, we have to say ÔIslamicÕ, ÔAfricanÕ, or ÔChineseÕ philosophy. From
a pedagogical point of view, there is nothing wrong with this. But the
deeper problem is the hegemony of Western philosophical thought
whereby all other philosophical traditions are assessed in relation to,
or separation from it. In spite of calls for multiculturalism right and left,
the question remains: Is Western philosophy ready to open itself up to
a dialogue with non-Western ways of thinking? 
The second problem, and I believe this is even more important than
the first, has to do with the way Islamic philosophy is studied today.
From its inception in Western academia, Islamic philosophy was always
studied by historians and philologists as part of Islamic-Near Eastern
studies. Classical Orientalism never produced a work on Islamic philos-
ophy or k a l a m for that matter that can claim to be a philosophical work
on its own. The issues were always of a historical nature such as the ex-
tent to which Islamic philosophy was indebted to Greek philosophy or
how Islamic thought came about as a result of translations from Greek.
The situation has not changed since then. Islamic philosophy is still
studied by scholars who come primarily from history or Middle Eastern
studies background rather than philosophy. Courses on Islamic philos-
ophy are offered not in mainstream philosophy departments but in ei-
ther religious studies or Near Eastern and/or Middle East studies de-
partments. One rarely sees scholars of Islamic philosophy at any of the
major philosophical conventions in the US and other places. These ob-
vious facts make the study of Islamic philosophy a parochial enterprise
insofar as philosophical thought is concerned. Putting aside the few
exceptions to the rule, those who study Western philosophy have no
interest in Islamic philosophy because it is mere intellectual history,
and those who study Islamic philosophy study it as part of Islamic cul-
tural history because they have no training in philosophy. 
From a comparative standpoint we have to ask ourselves if Islamic
philosophy has any place in the global philosophical scene today. Fur-
thermore, we have to ask if Islamic philosophers, both intellectuals and
professional scholars, are prepared to take Islamic philosophy beyond
classrooms and academic meetings. It will be too simplistic to claim
that since Islamic philosophy is no longer a living tradition it has to be
studied as history, and its relevance, or
lack thereof for modern thought, has
no bearings on its academic study.
There is nothing wrong with studying
an intellectual tradition from a histori-
cal and cultural point of view. The
problem arises when that tradition is
construed as only history. This is espe-
cially the case in philosophy where
pure historical analysis, no matter how
successful it is, is not always the best
aid to understand a particular philo-
sophical problem. Compared with
Hindu or Buddhist philosophy, there is
less and less interaction between Is-
lamic and Western philosophy and I
believe the current study of Islamic
philosophy as a historico-philological
field contributes to this problem. 
On the other hand, the perception of
Western and Islamic philosophy in
Muslim countries is saddled with even more acute problems. In Turkey,
for instance, Islamic philosophy is studied only at divinity schools, the
reasons given for this are clearly more ideological than pedagogical.
Those who study Western philosophy in Turkey and other Muslim
countries believe that they study philosophy per se, and that all other
philosophical traditions are either divergences from, or steps towards,
modern European philosophy. Turkish President Sezer expressed this
deep-rooted Euro-centrism present even in Muslim majority countries
in his opening speech when he proclaimed, to the astonishment of
hundreds of philosophers from different corners of the world, that
Ôphilosophy must be modern and secularÕ as if one can give such a law-
like definition of philosophy. TurkeyÕs official state ideology still under-
lies much of how one studies both Western and Islamic philosophy in
Turkey today. Paradoxically, this narrow definition of philosophy as an
ideology of secularism excludes not only non-Western ways of think-
ing but also a good part of Western philosophical tradition. Needless to
say, this was very much reflected at the various sessions of the Con-
g r e s s .
It will be a historic moment when Western philosophers open them-
selves up to other modes of thinking and especially to Islamic philoso-
phy that shares a long history with Western philosophy. The absence of
such a possibility at the present time makes the concept of Ôworld phi-
losophyÕ a euphemism for ÔEuropeanÕ philosophy. In a similar way, the
scholars of Islamic philosophy are responsible for taking Islamic philos-
ophy beyond a mere study of intellectual history. This will require
training a new generation of philosopher-scholars in both Western
academia and the Muslim world. Let us hope that the future conven-
tions of the World Congress of Philosophy will create more impetus for
expanding the meaning and relevance of philosophy in the world
t o d a y .
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In spite of calls for
multiculturalism right and left,
the question remains: Is Western
philosophy ready to open itself up
to a dialogue with non-Western
ways of thinking? 
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The research agenda for Islamic law
has been best encapsulated by
Muhammad Khalid Masud: ÔIn order to
gain greater understanding of the
working of law in Islam, a twofold ef-
fort is necessary. On the one hand, we
must examine how Muslim jurists tried
to develop a balance between legal
and social norms, and how they rooted
the normative basis of shari'a in social
practices. On the other hand, we need
to recognize the significance of the
public space for the social construction
of Islamic lawÕ (1991: 14). The two is-
sues concerning ÔpublicÕ space and the
balance between ÔlegalÕ and ÔsocialÕ
norms are related in complex ways and
provide an ideal point of entry to a dis-
cussion on the development of minori-
ty f i q h in contemporary Europe. 
Public space
The contemporary motivation for making some public space avail-
able for the construction, recognition and application of Islamic law for
European Muslims lies in the principle that European liberal democra-
cies must be tolerant of minorities. Historically, this principle of toler-
ance took the form of allowing minorities individual political rights
that ensured them a protected private space within which they were
free to choose their own social practices. For example, Muslims are free
to practice their religion in private. This principle was subsequently
given greater force by the non-discrimination principle which ensured
that as well as the right to act as they wanted in private, it was impor-
tant to accommodate minorities, even if in a limited way, in key areas
such as employment and education. In some countries there are
arrangements which prevent discrimination against Muslim women
who wear a headscarf or which allow Muslims to pray and fast whilst at
work or at university. Finally, and most recently, the principle of toler-
ance of minorities has taken the form of multiculturalism which is the
idea that minority cultures and practices should be accommodated
within the public sphere. Muslims may, for example, be invited to par-
ticipate in public ceremonies or the State may officially recognize
some Islamic religious festivals.
Balancing legal and social norms
Individual member states of the European Union (EU) have respond-
ed in different ways to diverse cultural and religious minorities. The UK
and the Netherlands, for example, have opted for modest multicultural
policies which seek to accommodate (where possible) the most press-
ing needs of religious minorities such as Muslims. Other legal systems
have responded with more assimilationist measures. Space exists for
the application of Islamic law in the private sphere such as in realms of
family and inheritance. The European
constitution (which is in draft form and
includes a Charter of Fundamental
Rights), which applies to all EU member
states, addresses many of these issues.
More significantly, there is now also rel-
evant EU Ôhard lawÕ including the Race
Directive (2000/43/EC) which ensures
non-discrimination on the grounds of
race in areas such as employment and
the provision of private and social
goods. The Framework Directive
(2000/78/EC) requires non-discrimina-
tion on the grounds of religion in em-
ployment and training. Both provisions
provide some resources and will gener-
ate legal rules that recognize and ac-
commodate some of the key religious
practices of individual Muslims.
The term Ôlegal normsÕ carries different meaning when used in different
contexts. First, legal norms refer to the norms of the domestic or EU
legal system, such as rules that require the prohibition of religious dis-
crimination in employment. Second, legal norms refer to the rules of Is-
lamic law or minority f i q h that individual Muslims treat as authorita-
tive. It is worth noting that issues about the relationship between legal
and social norms arise at both levels. An analysis of whether there has
been direct or indirect discrimination against Muslims raises a number
of issues about the social practices of Muslims. Questions are likely to
arise about social practices such as time off for prayers, wearing head-
scarves in the workplace and in public places, provision of facilities to
allow Muslims to break their fast, and whether a beard is obligatory.2
Muslims will look to Islamic legal rules such as minority f i q h as a guide
to their religious practices. Those who interpret and apply legal norms
(let us call them the ÔMuslim communityÕs legal institutionsÕ) will in turn
be influenced by social norms that prevail within their community by
their perception of the priorities and needs of individual Muslims at
that time, and by the context in which they are being asked to interpret
and apply Islamic legal rules. The two systemsÑthe domestic and Eu-
ropean institutions on the one hand, and the Muslim community insti-
tutions on the other, are likely to influence each other. 
Professor Masud writes: Ô [É] in order to translate shari'a into a work-
ing law, even in the form of f i q h, it has to dig deep in social norms for
its normative bases. Legal norms cannot be realized without their
foundations in the social normsÕ (Masud 2001: 14). This insight is espe-
cially important in the context of minority f i q h in contemporary Europe
where Islamic legal rules are dependant on social acceptance rather
than enforcement through state authority or coercion. Local Muslim
communities in Europe have and will need to construct imaginative
ways to adapt themselves to the inter-face between Islamic legal rules
and the majority legal system. Where there is no conflict between the
two systems this encounter can be amicable and Islamic legal rules
Law & Society
The presence of large number of Muslims in
Western Europe in the last thirty years has
given rise to considerable challenges for
Islamic law and Western legal systems. Can
the legal rules and institutions of Islamic law
be applied to contemporary Western Europe
where Muslims are a minority? How should
liberal democracies accommodate Muslims
who continue to grant authority to Islamic law
in their daily lives and social practices? Do the
two sources of legal norms conflict, and if so
can this conflict be resolved or managed?
T h e satisfactory resolution of these issues
depends on developments in a system of
Islamic law for Muslim minorities which is
often termed minority f i q h (fiqh al-aqalliyat).
I t is also dependant on getting the general
theory of Islamic law right. 
Accommodating Muslims
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may be comfortably accommodated. In Britain, for example, the dou-
ble tax (stamp duty) has been eliminated for those who prefer Islamic
mortgages. There are also well known examples of accommodation in
areas such as family law. The new EU anti-discrimination legislation will
facilitate the process of modest accommodation of Islamic legal rules
within European States. 
The inter-face between the two systems also provides Muslim com-
munities with an opportunity. Professor Masud has noted: ÔAt the so-
cial level, slaves, women, and non-Muslims suffered most from the
inner contradictions between shari'a ideals and social norms in Muslim
cultures. The ideal of the shari'a called for freedom, equality, and jus-
tice, but social stratifications in Muslim societies on the basis of status,
sex, and religion did not allow these ideals to be fulfilledÕ (ibid.: 6). The
development of minority f i q h within a framework of European consti-
tutional values which take freedom, tolerance and equality as their
starting point may not be as problematic as some may imagine. It may
provide a catalyst for re-discovering the ideals which underpin legal
norms within the Islamic tradition. 
Tackling conflicts
Not only national and European, but also the institutions of Muslim
communities have good reason to avoid conflict between the different
levels of social and legal norms. These conflicts are a substantial barri-
er to Muslim minorities identifying
with domestic/EU legal and political in-
stitutions. The goal of overcoming the
social exclusion of Muslims is a key
issue for the majority and the minority.
Conflict has the potential to cause
harm to individuals and hinder the in-
tegration of Muslims into the econom-
ic, social and political mainstream in
Europe. Ensuring greater access to
economic and social goods is also a pri-
ority for Muslims who recognize that
access to basic resources is a pre-requi-
site to moral and spiritual excellence.
But what happens when there is a con-
flict? The spectre of a conflict between
Islamic legal rules and the require-
ments of domestic /EU law raises the
most profound challenges. The per-
sonal anguish of those who are unable
to comply with their legal obligations
as citizens and their obligations as members of a religious community
should not be under-estimated. How should such conflicts be re-
solved? 
First, if the main reason for providing Ôpublic spaceÕ or recognition to
Islamic law within European states is to facilitate the freedom and
equality of minorities then this provides a useful guide for resolving
conflicts. One way of resolving any conflict is to take the motivation for
providing this Ôpublic spaceÕ within which Islamic law can serve as the
foundation for analysis. The reason that domestic/EU legal (and non-
legal institutions) are interested in Islamic law is purely instrumental: it
is part of their aim to ensure freedom, tolerance and equal treatment
of a significant minority group within the European Union. This pro-
vides a realistic framework for negotiating the inter-face between do-
mestic and EU institutions and the demands of European Muslims to
be governed by minority f i q h. The principles of freedom and equality
(whether in domestic or European constitutional documents) provide
the absolute minimum level for protection. Any calls for the accommo-
dation of Islamic legal norms in contemporary Europe must accept
these principles as non-negotiable principles of European constitu-
tional values. It may mean that in certain cases where the norms of Is-
lamic law conflict with European values, individual Muslims will not be
able to insist on the accommodation of their values. For example, Mus-
lims cannot simultaneously rely on anti-discrimination law to advance
their interests and at the same time argue against gender equality or
core values such as freedom of expression. 
Conflict between the values of European constitutionalism and the de-
mands of the Muslim community needs to be tackled explicitly rather
than ignored. Muslims need to undertake a debate within their own
communities about their priorities: e.g. what legal rules must be ac-
commodated and how should those rules be interpreted? Most chal-
lenging will be questions about how Muslims should react when faced
with conflicts between their legal norms and the fundamental non-ne-
gotiable principles of domestic and EU law. Successful resolutions of
these often intractable conflicts will be a painful process which re-
quires compromise and political maturity. However, this is the in-
evitable price that Muslims must pay as they move away from social
isolation and into participation in the mainstream of European soci-
eties. The debate needs to be broad and involve the full diversity of
Muslims, some of whom (such as women) have been excluded or mar-
ginalized in decision-making. In addition, Muslims must become in-
volved in public debate and mainstream political processes to articu-
late their demands. This means that they must enter into a much need-
ed discussion with the majority about the exact terms of the their sta-
tus as citizens in their countries and the European Union. If it is to be vi-
able and stable, any process of accommodation or multiculturalism
must pay attention not only to the needs of the minority but also to the
views of the majority.
The public space provided by developments in the European Union
for the construction of Islamic law may ensure greater coalescence be-
tween the social norms of European Muslims and BOTH (a) legal norms
of the domestic/EU system; and (b) the legal norms of Islamic law/mi-
nority f i q h. This has substantial bene-
fits for both systems. The EU is commit-
ted to freedom and equality for minori-
ties, as represented in its constitutional
values and anti-discrimination law. Ac-
commodation of the key demands of
Muslims through a recognition of
some aspects of minority f i q h could en-
sure a greater coalescence between
the experience of individual Muslims in
their daily lives (where they are guided
by Islamic legal rules) and their experi-
ence of majority normative legal and
political institutions. The result may be
a higher degree of willing co-operation
and identification with these institu-
t i o n s .
In this way domestic and European
institutions can recognize Islamic legal
norms as important because they pro-
vide freely chosen normative guidance
in the lives of Muslim citizens. Muslim community institutions need to
use this insight as the starting point for their own analysis. Muslims
communities in Europe need to develop mechanisms for decision mak-
ing that allow greater participation by the public and especially by
those who have been previously marginalised in decision making. Spe-
cialists and scholars of Islam need to understand and respond to the
social facts about the people who look to them for guidanceÑthe
Ôhere and nowÕ of the lives of European Muslims.This may have the
great benefit of ensuring that the authority of minority fiqh w i t h i n
Muslim communities derives from its acceptability to individual Mus-
lims rather than the exercise of coercive power. The contemporary
public space for developing minority f i q hÑwithin the limits of Euro-
pean constitutionalismÑprovides European Muslims with some at-
tractive opportunities. 
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If it is to be viable and stable,
a n y process of accommodation
o r multiculturalism must pay
attention not only to the needs
o f the minority but also to
t h e views of the majority.
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On the 10t h of August 2002, 22 men
from the Hashanat family were killed in
an ambush in a village in Upper Egypt,
an incident which was widely reported
in the local Arabic and English press.
The attackers were allegedly members
of the Abd al-Halim family who had
been in a feud with the Hashanats for
more than a decade. The feud started
in 1990 at a weeding when two chil-
dren, one from each family, got into a
fight. That incident led to the killing by
someone from the Halimi family of a
member of the Hashanat family and
was followed by two retaliatory killings: the first in 1995 of a Hashanati
and the second in April 2002 of a Halimi. The cars that were ambushed
on the fateful day of August 10t h were carrying Hashanat men to a
court session where two members of their family were on trial for the
April 2002 murder.
The succession of events leading up to the above massacre represent
an almost textbook depiction of a feud, though what is unusual is the
scale of the last incident with the killing not of a single person, but of a
large number of men from the same family. Journalists from the capital
largely interpreted the event as the result of the backward ÔclanÕ sys-
tem which prevails in Upper Egypt. Yet what rarely gets attention is the
important role played by a wide range of arbitration and reconciliation
institutions in curtailing the escalation of feuds and violence.
Attempts to solve disputes and contain
violence take place on a number of dif-
ferent levels. In daily life one may be
sure that when a brawl occurs in pub-
lic, whether in the marketplace or the
lanes of a village, somebody will at-
tempt to break it up. The intervention
will most often take place before any
serious blows are exchanged, or even
as soon as the first shouted exchanges
of foul language are heard. Oftentimes
older men will try to calm down or sep-
arate the parties involved. Such spon-
taneous interventions are also com-
mon when disputes erupt between families or spouses; elders in par-
ticular often use their influence and authority to try to find a solution
to the disagreement. In addition to these informal methods, there is a
range of other and more formal ways of settling disputes.
Councils and arbitration
Reconciliation councils are widespread in the southernmost parts of
Upper Egypt. These councils are known by different names including
majlis al-sulh (reconciliation council), majlis 'urfi (customary council or a
council that depends on tradition) and majlis al-'arab (Arab council).
Their objectives are to reach an Ôamicable settlementÕ (s u l h) within the
framework of ÔtraditionÕ (' u r f), that is, an Arab-tribal or Bedouin tradi-
tion (' a r a b), rather than through interpretations of the shari'a or state
law. These councils find solutions to disputes concerning land, water
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Feuds remain a part of the social fabric in
Upper Egypt and often get reduced in the
press as merely the result of backward ÔclanÕ
systems. Yet a wide range of arbitration and
reconciliation councils exists to deal with local
disputes including Ôblood feudsÕ. Even though
the media may not report on their successes,
councils frequently resolve conflicts and play
a role in curtailing the escalation of feuds and
violence. These councils underscore the
importance of reconciliation and peaceful
solutions, rather than violent ones, in Upper
Egyptian culture and tradition. 
Settling Disputes
in Upper Egypt
The killer is
p a r a d e d
through the
village with his
burial shroud. 
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in a house in the village. After having reached the house where the
murderer is waiting, he is handed his burial shroud (k a f n) and paraded
through the village to the tent where he is then escorted to a place in
the front which is kept free of chairs and spectators. The sheikh in
charge of the reconciliation will call out that the murderer is present, at
which time he arrives carrying his burial shroud. It is now time for the
family of the victim to come out and obtain their right (h a q q): the life of
the murderer. At this moment the family, which has been waiting out-
side the tent, enters and walks in the direction of the murderer. This is
usually the first time the family and the murderer meet after the killing,
therefore the situation is very tense. The sheikh repeats that it is time
for the family to take its right, but fortunately, instead of demanding a
life for a life, the two parties embrace. This central moment is followed
by speeches from the dignitaries who have been seated at a table at
the front of the tent. They thank those having arranged the truce and
the reconciliation and those who have been in charge of all the practi-
cal arrangements (the villagers) and in general terms about how both
religion and tradition support the idea of reconciling and avoiding
bloodshed. Other sheikhs will recite Qur'an and in the end all visitors
are invited to enjoy lunch with the people who have been in charge of
arranging the event. Lunch is served for up to 500 people at the time,
or in some cases around in the villageÕs many guesthouses where each
larger house or tribal section arranges the lunch. 
Councils in Upper Egypt garner great prestige and spend an enor-
mous amount of time and effort to resolve disputes. Unfortunately, the
cases which tend to get the most publicity are those in which the coun-
cils fail. Yet it is essential to point out that these meetings are much
more than a public event in which two families are being reconciled;
they are meetings which underscore the importance of reconciliation
and peaceful, rather than violent, solutions in Upper Egyptian culture
and tradition. 
rights, inheritance and cases where fights or violent acts have reached
a certain severity or caused injury to persons or property. Village lead-
ers or other respected local elderly men who have knowledge of the
communityÕs traditions organize the councils which may convene up
to several times a week. The elders invite and visit the disputing parties
and make sure that the necessary documents are present during meet-
ings. The councils have the authority to question the parties and wit-
nesses, determine fines and write documents. Although the work of
the arbitrators is done without payment, the councils incur expenses
related to meetings and depend on villagers to financially support
them. Meetings are most often held in a guesthouse (k h e m a) which is
either owned by one of the more well off families or by the tribes; own-
ers of the guesthouses cover the expenses stemming from the events.
Certain councils deal exclusively with disputes involving killings or
Ôblood feudsÕ. 
The Ôblood feudÕ councils
If a murder or accidental killing occurs, the accused is dealt with by
the state judicial system and is tried and sentenced in the ordinary
court. But after he has paid the penalty of his crime there is often a fear
that the family of the victim shall demand the death of the accused or,
in some cases, the death of one of his relatives. Therefore, both the
local communities and the representatives of the official system at-
tempt to contain the anger by trying to make the two families recon-
cile. The large councils dealing with killings and blood feuds are con-
sidered by many Upper Egyptians as the ÔrealÕ reconciliation councils,
even though they convene as little as twice per year. The council may
spend months or even years trying to negotiate a reconciliation be-
tween the families. Very few men have the authority and ability to deal
in Ôblood feudÕ arbitration, but those who do tend to be sheikhs. These
councils receive much attention due, in part, to the fact that they deal
with chilling stories of fights and feuds. Another reason for their noto-
riety is that thousands of spectators, visiting politicians and religious
dignitaries gather to witness families being reconciled. 
An event of this magnitude has to be arranged with a strict succes-
sion of events: When the spectators and dignitaries have gathered in a
large tent pitched by the villagers, the leading figures of the councils
will leave the tent in order to fetch the murderer who is usually placed
Law & Society
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Since the development of new institu-
tions in the late Enlightenment, the pri-
vate/public spatial dichotomy in the
West has broken down; as a result, pub-
lic and private spaces in Western and
Westernized cities have acquired similar
spatial characteristics and have even
become enmeshed. The prevalent di-
alectic of private and public allows peo-
ple to define themselves simultaneous-
ly as individuals and as public citizens.
In contrast, in some contemporary Mus-
lim societies the division of public/pri-
vate space is still arguably one of the
most important features of spatiality
and often centers on the female body.
The veil as ÔhabitatÕ
Architects usually think of ÔhabitatÕ as a manmade space or natural
environment occupied by a person or a group. A habitat can, however,
also refer to a non-architectural entity, such as clothing and veiling.
Such entities are directly related to our bodily acts, habits and even
ethics. Rosalyn Diprose maintains that the term ÔethicsÕ derives from
the Greek word e t h o s, meaning dwelling or habitat. Dwelling is both a
noun (a place in which one resides) and a verb (the practice of
dwelling). Dwelling is both a habitat and a habit-
ual way of life. This way of life, ethos, or set of
habits determines our character (Diprose 1994:
19). In both figurative and literal realms, DiproseÕs
etymological analysis suggests that an under-
standing of a habitual way of life centers on a
constitutive relation between oneÕs habitat and
oneÕs embodied nature. This notion identifies the
body as the locus of oneÕs ethos where the body
is constituted by a relation to its habitat.
In Iranian cultural contexts some connections
exist between conceptions of spatiality and the
c h a d o r. Applying DiproseÕs analysis to the rela-
tionship between Iranian womenÕs habitats, es-
pecially in public, reveals how women remain in a
secluded space behind the veil. Moreover,
womenÕs wrapped bodiesÑlike architectural en-
titiesÑinfluence the image of the environment.
Indeed, womenÕs bodies have always been cen-
tral in Iranian political discourse and in the con-
struction of public space. Soon after Reza Shah
came to power in the beginning of the twentieth
century, he embarked on a quest to modernize
the image of Iranian cities by ordering that the
streets be rid of the veil which was presumably a
sign of backwardness. 
In 1983 women were again obligatorily re-veiled,
creating a strong Islamic image for Iran. In post-
revolutionary Iranian political thought, the distinction between the
public and the private spheres has served both to confine women to
typically female spheres of activity like housework and to plunge them
into the public realm. Despite being allowed in public, women are se-
cluded from the outside world as their bodies are wrapped in the
c h a d o r. The chador works like a space for seclusion of the bodily ap-
pearance in the eyes of others. The c h a d o r, thus, functions first as a
portable habitat (reflecting the true meaning of c h a d o r, ÔtentÕ), re-
duced in size to the bulk of a womanÕs body. It also works as a stage set
for the audience (indicating a sec-
ondary meaning of c h a d o r , Ô s c r e e n Õ ) .
Janet Abu-Lughod points out that the
rules governing gendered spaces in
Islam have traditionally established
not only p h y s i c a l l y distinctive regions,
but also v i s u a l l y distinctive regions.
This idea has a long history in the dis-
course of Islamic architecture. Islamic
law has even regulated the placement
of windows, the heights of adjacent
buildings and the mutual responsibili-
ties of neighbors toward one another
to guard visual privacy (Abu-Lughod
1987: 167). The visual features of spa-
tial settings in Islamic architecture are, thus, as important as functional
aspects. The notions of visual privacy, as imposed on womenÕs bodies
in countries like Iran and Algeria, however, departed from their tradi-
tional meanings and carried a decisive political stamp; they shifted
from the historical stage to the level of political and institutional
frameworks. 
Images of womenÕs veiled bodies
In Iran the image of veiled women protesting in mass demonstra-
tions reinforces how images of wrapped bodies of women are mobi-
lized to create a new identity for Iran. WomenÕs veiled bodies appear
also in cultural products such as illustrated journals. Contrary to tradi-
tional beliefs about Muslim women, women are indeed present in the
public sphere. Post-revolutionary Iranian women are not associated
solely with the private because they seem to be everywhere in the out-
side world and because, ÔTo be outside is to be in the image, to be seen,
whether in the press photograph, a magazine, a movie, on television or
at your windowÕ (Colomina 1994: 7). Various right-wing womenÕs jour-
nals have reproduced images of the faceless chadori women, making
this image somewhat ubiquitous even now. 
In the images from womenÕs journals, women are not only faceless
but paradoxically bodiless too (fig. 1). Female readers should assess
their bodies according to the Ôother,Õ bodiless, selfless, and ultimately
mindless represented women. These images foreclose women from
their own desires and prevent them from taking full possession of their
own bodies. In contemporary Iranian artistic endeavors, a womanÕs
body becomes, once again, an ideological emblem. In contrast to real
life experiences, this emblem contradicts the post-revolutionary defin-
ition of womenÕs corporeality and protests against the mediaÕs defini-
tions of female corporality that puts women in a bodiless category. 
We can find specific evidence in the post-revolutionary period of the
interrelations of womenÕs bodies and space in Tehran by looking at the
first feminist-conscious enunciations that cautiously appeared in liter-
ature, cinema and conceptual art. 
Besides political regulations regarding art exhibiting and filmmak-
ing, there can be a great social pressure on women to omit details in
order to disguise truths about themselves. They have been drilled in
the rules of moral and Islamic discourse, thus internalizing censorship
from the outside into a kind of self-policing from within. Talking open-
ly about certain matters-Õtelling the truth about oneÕs own experiences
as a body,Õ as Virginia Woolf puts itÑÕis not niceÕ (Mairs 1995: xiii). The
proscriptions placed on Iranian womenÕs speech foster feelings of
shame that lead women to trivialize their own experiences and prevent
them from discovering the depths of their lives. Given the religious and
social constraints on womenÕs self-expression in public, exceptionally
few women have been able to break the silence. 
Body & Politics
Academic studies increasingly examine the
relationship between the social organization
of space, gender and sexuality in
contemporary Muslim societies. Such studies
tend to consider historical, socio-political and
religious notions associated with the veil, or
c h a d o r, as it is traditionally known in Iran.
Whether bound up with the concept of
male/female spatial binaries or closely
involved with aspects of space that create
visual and physical control, studies rarely deal
with the veil as an entity that can be
understood as a secondary space, or a ÔhabitatÕ
which clinches womenÕs bodies in public. 
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Body & Politics
In the realm of literature, Shahrnoush ParsipourÕs novels are among the
few feminist-conscious writings that appeared inside Iran in response
to limitations imposed on women by state ideology (Talattof 1998:
X V ) .1 Parsipour looks at the interrelation of body and space from inside
a chador! Perhaps she follows her own feelings to express psychologi-
cal conditions that can apply to most Iranian women. Parsipour is, in
fact, in search of a better correlation between space and womenÕs cor-
poreal existence. In her stories she describes the physical aspects of
womenÕs bodies, such as their virginity, their hair, their hands and their
heads in detail. More importantly, she relates these physical aspects of
the body to conceptions of spatiality. In her novel, Women without
M e n, ÔThe outsideÕ appears merely as a desire in the minds of the fe-
male characters. 
Conceptions of gendered spatial differentiation that traditionally em-
ployed boundaries and walls have, in fact, turned into implicit gen-
dered spatial zones both in residential space and in various public
venues of modern-day Iran. For example, women rarely sit in the cen-
ter of the living room when men are present. Similarly, in public places
women occupy the marginal zones. They choose the corner of the side-
walks closer to the walls or sheltered spots in public parks, restaurants
and coffee shops. In mosques the womenÕs section typically occupies a
corner; when a space is unevenly divided, usually by a curtain, the larg-
er section belongs to men regardless of the number of men and
women who are present. In addition, women are forbidden access to
some public places such as sports stadiums. 
The film director Samira Makhmalbaf finds many ways to illustrate
such problematic aspects of space in her movie The Apple (2001) as ex-
emplified in a scene when a social worker says in reference to two girls,
ÔThe problem is that they are girls. If they were boys they could have
played outside. They could even climb peopleÕs wallsÉÕ (Dabashi
2001: 271). The Apple symbolically shows Iranian womenÕs psychologi-
cal exile from the public space. 
In a somewhat similar manner, several young female Iranian artists
such as Shadi Ghadirian2 illustrate isolation of women from the public.
The walls that surround them are manyÑthe walls of their homes
(even the walls of domestic objects found in the kitchen as depicted in
GhadirianÕs works), the walls of their veils, and the walls of their intrin-
sic fears (fig. 2). In the face of harsh sociopolitical conditions, Iranian
artists have challenged many commonly held conceptions about veil-
ing and the c h a d o r. The c h a d o r creates a secondary space whose
boundaries can be folded and take shape in accordance with the
bodyÕs movements. A c h a d o r usually has no resistance to transforma-
tion. As the body moves the c h a d o r transforms and transfigures. The
c h a d o r in contemporary Iranian art becomes an emblem that is, in
MarxÕs words, Ôpregnant with its contradictions.Õ It creates a spatial
boundary and folds down a buckled space for womenÕs bodies; it can
also metaphorically unfold to function as a stage set filled with contra-
political messages for the audience. The female body transfigures as its
habitat moves, and consequently the ethics of womenÕs Ôproper placeÕ
shift from a genuine level to the stage of doubt and interrogation. 
It is perhaps no accident that the veiled female body is highlighted in
various cinematic techniques and in artistic skills used by Iranian film-
makers and artists. Indeed, subtle ideological discourses in recent Iran-
ian artistic endeavors are indissolubly tied to the female body. As such,
these works replicate a political consciousness that is, in Trinh T minh-
haÕs words: Ôas much the product of the eye, the finger, or the foot, as it
is of the brain.Õ (Trinh T minh-ha 1989: 39)
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What constitutes liberal education and
what are its boundaries? Such ques-
tions are perhaps best addressed in
moments of tension, when liberal edu-
cation is perceived as being under
threat. The appearance of a small num-
ber of students wearing the face-veil or
niqab at the American University in
Cairo (AUC) a foreign private university
located in Egypt, and Leiden University
(LU) a state university in the Nether-
lands, has emerged as just such a
threat. Despite significant differences
in their institutional histories and in
the national and legal contexts in
which they operate, face covering was
banned at AUC and LU. These bans were justified on remarkably simi-
lar grounds, at the core of which were arguments that face covering is
inherently incompatible with principles and practices of liberal educa-
tion. Yet the bans speak to issues far larger than pedagogy in liberal
educational settings; they get to the core of critical issues relating to
integration, liberalism, and the possibly uneasy place of Islam in it all. 
Comparative cases
During the fall term of 2000 a single Egyptian undergraduate student
at AUC majoring in psychology arrived to campus wearing a n i q a b . I n
the course of 2002-3 two undergraduate students of Moroccan origin
in the Department of Arabic, Persian and Turkish Languages and Cul-
tures (TCIMO) at LU did the same. In both cases the appearance of a
n i q a b wearer(s), or m u n a q q a b a ( t ) resulted in bans on face veiling. The
justifications for the bans were forceful and uncannily similar in both
contexts. In the case of AUC senior members of the administration rea-
soned that the presence of a m u n a q q a b a ÔdisturbedÕ classes, Ôdistract-
edÕ from group discussions, caused others ÔuneasinessÕ and ÔscaredÕ
staff and students. In January 2001 AUC issued a formal statement ban-
ning face veiling on the dual grounds that it presented security and
identification problems and was inimical to liberal arts education since
it inhibited Ôdialogue and intellectual interaction with colleagues and
with other members of the University community.Õ AUC further justi-
fied its ban by invoking a 1994 Ministry of Education order upheld by
the Supreme Constitutional Court in 1996 that forbids the n i q a b at na-
tional Egyptian educational institutions. AUCÕs policy forbidding the
niqab was subsequently included in applications for admission and in
its formal regulations regarding student conduct.
At Leiden University a small number of senior faculty members object-
ed to the presence of two munaqqabat in their classes on the familiar
grounds that face covering Ôimpeded interactive communication in the
classroomÕ and caused staff and other students to be Ôuncomfortable.Õ
They brought the matter to the Dean of the Faculty asking that the Uni-
versity take an official stand on face veiling. The Board of the Universi-
ty decided to officially ban face covering just days before the begin-
ning of the academic year 2003-4. The decision came on the heels of a
decision by the Equal Treatment Commission (case no. 2003-40) that
ruled that an institution for vocational training and adult education in
Amsterdam was entitled to prohibit wearing the n i q a b on the schoolÕs
g r o u n d s .1
The subsequent LU ban was inserted in
the highest level of university legisla-
tion and states, in short, that it is pro-
hibited to wear clothing or attributes
that cover the face in educational set-
tings within the university and during
examinations. The ban is justified on
grounds that Ôcommunication be-
tween student and teacher and
amongst students (or teachers) is in-
dispensable,Õ that Ôfacial expressions
are essential in communication,Õ and
that at examinations Ôthe identity of
the person taking the exam needs to
be beyond doubtÕ. The Leiden decision
was followed by a preemptive face-
covering ban at Utrecht University, since no students to date have
worn the niqab there. After some struggle, and given the late date of
the ban, the two m u n a q q a b a t students at LU were permitted to finish
out the academic year, however they are not allowed to remain at the
university until their anticipated graduation in two years time if they
continue to wear the n i q a b.
Contrasting legal and political contexts 
While the processes leading to face-covering bans at both AUC and
LU were remarkably similar, the legal and political contexts in which
the bans came about differed in some fundamental ways. In Egypt
the legality of the ban was called into question and led to a spate of
court cases in which two major questions were addressed: is the
niqab a requirement in Islam?; and does the niqab pose risks to na-
tional security? The latter issue relates to regime concerns dating to
the 1970s when intensive militant Islamic activities at national uni-
versities became widespread. Unlike AUC, a small, private liberal arts
university for the elite, EgyptÕs national universities have been con-
sidered a potential security threat and subsequently been under
heavy state security surveillance. The n i q a b, due to the fact that it
conceals the wearerÕs identity, obstructs mechanisms of surveillance.
In 1996 the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt overturned sever-
al lower courts rulings and upheld the niqab ban on the grounds that,
as stated in Article II of the ruling, ÔThe niqab is not stipulated for
under the preemptory provisions of the sharia. And it is in the inter-
est of the society that individuals are identified, in order to control
their conduct.Õ
Despite the court ruling, enforcing the n i q a b ban has proved exceed-
ingly difficult. Scores of students in EgyptÕs national universities wear
the niqab. At AUC the number of munaqqabat students has actually in-
creased from one to five students since the ban took effect. Technical-
ly, the AUC students argue that theyÕre complying with university reg-
ulations since theyÕve removed the cloth face cover that makes up the
n i q a b, however they replaced it with a piece of blank paper. When that
was forbidden, they walked about campus covering their faces with
their hands. Last spring the Vice-President for Student Affairs declared
in exasperation, ÔYou are not allowed to put clothes, papers, hands, not
even your finger on your face!Õ 2 Implementing the ban in an environ-
ment where even upper class AUC students are increasingly involved
in, or sympathetic to, the tenets of the growing pietistic movement re-
mains a challenge.
Current Issues
The appearance of a small number of students
wearing the face-veil or niqab at two
unrelated universities, The American
University in Cairo and Leiden University,
l e d to official bans on face covering. The bans
were justified on remarkably similar grounds,
at the core of which were arguments that face
covering is inherently incompatible with
principles and practices of liberal education.
Yet the prohibition of face veiling speaks
t o issues far larger than pedagogy in liberal
educational settings; it gets to the core
o f critical issues relating to integration,
liberalism and the possibly uneasy place
o f Islam in it all. 
Banning Face Veiling
The Boundaries of
Liberal Education
L IN D A  H E R R E RA  &
A N N E LI E S  MO O RS
Current Issues
In the Netherlands legal argumentations around face veiling bans
avoid specifically Islamic references, for this would be considered a
case of direct discrimination on the basis of religion.3 Hence, the term
Ôface coveringsÕ is employed rather than Ôn i q a b Õ . Still, in the above men-
tioned Amsterdam case the Equal Treatment Commission has ac-
knowledged that this phrasing constitutes a case of Ôindirect discrimi-
nation,Õ as it disproportionately affects those who adhere to a particu-
lar religious conviction (interestingly, the Commission didnÕt raise the
point that the ban can represent a form of gender discrimination as it
disproportionately affects female students). Indirect discrimination is,
however, allowed if there is an Ôobjective justificationÕ which makes a
ruling necessary. The Commission accepted the schoolÕs arguments
that face covering impedes communication, that the whole school
should be seen as a pedagogical setting (it should be noted that the
girls agreed to remove the face cover in classroom settings), that it hin-
ders identification which also poses a security risk and that it strongly
diminishes the girlsÕ chances for internships and future employment.
This decision was exactly what the Board of Leiden University had been
waiting for. However, whereas the Board had wanted to apply the Am-
sterdam order in its entirety, due to the intervention of student repre-
sentatives at the University Council, the ban was modified to apply to
classroom settings and exams only, rather than to all university build-
ings and grounds. 
Integration and the face
The emphasis on open facial communication as a central value of lib-
eral education, including the importance of student participation,
needs some closer scrutiny. One central element in interactive liberal
education is precisely that students are to be evaluated on the basis of
their ability to partake in rational debate and on the basis of the quali-
ty of their arguments. It is then remarkable that students wearing the
n i q a bÑpresumably just as potentially able as others to bring forward
their argumentsÑare a priori disqualified by the sheer fact that their
facial features are not visible. Such a perspective goes against the grain
of Habermasian notions of the modern public sphere where only the
force of arguments is supposed to count; it is rather grounded in long
standing assumptions commonly employed in such fields as physiog-
nomy that external appearance, including facial expressions, are a di-
rect reflection of inner states of being. Simultaneously, a highly ideal-
ized notion of the workings of the educational regime is employed. Ed-
ucation is not only about the exchange of ideas and the communica-
tion of knowledge, it is also about producing certain notions of self and
normative behaviors. It is precisely for these reasons that it was
deemed necessary in both cases to ban the n i q a b.
The sense of unease and feelings of discomfort some staff members
and university administrators at LU expressed when discussing the
n i q a b does not, however, only refer to (anticipated) problems of com-
munication. Something else seems to be at stake. They also referred to
the idea that by wearing the n i q a b these girls Ôset themselves apartÕ or
more explicitly Ôshow that they do not accept our central values.Õ In
other words, wearing n i q a b is not only seen as a challenge to the nor-
mative structure of liberal education, but simultaneously as a refusal to
integrate in Dutch society.
We need then to place these discussions about the n i q a b within the
framework of major shifts in the political landscape, the fall-out of 11
September 2001, of the right-wing anti-Muslim populism of Pim For-
tuyn, and of a political climate in which derogatory statements about
Arabs and Muslims appear increasingly to be more acceptable. These
factors came to the fore very strongly in the public reactions to the Am-
sterdam case. Prominent politicians belonging to a variety of political
parties all made statements against wearing the n i q a b; one even went
so far as to argue that if the girls would succeed in their appeal, na-
tional legislation ought to be drafted that would forbid wearing n i q a b
in all public spaces (in a phone-in radio programme, over 90% of the
callers supported this proposal).
That the ban of the n i q a b needs to be seen within the framework of a
changed political climate is strongly supported when comparing the
ruling of the Equal Treatment Commission on the Amsterdam case in
2003 with a very similar case in 2000, also about regulations prohibit-
ing face coverings at an educational institution. In the latter case (no.
2000-63) the Commission argued that there was no objective justifica-
tion for indirect discrimination and explicitly stated in its ruling that
wearing the n i q a b Ôleaves sufficient possibilities for communicationÕ
(also non-verbal) and that the school should take into consideration
that Ôin a multicultural society as the Netherlands not all groups in so-
ciety show their feelings through facial expression.Õ This is a very dif-
ferent position from that taken up in the abovementioned ruling of
2003. That wearing the n i q a b is seen as a refusal to adapt to Dutch
norms and values is further compounded by the way in which the
n i q a b is linked to a particular strand of Islam. It appears that the prob-
lem is not so much that these students bring a religious symbol into
the classroom, for the h i j a b, or headscarf has become more acceptable,
but that the n i q a b is linked to radical Islam. Such informally expressed
concerns cannot factor into official argumentation in the Dutch politi-
cal-legal setting, as banning n i q a b for political reasons would consti-
tute direct discrimination. Indeed the Equal Treatment Commission
has made it explicit that schools are not allowed to ban dressing styles
on the grounds that they express particular political points of view
(such as bomber jackets which can represent radical right sympathies),
as this would infringe on the principle of freedom of expression. 
In the Egyptian context a compelling set of political and security con-
cerns accompanied the policy of banning face veiling at national uni-
versities. In the case of the private, foreign AUC, however, security con-
cerns were overridden by arguments about the role of the university in
reproducing a particular type of liberal culture and accompanying nor-
mative behaviors. The practice of covering the face has been seen to
fundamentally contravene the universityÕs mission. Indeed as respons-
es to the niqab in both the AUC and LU cases illustrate, the practice of
face veiling has seriously tested the boundaries of who can and should
participate in liberal educational institutions as well as in liberal soci-
eties writ large. The point here is not to make light of the unease and
discomfort teachers may experience when confronted with students
who cover their face. Rather, the question is whether feelings of dis-
comfort are valid grounds to ban particular forms of dress and, subse-
quently, specific categories of students from the university? Should the
wearing of the n i q a b be understood implicitly or explicitly as a refusal
to integrate into the values of liberal universities, and, by extension,
liberal societies? Is banning the most suitable way of responding to dif-
ference, or might the university be better served
by embarking on an openended complex process
involving debate, inquiry and dissent in a manner
that could lead to the expansion, rather than nar-
rowing, of the boundaries of liberal education?
N o t e s
1 . The Equal Treatment Commission monitors
compliance with the Dutch Equal Treatment
Act which prohibits discrimination in
education and employment on grounds
such as religion, sex, race, and political
o r i e n t a t i o n .
2 . The interview was with Mohamed Farouq
A l-Hitami and cited in the AUC student
newspaper The Caravan, Issue no. 17, Vol. 8 3 ,
March 9, 2003.
3 . The Commission does not discuss whether
wearing n i q a b is an Islamic requirement.
I t considers it sufficient that a category
o f persons believes it to be such.
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Is the n i q a b
c o m p a t i b l e
w i t hl i b e r a l
p e d a g o g y ?
N A D I A  F A D I L Studies focusing on Muslims in Europe
are growing at a rapid pace. While the
subject of study is not new, the perspec-
tive is. Long considered guest workers in
Flanders, the Netherlands and Germany,
Muslims in Europe whose children con-
stitute the Ôsecond generationÕ are now
being studied increasingly from a reli-
gious, rather than a migrant labor, point
of view. In Belgium research on these
communities used to be largely policy-
oriented and focused on the communi-
tyÕs socio-economic problems. The more
recent research is more concerned with
ÔcultureÕ, with the newest trend being to focus on Islam and the possible
emergence of a specifically ÔEuropean IslamÕ. The collective hypothesis
that seems to be forming is that in coming years Islam will adapt to ÔnewÕ
European structures in a way that will enable Muslims to consider them-
selves full European citizens. One advantage of this hypothesis is that it
frees both scientists and concerned Muslims from having to choose be-
tween over-simplified categories of ÔsegregationÕ and ÔassimilationÕ.
Scholars no longer have to render Muslims exotic, nor do they have to ne-
glect their specificities. ÔMuslimsÕ can ÔintegrateÕ themselves in this new
European context and call themselves Ôfull membersÕ without necessarily
assimilating themselves into the dominant group. Their differentiating
identity is religious and thus transnational and neutral, not ethno-nation-
al. The consensus that this model offers both parties accounts in part for
the growing scholarly attention paid to ÔEuropean IslamÕ. 
A secularized Islam? 
Various studies about how Muslims live and organize themselves in
Western Europe have been carried out under the rubric of ÔEuropean
IslamÕ. Yet these studies have remained mainly outside the field of the
sociology of religion despite its well-established tradition of interpreting
the different tendencies present in religion. If a ÔEuropean IslamÕ is really
developing, a necessary question one might ask is how this Islam inter-
acts with the secularized context in which it has been translated?
Secularization is one of the most-commonly used concepts to typify
Western Europe and its relation to religion; for many it refers to the end
of religion. Yet secularization, as treated in the sociology of religion, re-
lates to the changing relationship of religion in society as modernization
takes place. Religion loses influence in spheres such as politics, econom-
ics and education and plays a role mainly in ethical and moral aspects of
life. As such, secularization implies neither an end to, nor a disappear-
ance of, religion; it simply refers to the transformation of religion in a
ÔmodernÕ era. 
At the level of the individual ÔbelieverÕ, this change becomes mani-
fest through the process of religious individualization: religious prac-
tice is no longer the consequence of prescription, but rather of choice.
The term Ôreligious b r i c o l a g eÕ has been used to emphasize the centrali-
ty of individual choice in this construct (Dobbelaere 1999; Hervieu-
Lger 1994). Another characteristic of the secularization process is
c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z a t i o n whereby people
seek religious answers only for specific
fieldsÑmainly moral and ethical is-
sues, while other fieldsÑlike politics or
economyÑare not associated with a
religious discourse. Yet do these con-
cepts hold up? Through in-depth inter-
views with Moroccan girls aged be-
tween 16-18 living in Antwerp (Bel-
gium) about their faith and religious
engagement, we can test some of the
propositions about religious individu-
a l i z a t i o n .1
Religious individualization
Several authors have recently pointed to an active process of indi-
vidualization in Islam. Babes argues, for instance, that notions of indi-
vidualization can be found in the Qur'anic distinction between n i y y a,
the one with unselfish faith and pure intention, and the m u n a f i q, or
hypocrite who practices without faith (1997, 2000). According to Babs
this distinction indicates that individual faith, the ÔIslam du coeurÕ as
she calls it, is appreciated much more than social Islam: this dimension
of faith, she concludes, is far more important to most Muslims than the
question of whether Ôthey may eat with the left hand or if saving
money is forbiddenÕ (authorÕs translation, 2000: 189). 
Through interviews with Moroccan girls about what they consider
Ôbegin a good MuslimÕ, we can assess normative attitudes. Nora, for in-
stance, describes a good Muslim as someone who Ôfollows the rules, all
the rules and not just those you like.Õ She explains that praying regu-
larly and fasting during Ramadan is an obligation, not a choice, and
says, ÔItÕs not like I choose praying, Ramadan too, but I donÕt go to
Mecca because itÕs too expensive. ItÕs no travel brochure, is it?!Ó 
Clearly, the description she gives of a good Muslim is not one in
which Ôindividual choiceÕ plays a central role. To her, Islam cannot be a
matter of individual choice and she casts a doubt on the very essence
of religious b r i c o l a g e. Rather, to be a good Muslim, she believes that
one has to be consistent in religious practices and follow the e n t i r e
story. This emphasis on ÔorthopraxisÕ was not only expressed by Nora,
but came up repeatedly by other girls who emphasized the impor-
tance of following a l l rules and conveyed the belief that Islam should
be applied to all spheres of life. They seriously call into question the le-
gitimacy of notions of religious b r i c o l a g e or compartimentalization of
religion from other aspects of life. When another girl Amina, for exam-
ple, evaluates her religious practice, she makes a clear distinction be-
tween herself and what she calls r e a l Muslims: by noting, ÔÉthere are
only few people who are real Muslims. There are only few who can say
about themselves: ÔIÕm Muslim, MuslimÕ. IÕm Moroccan, I believe in
Islam, but I donÕt really pray to be a real Muslim. They [the real Mus-
lims] live really strictly according to the rulesÑand thatÕs really diffi-
cultÑyou really need to have a will for it.Õ Though Amina says she be-
lieves in God and the importance of Islam, she clearly does not seem
to be satisfied with the way she practices her religion. 
M i g r a n t s
Research on Muslim communities in Europe
has recently shifted focus from labor and
social policy concerns to issues of ÔreligionÕ
and ÔcultureÕ. In particular, there has been
a growing interest in the possible emergence
of a specifically ÔEuropean IslamÕ.
T h r o u g h examining the religious attitudes
and practices of Muslim girls in Belgium,
t h e author investigates the viability of
a ÔEuropean IslamÕ and in so doing poses
questions about the nature of secularization,
free will and individualization of religious
practice and belief. 
Muslim Girls
i n B e l g i u m
Individual Freedom
t h r o u g h R e l i g i o n ?
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M i g r a n t s
This idea of being a bad or inadequate Muslim is also reflected in the
words of Iman who describes the sense of guilt she feels about her
poor religious commitment. She says, ÔIÕm not a good Muslim, IÕm
everything but a good Muslim.Õ When pressed about why she consid-
ers herself a bad Muslim she explains: ÔSometimes I donÕt pray out of
laziness. É sometimes I have boyfriends, and thatÕs not allowed.
Sometimes I lie, thatÕs also not allowed. I donÕt wear a headscarf, thatÕs
also not allowedÉ. Last week in the Mosque I started to cry. There was
an Imam who really gives himself to Islam, he was reading a part from
the Qur'an and I started to cry really hard on hearing that part. IÕm just
a really bad Muslim, I want to be better.Õ The dimension of practice is so
essential to Iman that her failure made her cry during a sermon. Her
weakness is lived as guilt, as a sin. What is described here is far from a
legitimate b r i c o l a g e. Individual orthopraxis is seen as an essential di-
mension of faith for individual religiosity. 
Though all girls seemed to agree with the fact that being a good
Muslim is a matter of total practice, none of them applied Islam prop-
erly. As Amina said, ÔitÕs really difficult to be a good Muslim.Õ For being
a good Muslim as they see it involves a total investment of oneself into
religious life, an investment one may never attain. Yet these same girls
conveyed a second version of how to be a good Muslim which seemed
to be closer to their personal spiritual quest, in which the notion of the
i n d i v i d u a l is more central. As Amina explained, ÔÉ if you believe in your
heart and as long as you think of yourself as a Muslim, and you believe
in God and you find the values of Islam important, then you can call
yourself a Muslim. But you donÕt have to listen to all the others who say
Òto be a Muslim you have to pray, you have to wear a headscarfÓ every-
body decides it for themselvesÉ.Õ Amina clearly emphasizes the ele-
ment of faith or what Babs describes as the religious n i y y a. Further-
more, she explicitly criticizes the ÔcommunalÕ influence in religious
practice. This seeming contradiction in describing a Ôgood MuslimÕ
could be observed in the remarks of several other girls. When asked the
question, ÔDo you think youÕre a bad Muslim if you donÕt agree with
some rules?Õ Nora responded, ÔI donÕt think so. You try, and as long as
you try you are Muslim I think. If you donÕt agree with something, you
have the right not to agree.Õ
On the one hand Nora was convinced that a good Muslim should re-
spect ÔallÕ rules. On the other hand, she insisted on individual choice in
faith and both challenges and criticizes the ways in which social pres-
sures surround religious practice. When talking about Islamic religiosi-
ty and individualization, what seems to be refuted is the communal in-
fluence over religious practice rather than an individualized and ÔfreeÕ
relationship towards religious prescriptions. The girls criticize religious
practice when it falls under the supervision of the community. Hence,
religiosity is translated as an e x c l u s i v e but t o t a l sacred relationship be-
tween God and the individual (Roy 2002).
Individualization through religious prescription
A way to overcome the seeming tension between the ideal of Ôfree
willÕ and conformity to religious prescription is simply not to see them
as such. Rather than view Ôfree willÕ as being jeopardized by acts of reli-
gious conformity, we can consider it as being obtained through a
search for religious prescriptions that legitimate individual choices. To ob-
serve whether this process of individualization is happening, it would
be interesting to observe to what extent ÔnewÕ interpretations are con-
structed which try to legitimize the ÔunlegitimizableÕ. SelmaÕs views
about the prohibition of marriage between a non-Muslim man and a
Muslim woman can provide some insight on this point. She notes, ÔI
read a text a few months ago in which a daughter of a friend of the
Prophet was married to someone, of the same kind, but he was an un-
believer, and she loved him until he finally converted. He was an unbe-
liever, but she married him.Õ These different observations seem to sug-
gest thatÑwhen speaking about Muslims in
Western-Europe who primarily identify themselves
through a religious lensÑan important reconsid-
eration of the definition of individualization is to
be made, namely: its dissociation from the process
of secularization. Concerning Muslims in Western
Europe we seem indeed to observe a process of
individualization which is not occurring in a Ôsec-
ularÕ way, but precisely through their ability to in-
terpret religious prescriptions.
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N o t e
1 . The data were collected from 2000Ð2001 and
are based on 23 in-depth conversations with
Moroccan girls aged between 16 and 18 and
living in the city of Antwerp (Belgium).
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Programme in 2004:
The Multicultural Society:
Representations in the Media, 22 January 2004 
To what extent do news reports on Islam and Muslims
contribute to knowledge of Islam and to what extent
does it entrench existing stereotypes?
New religious and social movements and
established organizations, 19 February 2004 
What is the standpoint of new movements and
established organizations such as the Arab European
League (AEL), the foundation Ben je bang voor mij
(ÔAre you afraid of meÕ), FORUM (Institute for Multicultural
Development), the foundation Islam & Burgerschap (ÔIslam
& CitizenshipÕ), and Koerswijziging.nl (ÔChange of courseÕ). 
Marriage, 18 March 2004 
What is the attitude of various ethnic and religious
groups in the Netherlands towards the institution
o fm a r r i a g e ?
Holy Books, 22 April 2004 
Literary-critical consideration of the holy books of three
monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
Concluding Meeting, 20 May 2004
The main themes of the series will be reviewed and
discussed. 
Venue of all meetings is Felix Meritis,
Keizersgracht 324, Amsterdam.
E n t r a n c e Û 7,50, lectures and discussion are in Dutch
L E C T U R E  A N D  D E B A T E  S E R I E S
The ISIM and Felix Meritis lecture and debate series 2003Ð2004
The Multicultural City: Images and Structures
The series explores the irreducible variety of multiculturality as if in a city walk.
Main themes include building, living, and consuming,
but also demonstrating, protesting, and debating.
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is, however, currently not engaged in
the training of imams. The Mosque of
Paris has also participated in similar
developments and in 1993 set up a
seminary that was ridden with prob-
lems, almost since its inception.3 F u r-
thermore, the recently created Institut
Franais des tudes et Sciences Is-
lamiques, as well as the Turkish move-
ment, Milli Grsü, also aim to develop
training programmes for imams. The
Conseil des Imams de France, founded
in 1992, has thus far had only a modest
role in this respect, and in the current
circumstances, strongly risks to be marginalized by the CFCM, which is
not cooperating with the Conseil des imams, according to its secretary
general, Dhaou Meskine. This lack of cooperation has, in fact, recently
led Meskine to openly contest the competence of the CFCM in dealing
with the training of imams, claiming that the CFCM is only an Ôadminis-
trative organÕ. 4
The Transformation of Islam in France
In order for the CFCM to become a truly efficient partner of the
French government in its Islam policy, work must still be done inside
the Muslim community. This is, however, only one of several issues
raised by the current discussions on the training of imams. More im-
portantly, these discussions make one wonder just how much leverage
the reform of the imam system would really offer to Islamic organiza-
tions and to the French government. Are imams really the Ôforemost
representativesÕ of Islam in France? How would such a reform affect the
religious life of French Muslims?
The insistence on the need to gallicize imams is based upon a specific
view of Islamic life that accords the ÔmosqueÕ a dominant role as the
place for prayer and sermon in the life of the average Muslim. Consid-
ered mutually reinforcing, the imam is seen as the major agent in the
transmission of Islam and the mosque as the centre of Islamic life. In
most western European countries, however, the structure of Islamic life
differs notably from this perception. As a number of authors have
noted, many ÔmosquesÕ in Europe serve as multi-functional community
centres. Besides being used as gathering places for prayer, these
mosques also serve as the focal point for various groups and, more
generally, for the social life of the community. This fact can be ex-
plained in relation to the near absence of migrant-specific institutions,
which thus turns mosques into key elements in the development of a
community infrastructure. The fact that subsidies for mosques are
often granted based on the incorporation of social and cultural pro-
grammes into the scope of the mosquesÕ activities, also contributes to
this trend.
However, the impact of migrant-specific factors on the diversification
of the mosqueÕs function should not lead one to overlook the parallels
between this development within Islam and the general transforma-
tion of religious life in Europe or other parts of the world. The function
of Christian churches has also undergone important changes in the
past decades. Community life, which was once focused on Sunday ser-
vices, has become decentralized and fragmented, and now takes place
Current Issues
Since the early 1990s, Muslim organi-
zations, activists and French politicians
have been discussing the complex
issue of how to organize the training of
imams in France. These discussions
seem to have recently entered a new
phase. In connection with the creation
of the Conseil Franais du Culte Musul-
man (CFCM) earlier this year, it seems
the debates might soon be leading to
their first tangible results. According to
leading French politicians, one of the
primary tasks of this national represen-
tative body is to reflect on the develop-
ment of an officially recognized curriculum for imams in France. Vari-
ous other public bodies, together with the ministry of the interior, are
also currently investigating the modalities for the training of imams in
France. The issue is being addressed by the newly installed Commis-
sion, headed by Bernard Stasi and created by President Chirac, in order
to review the current conditions for implementing the principle of l a  c-
it. In May, the French minister of education assigned the historian,
Daniel Rivet, the task of outlining a possible syllabus for French imams.
Everything thus indicates that the current government is continuing
along the path France embarked on in the late 1980s when it assumed
a much more direct role in the institutionalization of Islam in France in
order to accelerate its gallicization.
The State and the gallicization of Islam
How great would the contribution of French-trained imams be to the
aim of gallicization? In the speeches of French politicians, particularly
in the last months, the creation of training facilities for imams in France
has become a kind of necessary condition for the harmonious incorpo-
ration of Islam into French society. Imams, Ôthe foremost representa-
tivesÕ of Islam in France, in the words of the minister of the interior,
have to be ÔintegratedÕ and trained in France in order for Islam to be
fully integrated into the Republic.2 According to the government, the
perceived menace of foreign extremist preachers is to be circumvent-
ed by increasing the currently very low percent-
age of Francophone imams in France (fewer than
50%)Ñthe percentage of French imams not even
reaching 10%. Indisputably, this is not an easy
task. The above figures show that the creation in
the early 1990s of seminaries for the training of
imams in France has had a very limited influence
on the make-up of this group. 
Interestingly, the three major Islamic federations
have all made attempts to establish training facil-
ities for imams, albeit with varying success. The
Union des Organisations Islamiques de France
(UOIF), for example, is currently involved in the
running of two interrelated seminaries, the first of
these established in 1991-1992 in the rural area of Chteau-Chinon.
The French convert, Didier Ali Bourg, in cooperation with the Fdera-
tion Nationale des Musulmans de France (FNMF) and the Islamic World
League, founded in 1992 the Institut dÕtudes Islamiques de Paris, cur-
rently called Centre dÕtudes et de Recherches sur lÕIslam. This institute
There has been a growing political urgency in
several Western European countries to
institutionalize and create facilities for imam-
training. With the formation of the Conseil
Franais du Culte Musulman (CFCM) earlier
this year1 the French government aims to
create a uniform training system for imams.
This state-sponsored institutionalization of
Islam offers more ÔtraditionalÕ organizations
the opportunity to appropriate ÔFrench IslamÕ,
possibly at the expense of alternative
structures that have emerged in the French
Muslim community over the last few decades.
Training Imams
a n d the Future of
Islam in France
Are imams really
the Ôforemost
representativesÕ of
Islam in France?
on a variety of levels and in different
forms. Nowadays, the church, as Wuth-
now puts it, tries to Ôprovide communi-
ty in several distinct ways.Õ5 The ongo-
ing Ôdivision of labourÕ inside the
churches has manifested itself primari-
ly in the rise of small groups that are
particularly well placed to meet the
need for belonging in their often tran-
sient manifestations. While the institu-
tional set-up of Islamic communities in
France is, of course, far less developed
than that of the church communities,
one can nevertheless see a similar
process in motion, which, since the
1990s, has been intricately linked to
the ÔinstitutionalizationÕ of Islam. As
many authors have noted, the number
of age, gender or purpose-specific
groups has been constantly increasing
in French Muslim communities. Partic-
ularly in the 1990s, a host of educa-
tional associations and youth or
womenÕs groups were founded in
France. In the context of a latent intra-
generational conflict, these associa-
tions are often particularly important
for young Muslims who are thus able
to create a religious space conform to their specific needs.
This development has important consequences for the role of religious
authorities, most notably, for the imam. The imam, as head of the
mosque, is no longer necessarily the spiritual reference for all the
ÔmembersÕ of the community. Imams are working inside a complex net
of groups and associations, where informal and formal authorities min-
gle and where the profile of the latter keeps changing. Be it in circum-
scribed local groups or in the broader based media space, Muslim in-
tellectuals and activists of various forms play an increasingly important
role in the life of the community. The emergence of these persons, who
have access to a variety of media, further weakens the role of religious
institutions in the production and dissemination of religion. Next to
the traditional institutions of transmission, audio tapes, books, maga-
zines and websites have become key elements in the teaching and dis-
semination of Islam. Publishers such as ditions Tawhid, along with
websites like http://www.oumma.com, have demonstrated the possi-
bilities that entirely new organizational forms offer for the communi-
cation of religious knowledge within French Islam. With more than
120.000 subscriptions to its list server, oumma.com pursues ambitious
projects and attempts to establish cooperative ventures with foreign
Islamic institutes of higher learning, thereby indirectly contesting the
work of Islamic organizations and their seminaries in France.6
Looking at this emerging Islamic mediascape, one wonders if the cur-
rent debate on the training of imams is well founded. It is based on the
assumption that the current state of Islamic religious life and imams in
France is ÔproblematicÕ and that Muslims have to be assisted in the
process of ÔorganizationÕ. And while the relative lack of funds obviously
limits the organizational possibilities of French Muslims, this does not
mean that they are simply trapped in a state of stagnation or power-
lessness. The new forms of religious community and authority that
French Muslims have developed in the last decades are based on de-
centralized and sometimes temporary structures that often do not need
the support of complex and costly institutions. While these develop-
ments have, in part, been imposed by necessity, they nevertheless also
correspond to the profound transformations that religious life in West-
ern Europe has undergone. The upsurge in small community groups,
which could be interpreted as a decline in the imamÕs position of au-
thority, is not solely attributable to the incapacity of the latter to com-
municate with young European Muslims, but also to the fact that small
groups are often better adapted to new conceptions of community.
Likewise, the lack of a more uniform or centralized structure of religious
authorities is of course, partly a result of national, ethnic and doctrinal
divisions in the Muslim communities. However, the current pluraliza-
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tion of heterogeneous authority structures also corresponds to, and is
indirectly supported by, a general trend in EuropeÕs Muslim communi-
ties to move away from life-long affiliation with a specific mosque or or-
ganization and towards temporary or multiple associations.
Creating religious authorities 
Considering these developments, the current attempts in France to
create a uniform training system for imams demand the taking into ac-
count of at least two interrelated issues. In France, as in other coun-
tries, the stateÕs search for representative and powerful interlocutors
within Muslim communities has, thanks to the cooperation of Islamic
organizations, ultimately resulted in an often unacknowledged at-
tempt to create these representatives. The creation of seminaries and
the fostering of a group of French-trained imams will thus not only im-
pact upon the future theological developments in French Islam, as is so
often hoped; these developments will also affect the structure of reli-
gious life. In order to be truly effective, these institutionalizing at-
tempts will have to initiate a substantial transformation in the basic
structure of French Islam by shifting the centre of religious life back to
imams and to mosques as dominant places of prayer and sermon. The
process of state-sponsored institutionalization that French Islam is cur-
rently undergoing thus presents the paradoxical possibility that the
present structures of religious life, which have emerged, in part, out of
an adaptation to the ÔFrench contextÕ, will be re-
modelled and partly appropriated by more Ôtradi-
tionalÕ organizational forms, whose functions and
adaptation to the current situation can be debat-
ed. The ongoing experiments with Islamic semi-
naries and training programmes for imams will
thus not only lead to a definition of the ÔdesirableÕ
theological and professional profile of imams in
France, but, more generally, they will show if it is
possible to remodel the historically developed
community structures of French Islam by reap-
praising the role of official religious authorities
and unified community structures in the twenty-
first century. Both issues are, of course, interde-
pendent, but it is the latter which will decide the
future role of institutionalized Ôreform move-
mentsÕ in French Islam.
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and garagesÕ, and which is supposed to
express its attachment to the Ôfounding
values of the RepublicÕ and, for instance,
support the ban of the Islamic scarf in
state schools and condemn Ôcommuni-
tarianismÕ. This distinction, used at all
levels of French public institutions, be-
comes a quasi-scientific category that is
employed by political leaders, exploited
in the media, and that structures main-
stream perceptions. It should be noted
that the ÔmoderationÕ of so-called ÔgoodÕ
Islam is not characterized in entirely the
same way in France and Great Britain.
Dominant discourses and perceptions
on questions regarding the place of reli-
gious or secular communities are not held in common. These opposi-
tions and differences in perceptions and founding myths (Republic vs.
Multiculturalism) do not however mean, as often thought by main-
stream analysis, that France and Great Britain embody contradictory
models on the matter of relations with the Muslim ÔotherÕ. 
Significantly, ÔgoodÕ Islam is portrayed to be authentic, the one and
only ÔtrueÕ Islam. Simultaneously, ÔbadÕ Islam is not only deemed ÔbadÕ be-
cause it promotes social or political practices that are viewed as harmful,
but also because it is supposedly wrong at the theological level and
thereby opposed to the ÔtrueÕ teachings of the Qur'an. Public institutions
have thus granted themselves the right to determine the authentic na-
ture of Islam. These public institutions do not escape the essentialist ap-
proach that considers this religion to exist independently of its followersÕ
divergent social practices. 
And while ÔgoodÕ Islam is Ôintegrated into the national communityÕ,
ÔbadÕ Islam is seen as essentially foreign, imported through Ôtransnation-
al networksÕ, connected with Ôinternational terrorismÕ and thus not pos-
sibly ÔFrenchÕ or ÔBritishÕ. Nicolas Sarkozy, French Minister of the Interior,
once asserted, ÔWe know that in the garages, in the caves of certain sub-
urbs, hateful and intolerant discourses are still being held in the name of
Islam. This Islam of disparity should not be [that of the Muslims of
France] since it does not have its place in France.Õ6 ÔBadÕ Muslims thus
represent an enemy from within that is directly connected to the inter-
national sphere, and to situations of conflict in the Muslim world. In De-
cember 2002, the French police arrested members of a so-called
ÔChechen networkÕ, which was considered to be linked to just such inter-
national terrorism. This linkage, highlighted by the official discourse, is
meant to de-legitimize non-conforming Islam. Imams in particular, are
stigmatized and believed to be the main agents of the process of foreign
importation. As Sarkozy put it in an interview, ÔIt is important that the Re-
public dialogues with Muslims. It is an issue of appeasement. What I
want is precisely an appeased and moderate Islam. I would add that this
mutual recognition also gives us more ability to fight the few imams that
transgress the law and preach violence and anti-Semitism. These should
be expelled.Õ7 Notably, Sarkozy refers only to ÔforeignÕ imams, those who
can be expelled, as the only ones who preach violence.
Significantly, all the social practices that are considered negative by
dominant views are believed to be imported and are said to have noth-
ing to do with local political and social issues. In the framework of the
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCSA), voted into existence by
the British Parliament in November 2001, suspects are explicitly con-
The publication of Edward SaidÕs Orien-
talism in 1978 inspired a long series of
critical studies on the representation of
Islam and Muslims in ÔWesternÕ media
and politics. These studies, of varying
quality and interest, focused on the way
dominant discourses essentialize and
stigmatize Islam and the Muslim World.
It was to be expected that mainstream
reactions in North America and Europe
to the September 11th terrorist attacks
would constitute an elaboration on
those types of depictions. And indeed
many popular books, articles and edito-
rials published after 9/11 have insisted
on the allegedly intrinsic links between
terrorism and Islam. While true that Islamophobia is not new and that it
has been transmitted by various media, experts, and political parties and
organizations,1 it appears that, at least in Europe, 9/11 and its aftermath
have given rise to much more complex and ambiguous reactions than
were initially apparent.
For reasons having mainly to do with the proliferation of anti-discrimi-
nation norms and regulations, as well as the growing demographic
weight of Muslim citizens, the ministers, members of parliament, and
judges in France and Great Britain did not portray Islam or the Muslim
community as being responsible for the terrorist attacks of 9/11. A few
days after 9/11, Tony Blair stated that, ÔBlaming Islam is as ludicrous as
blaming Christianity for loyalist attacks on Catholics or nationalist attacks
on Protestants in Northern Ireland.Õ? Lionel Jospin, the then French Prime
Minister, similarly asserted that, ÔIt must be clear that this fight against ter-
rorism is waged neither on Islam nor on Arab or Muslim countries.Õ? These
sorts of statements underscore a specific feature of post-9/11 reactions
from public institutions, most notably in both Great Britain and France,
which can be called the selective stigmatization of Islam and Muslims. 
As Mahmood Mamdani4 and Jocelyne Cesari5 observed, the 9/11 at-
tacks created conditions that required a distinction within dominant dis-
courses between what is considered ÔgoodÕ and ÔbadÕ Islam. Obviously,
this type of stigmatization is not new, and therefore 9/11 cannot be con-
sidered a total point of rupture with the past. The attempts to explain the
1979 Revolution in Iran and the actions of the Hizbollah in Lebanon, by at-
tributing these to the supposedly divergent nature of the Shi'a and Sunni
Muslims, already expressed a similar stigmatizing conception. Yet, with
the attacks in New York and Washington, this stigmatization has become
much more significant and has been quite systematically used by French
and British public bodies to legitimize certain government-adopted poli-
cies. 
Modalities of stigmatization 
The selective stigmatization of Islam and Muslims is based on certain,
usually implicit, characteristics that appear in the dominant social dis-
courses. First of all, so-called ÔgoodÕ Islam (as opposed to ÔbadÕ Islam) is
seen as moderate and must therefore explicitly and continuously con-
demn Ôpolitical IslamÕ, stick to dominant views on international and
local issues and be vigorously opposed to all forms of terrorism.
The current conservative French government makes just such a dis-
tinction between Ôbad IslamÕ and the preferred Ôopenly visible IslamÕ (ÔlÕIs-
lam au grand jourÕ), which is strictly opposed to the ÔIslam of the caves
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nected to the outside; thus some sections of this act that concern the de-
portation and detention of so-called Ôsuspected international terroristsÕ
(Sections 22 and 23) and exclude any protection under the refugee con-
vention (Sections 33 and 34), apply to foreigners only. The case of Abu
Hamza al-Misri, former preacher of the Finsbury Park mosque, reveals
the resolve to externalize the so-called ÔbadÕ Muslim. Those, like Labour
MP Andrew Dismore who support the act, directly applied section 4 of
the new Asylum, Immigration and Nationality Act that came into force in
April 2003 to Abu Hamza. This act enables the state to revoke the British
citizenship of immigrants who are considered to Ôseriously prejudice the
United KingdomÕs interests.Õ The revoking of Abu HamzaÕs British nation-
ality and, as a result, his possible deportation, permitted the government
to stress even more his supposed foreignness. 
Materializing the distinction
Ever since 9/11 governments in both Britain and France have shown
themselves to be keen on ÔintegratingÕ those considered ÔgoodÕ Muslims;
that is, to institutionalize the relations with the so-called ÔgoodÕ faction of
Islam. The 9/11 events were conveniently used as an opportunity to in-
tensify the relations between the British Labour government and certain
Muslim organizations, particularly the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). In
France, the victory of the conservative government in June 2002 lead to
an acceleration of the process of the formation of the Conseil Franais du
Culte Musulman (CFCM).8 The creation of this top-down structured
council, basically controlled by the Ministry of the Interior and first initi-
ated (under a different name, and with different methods and organiza-
tions) in the beginning of the 1990s, is believed to be an answer to 9/11. 
In France, the new debates on lacit, and the specific law that could be
adopted to ban the Islamic scarf from state schools, have surfaced as the
direct responses of different groups to the recognition of ÔgoodÕ Islam as
promoted by the CFCM and the levels of government involved in its cre-
ation. David Blunkett, Home Office Secretary and author of the National-
ity, Immigration and Asylum Bill, passed in 2002, underscores the grow-
ing need for a critical revaluation of the concept of multiculturalism and
the assertion of specific values concerning the ÔintegrationÕ of Ôimmi-
grantsÕ. The institutional determination to include or, to use the more
common vocabulary of the Republic, to ÕintegrateÕ the ÔgoodÕ Islamic fac-
tion, goes together with the exclusion of what is considered to be the
ÔbadÕ one. The struggle against terror and the numerous negaative ef-
fects of this on the livelihoods of Muslims, are legitimized by the process-
es of inclusion regarding ÔgoodÕ Islam, in the form of the CFCM or the
MCB or otherwise, in mainstream discourses. 
Contrary to Great Britain, France did not formally adopt a state of ex-
ception after 9/11, yet the Labour government did add temporary
amendments granting police special powers to the ÔLaw on Everyday
SecurityÕ, which were unconstitutionally imple-
mented by Parliament in November 2001. The re-
enforcement of the ÔPlan VigipirateÕ (applied in in-
stances of high terrorist threat) took place imme-
diately after 9/11. Its stipulations also grant tem-
porary powers to the police and judiciary in order
to wage war against terrorists. The articles in the
ÔLaw on Everyday SecurityÕ connected to the new
Ôglobal threatÕ, amongst many other things, facili-
tate deportations from French territory and allow
for pre-emptive action against suspected terror-
i s t s .9 The Ministry of the Interior is now able to
justify the arrests of Muslim individuals by simply
stating, ÔThe coming days will allow us to see if
they are involved in serious affairs.Õ1 0
The selective perceptions and portrayals of
Islam and Muslims, and the ambiguous language
and messages that underlie the practices of pub-
lic bodies today, are important and possibly last-
ing characteristics of the relations between the
body politic and Muslims in the post-9/11 context
in France and Britain, and possibly in other Euro-
pean countries as well. The differences between
French and British approaches towards Islam are
much less real than they are often believed to be.
Post-9/11 has brought with it a consensus on the
nature of what constitutes the ÔotherÕ, thus blur-
ring the French republican and the British multi-
cultural models.
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In the months leading up to the US invasion of Iraq, I did not believe,
and said so in public, that Iraq was in any way directly responsible for
9/11, or that the Iraqi regime had any substantive links with al-Qa'ida,
or that it was likely that Iraq was actually able to field weapons of mass
destruction. I believed that Iraq had probably tried to obtain weapons-
grade plutonium, and I knew that it had actually
obtained centrifuges from Germany, as well as
the means to manufacture chemical and biologi-
cal weapons from Germany and the US. I sur-
mised, from a position of total scientific igno-
rance, that Iraq probably possessed most of the
ingredients necessary to manufacture weapons
of mass destruction, but that it was some way off
from actually doing so. 
I also knew that Iraq had one of the most vicious
and unscrupulous regimes in the Middle East, if
not the world; that Saddam Husayn and his
cronies had between them murdered and impris-
oned hundreds of thousands of Iraqi citizens, and
that any Iraqi who could escape from Iraq (and,
given the long and largely unguarded frontiers,
this was not too difficult) would do so. There
were, in January 2003, some two million Iraqis liv-
ing in exile in other Middle Eastern countries, in
Europe, especially in and around London, and in the United States. I
knew that an essential ingredient for peace and stability in the Middle
East, apart from a just and permanent settlement of the Israeli-Pales-
tinian issue, would be the removal of this terrible regime. And finally, I
knew that, much as they might desire its removal, the people of Iraq
were not, and for the foreseeable future would not be, in a position to
remove it by themselves. And for that reason, I supported an American
invasion whose ostensible objective was to remove this vicious dicta-
torship, knowing full well, that Saddam Husayn owed his own survival
throughout the 1980s to the support of an American administration
which included such knights in shining armour as George Bush senior
and his good friends Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. Perhaps I was
nave, but I could see no other way of removing Saddam Husayn. 
However, I pretty well withdrew my general approval of the action
taken by the US to remove the regime on 9 April 2003, 21 days after the
invasion was launched, the day on which Saddam HusaynÕs regime fell
apart. Every day since then has brought mounting evidence of the al-
most incredible bungling and incompetence which has attended the
American administration of the peace. It is not as if no one in the ad-
ministration had given any thought to what might happen after an
American victoryÑwhich, of course, could scarcely have been in
doubt. An article in the New York Times on October 18 reported at
length on a State Department project initiated in April 2002 involving
over 200 Iraqi lawyers, engineers and businessmen, divided into work-
ing groups Ôto study topics ranging from creating a new justice system
to reorganizing the military to revamping the economy.Õ Surprise, sur-
prise, the Pentagon ignored most of the projectÕs findings, which in-
cluded, for example, a much more dire assessment of the dilapidation
of the countryÕs water and electricity supplies than the Pentagon as-
sumed. ItÕs also fascinating that the working groups predicted that a
fair amount of looting would take place. It is regrettable, to say the
least, that some of the projectÕs cautionary findings were not acted
upon much sooner. It will be fascinating for future historians to try to
work out Ôwhat went wrongÕ; tawdry turf wars between the State De-
partment and the Pentagon are presumably at the root of much of the
mess. 
It is not entirely clear how or why the situation unravelled so quickly,
but here are some general pointers. In the first place, the invasion it-
self lacked the broad legitimacy which a UN mandate would have
conferred upon it. Undoubtedly, the reason why the invasion took
place when it did was a general sense, on the part of the US adminis-
tration, that the large body of troops which it had transported to the
region could not be kept in place there indefinitely. The Bush admin-
istration seems to have simply ignored the importance of taking the
international community along with it, as it has discovered at its ex-
pense. 
In the immediate aftermath of the attack on Iraq, when no weapons
of mass destruction were found and went on being not found, it was
argued that as Iraq was the size of California, it was not all that sur-
prising that US troops could not find anythingÑthey could not
search every nook and cranny over such a wide area. At the same
time, Rumsfeld and the US regional and field commanders, to this
day, assert that there are ample numbers of troops in Iraq. One can-
not have it both ways; if there are not enough troops to find the
weapons of mass destruction, then there are not enough to stabilize
or pacify the country, period. And then there were the issues of elec-
tricity and water. Obviously, the infrastructure had been in a mess
since the Iran-Iraq war, but it nonetheless seemed almost incredible
to many Iraqis that things took so long to be put right, in spite of sab-
otage and the difficulty of getting large electric generators into
place. 
Every day we hear on the news that another US soldier, another
group of Iraqi civilians, has been killed by forces still loyal to Saddam
Husayn, or by terrorists who have infiltrated the ÔporousÕ borders. Al-
most all these attacks take place in a relatively small area, the Sunni
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rectangle (rather than triangle) bounded by Baghdad, Takrit and Fal-
luja, and al-AnbaÕ, the provinces of Diyala and Dulaym. This was and
remains the heartland of support for the regime. Although Sunni
Arabs only form between 15 and 20 per cent of the population of
Iraq, they have nonetheless ruled the state since its foundation under
British auspices after the First World War. Under any future regime, it
is almost inconceivable that they will continue to do so. This particu-
lar form of resistance is probably not the expression of an especially
widespread sense of outrage at US occupation, although the inability
of the US to maintain order, and get adequate water and electricity
up and running again, means that the
US is not quite as welcome as it
thought itself entitled to be. This re-
sistance is a kind of last stand, an ef-
fort on the part of a fairly small group
of desperadoes who have no future in
a reconstituted Iraq and who feel that
they have nothing to lose. Obviously,
those behind such incidents are Sun-
nis, because there are no Shi'is in that
part of Iraq. But this is very far from
being a Ôreligious resistanceÕ, al-
though there are undoubtedly some
salafis, or Sunni fundamentalists, among
the resisters. More pertinently, Saddam
Husayn and his circle came from Takrit,
and were all Sunnis. But what is much
more important than the fact that they
were members of the same religious
sect is that they were all from the same
area, had gone to school with each
other, knew each othersÕ relatives, and
so on. So, to speak of ÔSunni oppositionÕ
is both misleading and disingenuous.
The US administration has made a
large number of serious mistakes. In
the first place, as I have already im-
plied, not enough troops were in-
volved in the conquest of the coun-
tryÑor at least, not enough to ensure
stability and security after the battle
for control had been won. Neither the
Iraqi army nor the Republican Guard
was properly disarmed, which is why
members of both groups have weapons which they are turning against
US soldiers. In mid-November, it was reported that American troops
killed three Iraqi civilians at an arms market ; that such an institution
could operate freely under present circumstances suggests an extraor-
dinary lack of perception on the part of the US. 
Perhaps the US civil administrationÕs greatest weakness is its apparent
lack of sense of direction, and what seems to be the lack of any real ex-
pertise among the expatriates who are being employed. For example, I
have read several reports on the general topic of Ôwhat should be doneÕ;
none of the authors are either country or regional experts. They are
worthy people who have worked at putting Bosnia back together again,
or in regenerating Kosovo, but they have not had any substantial Mid-
dle Eastern experience. 
The repressive situation within Iraq over the last thirty years made it
impossible to develop a viable opposition to the regime, which meant
that opposition forces and groupings had to come together in exile.
The US, perforce, reliedÑfar too much, in my opinionÑon those who
told it what it wanted to hear. Ahmad Chalabi, who had and still has al-
most no name recognition, let alone popular following, in Iraq, appar-
ently encouraged the US to believe that its soldiers would be Ôgarland-
ed with flowersÕ wherever they went. Chalabi, incidentally, was con-
victed of embezzling $300 million from a Jordanian Bank in the late
1970s. He alleges that he was framed by the Jordanian government
acting under pressure from Baghdad, but whatever the extent of Chal-
abiÕs actual dishonesty, his apparent lack of judgement should surely
disqualify his candidature for the leadership of Iraq, a project seeming-
ly high on the agenda of the US government and that of Professor
Bernard Lewis. The 84 year old Lewis, whose views are often taken
quite seriously in Washington, went on record recently as advocating
the restoration of the Iraqi monarchy. 
In July, the US created the 25 member Iraqi Governing Council, sup-
posedly the first step towards Iraqis taking over control of their coun-
try themselves. While it is not intended to be a democratic body, the
IGC is supposed to prepare the country for the transition to self-gov-
ernment. Unfortunately its functions are rather hampered by the fail-
ure, on the part of the CPA and the USÕ
proconsul Mr Bremer, to give even the
vaguest indication of a time frame for
this handover. As I said, I do not think
this handover should take place, for
some time, at least as long as the secu-
rity situation remains as uncertain as it
is. To hand over full responsibility for
security to the Iraqis with any speed
would most likely result in a version of
the kind of war-lordism we are familiar
with from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it
would be wise to give some indication
of the general direction the US envis-
ages things will be moving in, a road
map, to use a term devalued from an-
other Middle Eastern context.
Of course, in an ideal world, one coun-
try would not send an army of occupa-
tion to another, nor would it seek to
compensate for its military expendi-
ture by awarding a number of lucrative
post-war and reconstruction contracts
to its own nationals, in processes
which are obviously far from transpar-
ent, to say the least. I am highly critical
of the incompetence and sheer stupid-
ity of US policy in Iraq. But willing the
US not to be there in the first place is to
deny reality, however uncomfortable
we may be with this. I do not know
whether, in the long term, the US will
succeed in what it claims to wish to
achieve, that is, bringing democracy to
the Middle East. Of course this laudable objective would also signal the
end, or the very great modification, of the present regimes in Egypt
and Jordan, not to mention those in Saudi Arabia and Syria, or IranÑal-
though there the people may, very painfully, manage that on their
own. Arab regimes are almost universally execrated by those who are
unfortunate enough to live under them, and they are often still in exis-
tence because of the support which they receive from the United
States. On the other hand, the construction, or the encouragement, of
democracy is not an unworthy aim. The main problem, in Iraq at the
moment, is getting it right, and I am not sure how long either the
American people or the more long-suffering people of Iraq can put up
with the United StatesÕ seemingly unending capacity to get it wrong. 
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Jordan has been a particularly interesting location to observe the
trends, patterns and dynamics of long-term emigration from Iraq over
the last period of Baathist rule. Between the 1991 Gulf War and the fall
of Saddam Hussein, circulation between Iraq and all its other neigh-
bours officially stopped periodically, whereas the flow of people,
goods and capital never ceased across the border with Jordan, which
remained IraqÕs primary economic partner. The Jordanian authorities
granted Iraqis almost unconditional entry; they allowed Iraqi interna-
tional businessmen and cross border traders to skirt the embargo by
using Amman as a base, tolerated the presence of the Iraqi intelligence
services, and even admitted Iraqi opponents as long as they were not
active politically. While airports in Iraq were closed due to the embar-
go, Jordan was the gateway to the outside
worldÑnot only for the Iraqi business and po-
litical elite who were travelling internationally,
but also for the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi
exiles who left the Middle East over that peri-
od. 
In Jordan ÔrefugeeÕ is an extremely loaded
term, and a legal, social and political category
that is almost exclusively the preserve of
Palestinians. Neither in the law, nor in collec-
tive representations is there space to consider
the Iraqis as refugees, and very few Jordanian
civil society structures have undertaken assis-
tance programmes for this group. The country
is party to no international legal instrument
relating to non-Palestinian refugees and has
devised no domestic framework for asylum
granting. It is the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) who is locally charged with
the task of determining refugee status and the
subsequent resettlement of refugees to a third country, usually in the
West. In this context, what have been the large Iraqi community mem-
bersÕ livelihood strategies in Jordan, and how has the Jordanian non-
policy towards them affected their migration trends over the last 12
years? 
Patterns of the 1990s
The number of Iraqis who have come to Jordan since 1991 and not
returned to Iraq, either staying in the Hashimite Kingdom or transiting
it, could be as high as 1,5 million. Before 1996, there were roughly
100,000 Iraqi residents in Jordan; most recently, there were about
350,000. Just before the April 2003 US and British military intervention
only 30,000 of them were legally permanent residents, while another
10,000 to 15,000 were temporary circular migrants. This left over
300,000 Iraqi exiles, 5,000 to 7,000 of whom were either asylum seekers
or refugees under the mandate of the UNHCR. The rest had mostly
overstayed their 6-month temporary visit permits and were remaining
clandestinely. Since the Gulf War, this group has been in constant re-
composition. New individuals keep arriving from Iraq, while others
leave Jordan to immigrate to countries further afield. There is, howev-
er, a stable core of legal and long-term illegal residents, the latter hav-
ing found the connections and protection that allow them to eke out a
living in the informal sectors of the economy and to avoid expulsion
back to Iraq.
During the early 1990s, mass emigration from Iraq took place mainly in
the direction of Iran, in response to the repression that followed the so-
called Shiite and Kurdish uprisings of 1991. Iran generally granted
Iraqis refugee status in one form or another, if not always the prospects
of local integration.1 Those who came to Amman with a view to staying
long-term consciously chose Jordan over Iran, a land with which they
had no political and often no religious affinity. Their decision to leave
mostly stemmed from a serious feeling of insecurity: a dramatic drop in
their standard of living ensuing from the deteriorating economic situa-
tion, sometimes coupled with harassment by the authorities. These
emigrants were among the most educated, starting the brain drain the
regime feared, and against which disincentive measures were soon
adopted: passport and exit fees were raised and family members left
behind were often harassed. These high costs reinforced the self-selec-
tive effects of migration by penalizing the less well off or those who
were unable to mobilize cross border and/or transnational social net-
works. 
As a result, one category of migrants came to Jordan with the aim of
activating family reunification schemes with the help of foreign em-
bassies and the office of the UNHCR in Amman. Canada, Australia and
the USA initially granted a number of immigration visas, as sponsor-
ship schemes for humanitarian refugees existed in most of these coun-
tries. All these options favoured those who already had close relatives
in Western countries, or who were members of communities long-es-
tablished in such countries and who could use communal associations
as sponsors. This was especially widespread among members of the
various Christian denominations.
Another important group was that of professionals who were initially
in demand in Jordan. Engineers, doctors, university professors and
artists were generally able to find employment in Amman, and were
granted residency and work permits. At a time when they could im-
prove their situation by integrating into the existing Jordanian job
market, that was the option many selected over attempting a dubious
legal or clandestine migration to a Western country, even when con-
sidering the good chances of being granted refugee status. Only a mar-
ginal number of exiles approached the Amman office of the UNHCR.
Most feared its infiltration by the Iraqi intelligence, which would mean
insecurity for those left behind. But as early as 1994 it had become al-
most impossible to find legal employment in Jordan and most Western
countries had stopped granting immigration visas, with many having
adopted more restrictive measures on family reunification. Until 1998
very limited possibilities for leaving Jordan remained; one could nego-
tiate a work contract with Yemen, Libya or Sudan which were short on
professionals, an option that tended to appeal more to Sunnis than to
Shiites or Christians. For the majority of Iraqi exiles in Jordan the only
alternative to staying was to attempt clandestine migration, mainly to
Western Europe. To meet this demand, a market for services to skirt
border control policies developed in Amman, the high costs again
favouring those who could access financial capital.2
Migration networks
Social networks were called upon to help meet the costs of both life
in Jordan and of clandestine migration. Iraqi Christians approached
the many well-established churches in Jordan. Religious solidarity was
mobilized to find housing, work, to receive assistance, to access free
M i g r a t i o n
From One War to Another 
Iraqi Emigration
t o J o r d a n
Neither in the law,
n o r i n c o l l e c t i v e
representations is
there space to
consider the Iraqis
as refugees.
M i g r a t i o n
medical services, or to register children in Christian schools. Jordanian
parish priests interceded to prevent deportation back to Iraq, and to
support visa applications or refugee claims. According to their indi-
vidual inclinations and the available social identities, other migrants
tried to reach out to comrades in the Jordanian Communist Party, to
professional associations, to fellow artists, to religious based Sunni
charities, or to the few notables of Iraqi origin whose families had be-
come well established in Jordan after the 1958 overthrow of the
Hashimite monarchy in Baghdad. These relations provided Iraqis lo-
cally unconnected by kinship ties with an entry into the patron-client
structure that is one of the driving forces of Jordanian society and
through which work and housing could be found. To meet the costs of
long-distance emigration, individuals indebted themselves to rela-
tives or close friends scattered all over the world. When the move was
planned in advance, part or all of the costs were gathered in Iraq, usu-
ally by selling properties. This entailed decision-making involving the
whole household, and often even an extended family. Strategic choic-
es were made as to which country to aim for, who should go first, and
who should stay in custody of properties. The subsequent reunion of
all family members was also carefully planned. Originally, exile mi-
grants to Jordan were mostly working-age males. But as their stays in
Jordan were prolonged, many wives joined their husbands together
with their children. Later, women came whose husbands were already
in the West and who had either asked for family reunification, or had
gathered enough money to pay for the rest of the familyÕs clandestine
journey. 
Shiite exiles
The year 1996 marked a turning point in the patterns of Iraqi exile mi-
gration to Jordan. In Iraq, a major wave of repression hit the Shiite reli-
gious establishment and any individuals who were suspected of being
pro-Iranian. Thousands who would have turned to Iran for asylum were
willing to flee Iraq. But crossing into the Islamic Republic had become
extremely dangerous now that the state-sponsored drainage of the
Southern MarchesÑthe traditional passageway of refugees into IranÑ
was almost complete and the border area heavily mined. Prospective
migrants thus looked to Jordan, albeit aware that they would not be re-
ceived as refugees, and that their sectarian affiliation and pro-Iranian
inclinations would be problematic. Self-asserting Shiites were very
much alien to Sunni or Christian Jordanians. No provisions in Jordanian
law allowed for the development of Shiite communal institutions such
as mosques; the Iranian Revolution was a model for no local political
current, and official relations with Iran were cold if not openly tense.
Because of the usual financial constraints, those Iraqi Shiites who fi-
nally made it to Jordan were once again members of the educated
middle class. They rarely had high financial assets, but expected their
educational and professional capital to be negotiable on the official
Jordanian job market. They soon found that the professional sectors
were saturated, and that, without relations on which to rely, it was ex-
tremely difficult to find even petty jobs, cheap and decent housing,
and to access a number of basic services. Confronted with what they
saw as unacceptable living conditions, the most well off did not stay
long in Jordan. They were ready to pay to reach the UK, which hosted
the largest Iraqi exile community in the West, and where Shiite insti-
tutions were well developed. The rest of these migrants, having ex-
hausted their savings on their exit and on their stay in Jordan within a
few months, experienced a sharp social downfall and what they
sensed as religious discrimination. Devoid of legal rights, including
those of practising their religion collectively or of getting married, di-
vorced or buried according to their rite, many now also lived well
below the poverty line in extremely poor housing and unsanitary con-
ditions, when they had once been among the intellectual elite of their
communities. They thus deeply resented having to live side by side
the lowest strata of Jordanian society. Unable to work legally, many
had to compete with unskilled Egyptians on the informal labour mar-
ket. Within a couple of years, a process similar to the one experienced
by the earlier wave of Iraqi exiles took place. Wives and children
joined men and specialized travel agents offered their services from
Amman to Western countries. 
The difference this time around was that pioneer Iraqi Shiites had been
being accepted legally in North America, Northern Europe and Aus-
tralia as resettled refugees since 1992. So those unsatisfied with their
lot in Jordan could now contact their kin who had stable legal status
and better economic conditions abroad. The latter thus sent funds to
the former, and a chain migration and worldwide dispersal of Iraqi Shi-
ites was then fuelled; this was in contrast to the previous waves of Shi-
ite migrants that had largely been absorbed into Iran. 
Iraqi Shiites also managed to locally develop their own support net-
works based on sectarian ties, although these groups never fully recre-
ated a structured community. Small-scale religious gatherings regular-
ly took place, scattered across various neighbourhoods in Amman,
each headed by a member of the clergy, often a young theology stu-
dent able to access resources within the worldwide Shiite community.
On a spiritual level, these gatherings gave a religious sense to mem-
bersÕ collective experiences as marginalized exiles. On a practical level,
they allowed for the exchange of information regarding the situation
in Iraq, livelihood opportunities in Jordan, and the possibility of further
emigration. Finally, they acted as financial support networks to cover
the costs of migration to the West, generally to the UK, which in some
cases served as a last step before finally reaching Iran. 
The recent regime change in Iraq has prompted a new category of
Iraqis to envision their futures abroad, those belonging to the layer of
the middle and upper middle class that was associated with the previ-
ous regime and which has capital. Jordan is again the main regional
pole of this emigration, from where Western EuropeÑif not post-9/11
North AmericaÑremains accessible, and where work contracts can be
negotiated again with Libya and Yemen to replace those Iraqis who
now think of returning. A limited trend of return migration is already
perceptible, in which Jordan is the last step before getting back to Iraq
to explore the possibilities of long-term return or the mere re-estab-
lishment of economic or social ties. Now that Iraqi migration has had
ample time to gain a transnational dimension, it is likely that chain mi-
gration through Jordan will continue until families are reconstituted
away from the Middle East, or until families reverse the direction of
their migration and reunite within Iraq. 
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The decorative application of henna has
recently become a globalized fad, espe-
cially among young people in cos-
mopolitan cities where tattoo culture
has set a trend in body art. Fashionable
shops from Europe and America to
Korea provide their customers with
henna drawings. In Muslim societies the
application of henna has a long tradi-
tion, dating at least to the time of
Prophet Mohammed. ItÕs believed that the Prophet regarded white hairs
on the body as ugly and accordingly said, Ôchange this whiteness of the
hair and of the beard with something and avoid blacknessÉ [T]he best
way to change whiteness is henna and k a t a m (another dying material).Õ1
Apart from its association with the Prophet, henna drawing rituals
had been a long-standing tradition in the Middle East, especially on the
occasion of the bridal ÔshowerÕ which is usually held the night before
the wedding. In addition to serving decorative and informative func-
tions, henna also played an important role in the social and festive as-
pects of the wedding. For instance, henna drawings were seen to pre-
pare the brideÕs body for her wedding night (a decorative function), and
also announced her marriage to others (an informative function). At the
same time, henna night represented a time when womenÑincluding
female relatives and friendsÑcelebrated in a segregated gendered
space where professional singers and dancers entertained them (a fes-
tive function). The henna party can thus be seen as a time when women
bid farewell to the bride before she left her natal home (a social func-
tion). It was also commonly believed
that henna night brought good luck to
a marriage.2
With changes in urban middle- and
upper-class cultures in the Middle East,
the henna ritual began disappearing.
Yet based on field research I conduct-
ed in Cairo from 2001 to 2002, it be-
came apparent that in some circles the
custom has been revived due, in part,
to the emerging commercial wedding industry in Cairo.
Henna night in contemporary Cairo
The term Ôhenna nightÕ can be deceptive as I found when I was invit-
ed to the henna party of 25-year-old Iman where henna drawings did-
nÕt make up any part of the celebration whatsoever.3 The henna night,
following tradition, was held at the home of the brideÕs parents. Multi-
coloured light bulbs were hung in a triangular pattern on their apart-
ment building to signal the event.4 I entered the party to sounds of
loud music and womenÕs z a g h a r i d (sound made to express a joyous oc-
casion). ImanÕs mother warmly greeted us with hugs and kisses and
after seating us served us small bottles of Pepsi. She told us that Iman
had gone to the coiffeur. Soon thereafter Iman entered the house
dressed in a long, snug-fitting gold-coloured evening dress signalling
the start of the henna night. 
For our entertainment taped music of Egyptian pop singers such as
Hakim and Amd Diab blared from the loudspeakers. We danced,
clapped and sang along to the music. Several other female relatives
and neighbours arrived and some of them took off their headscarves,
tied them around their hips and danced in the Oriental style swerving
their hips adeptly. Some girls changed into party dresses that they had
prepared especially for the night. Another guest brought her video
camera to record the nightÕs activities. When we tired of dancing,
ImanÕs mother served us chocolates, Pepsi and cakes and several
women gathered around Iman to ask her about her experience at the
coiffeur. The group then started to sing again, this time folkloric songs
about the love between a man and a woman. Some girls improvised
rhythms turning anything they could find such as a plastic vessel, a pot
and salad forks and spoons into instruments (in place of t a b l e ( d r u m )
and d u f f (tambourine)). Later, the girls presented the bride with some
gifts which included a silver ring, a small silver frame carved with
Qur'anic verses and expensive foreign perfume. After more z a g h a r i d,
the party came to an end.
I later began investigating why the actual application of henna didnÕt
make up a part in the nightÕs celebrations. According to older Egyptian
women whom I interviewed, the drawing of henna patterns in the
henna night seems to have been gradually disappearing since the
1950s and 1960s, or even earlier, except in Upper Egypt. Some said its
decline occurred when women first started entering the labour force
since working urban women and students found it inappropriate for
their skin to be stained for up to several weeks with henna drawings
(Morgan 1995:36).5 However, even though the tradition of henna draw-
i n g seemed to have become extinct in Cairo, the tradition of women
gathering the night before the wedding for the Ôhenna nightÕ contin-
ued. Since the late 1990s, however, some young middle-class and
upper-class Cairene women have revived the tradition of the actual
henna painting during henna night. Their interest in the art is often at-
tributed to the popularity of Sattouna, a Sudanese h a n n a n a based in
Cairo who draws traditional Sudanese patterns on the body with
henna paste. The tradition of hiring professional singers and dancers
(as opposed to relying on taped pop music) has also returned to Cairo.
The revival of henna night seems to be also attributed to the growing
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wedding industry in Cairo where it can be purchased as part
of a wedding package. Henna nights are now organized, di-
rected, and performed by professional groups who supply
the musicians, famous singers, dancers, and most critically, a
videographer to professionally record the entire event. The
current henna rituals seem to have changed from a ritual of
ÔcelebrationÕ to a commodity that can be ÔpurchasedÕ.
The commercialization of henna night
Interestingly, in the interest of Ôthe revival of traditionÕ, the
programmes of several henna nights that I attendedÑ
which were organized by one of EgyptÕs famous singersÑ
actually followed the rituals of the traditional henna night,
with the exception that women and men were no longer
segregated. In the new commercialized henna night party,
both the bride and the groom are adorned with ÔtraditionalÕ
items supplied by the nightÕs show director. While the bride
is entirely covered from head to waist and escorted by sev-
eral dancers in traditional garments, the groom is adorned
in the Turkish style, carries a walking stick and wears a red
fez (Turkish-style hat) on his head. The coupleÕs movements
are directed and controlled by the directorÕs cues in order to capture
the best moments for video recording. Following the performance, the
henna drawing ritual takes place. 
The commercialized henna night brings about a significant transfor-
mation in the traditionally segregated ÔfeminizedÕ space. Unlike the tra-
ditional henna night, the mixing of men and women in the current,
commercialized henna night festivities has blurred the divisions be-
tween gendered spaces. As a result, womenÕs expressions and move-
ments in the current mixed henna night festivities are more restricted
than in the past. The revival of the henna night serves as an example of
how ÔtraditionalÕ and ÔauthenticÕ practices get reinvented.
The current henna rituals seem
t o have changed from a ritual of ÔcelebrationÕ
to a commodity that can be Ô p u r c h a s e d Õ .
Patterns of henna on the brideÕs hand
Sattouna, who is a hannana, is drawing patterns on the brideÕs skin at the henna night.
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On 25 July 2003, one of the Islamic wel-
fare associations in Jordan, Al Afaf, held
its tenth collective wedding party in
Amman since its establishment ten
years ago. Fifty-two couples celebrat-
ed their marriage in a mass party at-
tended by thousands of visitors. The
party took place in and around the Is-
lamic Dar ul-Arqam school in an afflu-
ent Amman neighbourhood. The street
leading to the school building was
packed with cars, buses and invited
families. Banners welcomed the visi-
tors. Upon entering the school area,
men and women visitors were separat-
ed from one another, as men and women celebrate in separate parts of
the complex. There was excitement in the air. Men in green uniforms
from the Jerusalem Scouting Association walked around to maintain
order. An Al Afaf Association spokesman welcomed the visitors,
thanked Allah for enabling all those present to attend the party, de-
clared it a joyful occasion and presented the programme. Qur'anic
verses regarding marriage and family life were recited. Next, the
spokesman rose to the platform again, and spoke of the values of mar-
riage, sharing, solidarity and love. He expressed the wish that Ôthe fa-
therlandÉ be a land of love and welfare for everyone.Õ Several Islamist
male singing groups performed throughout the feast. They sang of
Allah the Almighty and the merits of marriage, and of the bride and
bridegroom. Mostly no musical instruments were used, except for oc-
casional drums. Nonetheless, the performances were rhythmic in char-
acter. Many men in the audience started to clap, and some danced. Fi-
nally, the fifty-two bridegrooms were led to the schoolyard by a group
of men in white k e f i y aÕs and traditional robes. Once in the schoolyard,
white foam was poured over the bridegrooms and a circle was created
in within which they danced. Towards the end of the party, d a b k e h-
dancers bared their fists and sang of liberating Palestine from the
ÔZionist enemyÕ. 
Marriage and family
Al Afaf is one of the many associations in Jordan founded and run
by people belonging (either formally or informally) to the Jordanian
Islamist movement. Al AfafÕs president, Dr. Abdul Latif Arabiyat, for
example, is a prominent leader of the Islamic Action Front Party, the
political wing of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. The associa-
tionÕs founders were alarmed by the lack of access to marriage for
many young Jordanians due to the high financial and material de-
mands of the wedding parties, along with the costs and demands in-
volved in starting a family. In their view, these high demands and the
inability of young people to meet them, could easily lead to the
spread of sexual immorality. The main activities of Afaf consist, there-
fore, in the organization of mass weddings, the provision of bridal
gifts and contributions, and also of interest-free loans to the newly-
weds. Moreover, the association organizes lectures and workshops
related to marriage and family issues and publishes books on these
topics. Within these domains Al Afaf emphasizes the traditional role
of the husband as the family provider, and that of his spouse as
housewife and mother. At the same time, the values of harmony, pa-
tience, mutual respect and understanding within marriage are
stressed. Abuse of the wife, a wide-
spread phenomenon in Jordanian so-
ciety, is firmly rejected in the name of
Islam. 
Al AfafÕs discourse regarding marriage
and family has a strong anti-materialist
and anti-consumerist component as
well. Mufid Sarhan, general manager of
the association, believes Jordanians
set their priorities incorrectly if they
wait until they have obtained a well-
paying job, a spacious home and a
beautiful car before they decide to
marry. ÔAccording to Islam,Õ Sarhan ar-
gues, Ômarital life and love is fundamental for the well being of the
human being. One shouldnÕt cherish too high material expectations in
this regard (É) material expectations should be lowered, and a higher
priority should be put to the importance, the warmth and the love of
marriage.Õ 
Solidarity or t a k a f u l between the rich and the poor is another vital
component of Al AfafÕs discourse. Arabiyat explains: Ôwe see two ex-
tremes in our society now. On the one hand, there are many people in
Jordan who are so poor that they do not have the means to have a sim-
ple wedding party, and on the other hand, there are rich people who
spend tens of thousands [of] dinars on wedding parties, and celebrate
them with a lot of glamour and with the aim to show off.Õ According to
Arabiyat, it would be better if the rich spent part of their money on
helping the poor to marry. Al AfafÕs collective weddings, to which
wealthy donors and companies contribute financially and in kind, are
an expression of this conviction. The wedding-parties are meant to cre-
ate an atmosphere of shared joy and togetherness, regardless of the
social ranking of the participants. The parties are meant to symbolize a
Ôbetter Islamic societyÕ, characterized by a spirit of modesty, coopera-
tion, and compassion; a society in which rich people spend part of their
wealth on the welfare and the social and educational opportunities of
the less privileged, rather than on their own social prestige. After all,
giving for the sake of the poor and the common good is giving fi sabeel
A l l a h, Ôfor the sake of GodÕ. 
Helping the poor, orphans, widows and the needy in general, fi sabeel
A l l a h , could be considered the most basic tenet in the discourse sur-
rounding the social work of Islamic voluntary welfare associations in
Jordan. All kinds of services to the underprivileged groups just men-
tioned, whether they consist of monthly payments of financial bene-
fits, distributions of food, clothes and blankets, i f t a r-meals during R a-
m a d a n, helping poor families to cope with social problems, providing
vocational training in areas ranging from sewing to basic computer-
skills and income-generating projects, ought to be given without ex-
pecting anything in return. Members and donors of the associations at-
tribute selfless human compassion towards others to t a q w a or fear of
God, and any activity emanating from that principle is considered to be
done for Him. Such activity is thus considered part of the Ôi b a d a t, as
much as as an observance of the s a l a t or the h a j j, for instance. In this
connection, concern with the after-life is often expressed as a central
element of the motivation for a Muslim to do social work. 
S o c i e t y
During the last two decades the voluntary
welfare associationsÕ role in providing social
services to the underprivileged in the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been
significantly enhanced. Important
contributing factors to this development have
been the process of political liberalization
since 1989, increased economic hardship and
rising levels of poverty (which were partly due
to continuous state withdrawal from the
domain of social welfare). Religious revival
has also been a key factor and has greatly
strengthened the role of voluntary
associations with an Islamic background. 
Islamic Voluntary
Welfare Activism
i n J o r d a n
S o c i e t y
Apart from the question of motivation, Islamic faith and discourse also
play a role in the tarbiya or educational programmes that these associ-
ations provide for the poor and orphaned, and for the wider public.
The centres for orphans and the poor belonging to the Islamic Charity
Centre Society, a nationwide welfare society widely considered as the
Ôsocial wingÕ of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, claim to have a
ÔcomprehensiveÕ approach towards the problems of the poor and or-
phaned. They provide lessons in Qur'anic recitation, t a f s i r, and rituals;
they help poor and orphaned children with problems related to learn-
ing at school; and they teach them a d a b or good manners and morals
in dealing with others in society and about various other health and so-
cial issues. Apart from that, they teach the mothers to bring-up their
children in a patient and friendly way and urge the client-families to
stick together. Older brothers or sisters are admonished to take re-
sponsibility for their younger siblings, and the latter are told to obey
the former. Working at achieving harmonious relations within family
and community is regarded as an essential Islamic duty. Preaching Is-
lamic values, like patience and thankfulness for what is provided by
Allah, is also regarded as part of the da'wa carried out by these centres
and associations. The objective of this mission is instilling a combined
sense of piety and dignity into orphans and the poor, and to prevent at
all cost the dreadful prospects of family-disintegration, addiction,
crime and immorality. 
Politics of welfare
Are Islamic voluntary welfare associations vehicles for the political
aims of the Jordanian Islamist movement? Representatives of these
associations vehemently deny any such political involvement. They
stress that they work under the authority of the Ministry for Social
Development and the Jordanian Law on Societies and Social Bodies,
which stipulate that voluntary associations are prohibited from work-
ing for any personal or political gain. There are actually religiously in-
spired Muslim welfare associations in Jordan without any links to the
movement. Dr. Musa Shteiwi, a sociologist at Jordan University, in-
sists, however, that at least those associations affiliated with the Mus-
lim Brotherhood clearly play a political role in, and mobilize support
for, this mainstream Islamist movement through their social work.
This view appears to be supported, for example, by the active in-
volvement of workers of centres belonging to the Islamic Charity
Centre Society in the election-campaigns of the Islamic Action Front
Party (IAF). The director of one of the centres for aiding orphans and
the poor in Amman, for instance, figured as an IAF-candidate dur-
ing the campaign for the municipal elections held on 17 July 2003.
That the public sympathy and respect Islamists enjoy in several local
communities through their social work is closely related to their po-
litical mobilization efforts, is highly probable. It is theÑoften multi-
pleÑroles of the people within and around these associations, with
all their social networks at their disposal, which shed light on topics
like the relationship between voluntary welfare associations and the
Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Action Front Party, the government-
sponsored z a k a t-comittees, other political and social institutions,
and the general public. 
There might be other reasons why representatives and members of Is-
lamic voluntary welfare associations do not like to be identified with a
particular movement or organization such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
They want to stress that their services and/or messages are available
and addressed to all members of the community, regardless of their
political or organizational affiliation. This seems to conform to the pop-
ulist message of Islamists who stress that Islam as a total way of life,
and as a social and political order, represents the true desires, aspira-
tions and needs of Ôthe peopleÕ as a whole, regardless of class, gender
and social standing. Their ideology claims to represent a Ôreligious
coreÕ among all Muslims (and among Christians) rather than just one
version of (political) Islamic discourse. As Mufid Sarhan, general man-
ager of Al Afaf stated: ÔÉ there isnÕt such a thing in Jordan as an ÒIs-
lamic association.Ó Of course, we give expression to Islamic norms,
morals and values in our work and our publications, but how could you
expect otherwise? After all, the overwhelming majority of the people
here are Muslims!Õ
Religion plays a dominant symbolic role in Jordanian civil society and
the public sphere, and this role has only strengthened since the events
of 11 September 2001. Dr. Abdallah Khateeb, the president of the Gen-
eral Union of Voluntary Societies in Jordan, certainly not an Islamist
himself, is sceptical about the concept of Islamic voluntary welfare as-
sociations, and stresses that all voluntary societies work on the basis of
religious principles related to compassion and solidarity with the poor.
Evidently, radical secularist voices in Jordan, which are explicitly ques-
tioning of the role of religion in political and social life, are marginal.
And while Islamist opinions on concrete issues might be countered in
the public sphere, this also often happens in the name of Islam. For in-
stance, in August 2003, when Islamist deputies contested the new di-
vorce (k h u l u) law giving women the right to divorce their husbands
without the latterÕs consent, arguing that the law would pave the way
for the disintegration of families, demonstrations were held in defence
of the new legislation. The demonstrators asserted that a harmonious
family-life could only be based upon the voluntary commitment of
wife and husband, and that the new interpretation of k h u l u was there-
fore in agreement with the principles of the s h a r i ' a. Government fig-
ures usually support the more liberal interpretations within Islamic dis-
course and since the regime has managed, so far, to determine the
rules governing public debates, Islamists are compelled to spread their
d a ' w a , to a large extent, through their social networks. 
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Edward Said was thoroughly secular; his secularism was not anti-reli-
gious as much as a-religious. His interest in Vico is indicative of his own
position. Giambattista Vico, in his New Science (1725), separated the
domain of the divine from the domain of the human, concentrating on
the latter in his analysis and using the terminology and concepts of his
time. He was interested in the history of the gentiles, a history made by
people and not the history ordained by God. Likewise Said was inter-
ested in human endeavor and history, in all that was made by human
beings, not by supernatural forces, and thus in what can be changed
by human beings. For Said, it is futile to discuss GodÕs ways partly be-
cause he had no taste for it, and partly because what can anyone say to
someone who tells you God is on his side? How can one have dialogue
and exchange with such ÔholinessÕ and ÔfundamentalismÕ? Once you
are one of the elect, or once you are
convinced that your people are the
Ôchosen peopleÕÑand chosen by no
less than God HimselfÑthen there is
no room for human intervention, no
place for human agency or endeavor.
Colonial hegemony, as Said shows in
his O r i e n t a l i s m (1978), was not simply
military and political, but also cultural.
The debasement of the Other Ðthe col-
onized Ðwas a necessary task to justify
domination. Wittingly or unwittingly,
European culture caved in under pres-
sures of racism in whose frontlines
stood colonial administrators and Ori-
entalists. Whatever humanistic vision
Europe had during the Enlightenment
was subordinated to the colonial dis-
course. It was easy to call on the me-
dieval hostility between Christendom
and Islam (not withstanding areas of coexistence between them) and
raise the specter of wicked and dangerous Muslims. Islam and Muslims
were then classified as both false and evil. Even though such a world-
view is essentially motivated by political considerations, the religious
zeal of missionaries and other Christian and Jewish fundamentalists
made use of it and disseminated a lop-sided view of Islam and Muslims.
Fair-minded as Said was, he could not tolerate this smearing of the
MuslimÕs image, this wholesale condemnation of a religious faith and
its adherents, thus he wrote Covering Islam (1981). The title itself has a
double meaning, for Ôto coverÕ indicates Ôto know fullyÕ and Ôto concealÕ.
The book uncovered how Islam and Muslim countries are misrepre-
sented in American media. Frances Fitzgerald noted that Ôevery foreign
correspondent and every editor of foreign newsÕ
should read it.
Said went further than revealing prejudices
against Islam and Muslims. He strove to learn from
Islamic thought, and to use the insights of Islamic
culture in his view of, and concern for, the relation
between humanism and knowledge. In ÔFoucault
and the Imagination of PowerÕ (1986), Said throws
light on Foucault through reference to the Muslim
philosopher of history Ibn Khaldun, sometimes
known as the Ôfather of sociologyÕ. Without reduc-
tiveness, Said shows affinities while at the same
time points to differences between the two. This
analogical and contrastive approach not only puts
those two minds on the same horizon, but also uses
each to elucidate the other.
One of the main paradoxes that Said as a critic tried to solve was how
the literary text is both timeless and time-bound. It is timeless in the
sense that we can read it, enjoy it, and learn from it even though it was
produced in a different age whose worldview is no more relevant to us.
It is time-bound as the text itself is very much a product of its context
and has strong bonds with the cultural environment that shaped it, in-
cluding the socio-aesthetic cross-currents of the time. Said is not the
first person to try to solve this seeming contradiction. Marx before him
in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1904) wondered
how man in an industrial world can enjoy Greek myths. His explanation
was that such a pleasure is a sort of nostalgia for mankindÕs childhood,
a recollection of an earlier mode of production. SaidÕs interpretation,
on the other hand, makes use of Islamic hermeneutics and exegesis to
explain this Janus-faced textual phe-
nomenonÑthe text being both histor-
ically anchored and trans-historical. In
The World, the Text, and the Critic
(1983), Said refers to the medieval An-
dalusian theologian, Ibn Hazm, who
solved the problem of actuality versus
textuality. He and other Zahirites saw
the interplay between the holy text
and its circumstantiality (embodied in
asbab al-nuzul, the study of the causes
and contexts of the revelations). Their
view of language as both immutable
and an instrument of contingency pro-
vided them with a view of the Qur'an
as both divine and worldly.
SaidÕs distinction between filiation
and affiliation made elegantly and
powerfully in the introductory chapter
of this book, entitled ÔSecular Criti-
cismÕ, reproduces for those familiar
with Islamic values the distinction made in the Qur'an between tribal
Ôa s a b i y y a, where solidarity is based on kinship, and the spiritual soli-
darity Islam preaches among fellow believers (Repentence IX: 24; The
Disputer LVII: 22; Apartments XLIX: 10). Though the context in which
Said is using these terms is unquestionably secular, his binary opposi-
tion parallels the distinction between blood solidarity of J a h i l i y y a ( p r e -
Islamic period) and solidarity which goes beyond blood to the bonding
of conviction and belief in post-Islamic society.
What Said was interested in when writing about criticism was to put
critical thought before solidarity. He was against secular cliques and
partisan loyalty, against sectarian politics and confessional identity. He
fought against blind adherence and mystificationÑbe it for a secular
creed or a religious dogma. Like a mujtahid par excellence, Said always
strove for critical thinking and innovative interpretation.
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Said was interested in human
endeavor and history, in all that
was made by human beings, not
by supernatural forces, and thus
in what can be changed by
human beings.
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Edward SaidÕs death was front-page news in the Netherlands and a
Dutch journalistÕs interview with him in 1999 was broadcast on nation-
al television. This is the kind of attention given only to intellectuals of
the stature of Sartre or Foucault. When he saw the interview on televi-
sion, Pierre Audi, the artistic director of The Netherlands Opera, said
that he had felt touched as though by the Allegro of BeethovenÕs great
symphonies. Audi dedicated his production of BerliozÕ Les Troyens,
which had its premiere that same week, to his friend. Said was a great
music lover; he wrote on classical music for the nation, and was a close
friend of the conductor, Daniel Barenboim. According to Said, Les
Troyens is not only BerliozÕ greatest work, but also a good example of
orientalism in its references to FranceÕs new domination of northern
Africa in the 1850s and 1860s. AudiÕs was a pleasantly cosmopolitan
gesture in an otherwise quite predictable set of responses from the
Dutch cultural and intellectual communities. For scholarly and political
reasons, Said has always been at least as controversial in the Nether-
lands as elsewhere, if not more so. His famous O r i e n t a l i s m (1978) has
been translated into thirty-six languages, but not into Dutch. Many
years ago, Said told me that a Dutch publisher bought the translation
rights, but then followed the advice of an Indonesian history specialist
to not publish it. His Culture and Imperialism (1993) was translated into
Dutch, but received negative reviews from, among others, the then
leading Dutch liberal politician and later European commissioner, Frits
Bolkestein, who negatively compared SaidÕs scholarship to the superi-
or work of PrincetonÕs Islamologist, Bernard Lewis. Some years before,
the comparison to Bernard Lewis had already come up in a scandal at
Leiden University. Both Said and Lewis had been invited to the open-
ing of the Centre for Non-Western Studies in 1988, but after much
quarrelling (including Parliamentary debate), SaidÕs invitation was
withdrawn. 
The generally negative attitude towards Said in the Netherlands is the
result of a combination of factors. In the Dutch Academy, orientalists
dominate the study of the Middle East and these scholars feel very of-
fended by SaidÕs work because they see it as almost a personal attack
on their integrity. The scholarship in these circles is by and large em-
piricist and positivist, while the impact of FoucaultÕs Knowledge and
P o w e r has been rather limited. It remains puzzling, however, how little
real attention specialists in the Netherlands have given to SaidÕs work,
given the fact that it is firmly rooted in the German historical tradition
of Curtius, Panofsky and, of course, Auerbach, whose Mimesis has re-
cently been re-published with a new introduction by Said. Contrary to
what people who have not read his work often think, Said is not a rad-
ical iconoclast, but, in fact, a great lover of Western cultural and schol-
arly traditions. The other factor, obviously, is SaidÕs Palestinian nation-
alism. Dutch politics is, in general, pro-Israel, and criticism of Israel is
easily interpreted as anti-Semitism. This has its origins in Dutch guilt
feelings about the Holocaust and post-war Protestant sympathies to-
wards the Jewish inhabitants of the Holy Land. Against this back-
ground it was remarkable that Said was the first recipient of the Inter-
national Spinoza Prize, awarded in The Hague in 1999. He was very
moved by the event because he felt a strong affinity for the secular
cosmopolitan, Baruch de Spinoza, who was born in Amsterdam in
1632. Spinoza and Said were humanists who distanced themselves
from the radical religious politics of their times. They were indepen-
dent secular thinkers with a strong ethical belief in tolerance and
human rights. And both of them belonged to exile communities.
SaidÕs work has been taken up by new generations of postcolonial
scholars who have, like Said, migrated to the US. Many of them, like
Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha and Gauri Viswanathan, are from the In-
dian subcontinent and teach in English departments at Ivy League uni-
versities such as Columbia and Harvard. That kind of impact is hardly to
be expected in the Netherlands, partly because the Dutch colonialists
in Indonesia promoted Malay, not Dutch, and partly because Dutch is
not a world language. In the Netherlands the impact of SaidÕs work has
been primarily on debates about Dutch colonialism and quite limited
in its reach. Nevertheless, an increase in the importance of SaidÕs work,
in the Dutch academy and elsewhere, seems likely to grow with the ris-
ing demand for a renewed imperialism which can be seen in the new
historical writing of Ferguson in Britain and Emmer in the Netherlands,
for example, and which can be witnessed even more directly in current
US foreign politics. As long as imperialism does not disappear, SaidÕs
work is sure to retain its topical importance.
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SaidÕs involvement with the Palestinian
struggle was by his own admission
more a matter of coincidence than in-
evitability. Unlike many of his contem-
poraries, he was not spurred to a life of
activism by the Palestinian n a k b a ( Ô c a t-
astropheÕ) of 1948; born in Jerusalem
to an entrepreneurial family with ties
to both Egypt and LebanonÑties that
helped it avoid the worst depredations visited upon the Palestinian
people by war and dispossessionÑSaid spent the next two decades
pursuing his education in Cairo and the United States. On the eve of
the1967 June War, which he would subsequently define as an event of
transformative significance, the young Said was a rising and content-
edly assimilated star in the English Literature department of New
YorkÕs prestigious Columbia University. Retaining only tangential con-
nections with the Arab world (and then largely with the elite, cos-
mopolitan milieu of his youth beautifully memorialized in his autobio-
graphical Out of Place), his promising academic career appeared to
form the limit of his political horizon.
IsraelÕs overwhelming defeat of the Arab states and occupation of
the remaining areas of Palestine in 1967, the overtly triumphalist and
crass anti-Arab reception accorded IsraelÕs victory in the United States,
and the rise of the Palestinian nationalist movement shortly there-
afterÑall against the background of an increasingly turbulent world
exemplified by the Vietnam War and the gathering revolt on university
campusesÑhad a profound effect on Said. He actively sought out the
emerging Palestinian leadership in a series of visits to Jordan and
Lebanon during the late 1960s, and became an increasingly visible and
prolific public advocate for the Palestinian struggle for self-determina-
t i o n .
Relentlessly energetic, supremely eloquent, consistently rigorous and
witty, always dapper in dress and appearance, Said combined uncon-
cealed moral and political commitment with an indefatigable relish for
intellectual and polemical combat, and did so to unparalleled effect. By
the late 1970s he had become the leading spokesperson and cam-
paigner for Palestinian rights in the Western world, directly and indi-
rectly responsible for an openness towards the Palestinian narrative
among opinion makers, intellectuals, and activists in Europe and North
America that would have been inconceivable only a decade earlier.
Only PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and a handful of other Palestinian polit-
ical leaders maintained greater public recognition outside the Middle
E a s t .
Said and Palestinian
p o l i t i c s
SaidÕs relationship with the Palestin-
ian leadership was complex and went
through various stages. A lifelong in-
dependent with a profound distaste
for the imposed discipline inherent in
political organization, he never joined
a political movement although he
served as a member of the PLOÕs Pales-
tine National Council between 1977
and 1991, and was on several occa-
sions nominated as a negotiator on its
behalf. Along with kindred spirits such
as the late Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and
the PLOÕs Lebanon representative
Shafiq al-Hut, emerging leaders such
as Azmi Bishara and Mustafa Bargh-
outhi, and international comrades like
Eqbal Ahmad and Noam Chomsky,
Said promoted strategies that sought
to reconcile principle with pragma-
tism, along with tactics that would
maximize their potential by achieving
support in the crucial battlegrounds of
European and American public opin-
i o n .
Reflecting this agenda, Said was during the 1970s a pioneering advo-
cate of a two-state settlement and worked closely with Arafat, whom
heÑcorrectlyÑviewed as the only leader capable of persuading both
the PLO and the international community to adopt partition as the
basis for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Question of
P a l e s t i n e (1978), although primarily intended to expose a Western au-
dience to the realities of Palestinian history and the legitimacy of Pales-
tinian national aspirations, remains the most powerful statement pro-
duced on behalf of a two-state settlement to this day. It not only led to
its authorÕs vilification by Palestinian radicals, but also unleashed a
concerted and increasingly vulgar campaign against his scholarship
and character by pro-Israel intellectuals and activists that continues
even after his death. For Arab intellectuals seeking approval in Wash-
ingtonÕs corridors of power, furthermore, shrill denunciations of SaidÕs
Ôpernicious influenceÕ became de rigeur. Threats against his life, ema-
nating from both Arab and (primarily) Zionist quarters, became routine
but were blithely ignored.
Although Said supported Palestinian participation in the 1991
Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, he was by then increasingly es-
tranged from Arafat and the Tunis-based PLO leadership, and offered a
blistering farewell when he resigned from the PNC that same year. Ac-
cording to Said, the Palestinian leadership had squandered too many
opportunities, failed to mobilize Palestinian capabilities and resources,
neglected the crucial struggle for global (and especially Western) pub-
lic opinion, limited its energies to a largely futile search for friends in
high places, institutionalized malfeasance and mediocrity, andÑin the
logical culmination of this collection of failuresÑgrievously misman-
aged the Palestinian response to IraqÕs 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
The 1993 Oslo accords ensured that the break became definitive as well
as increasingly acrimonious. Said accused Arafat of a grand sell-outÑ
signing a ÔVersaillesÕ that transformed the PLO into a ÔPalestinian
VichyÕÑin order to perpetuate his failed leadership and the political rel-
evance of his organization. Oslo, he
consistently argued, would provide
only cosmetic changes to the occupa-
tion, and deliver a Middle Eastern ver-
sion of a p a r t h e i d rather than self-deter-
mination. The Palestinian Authority rec-
iprocated by banning his books and at-
tacking him on its airwaves.
As Israeli settlement expansion con-
tinued at an accelerated pace during
the 1990s and his predictions about
Oslo were realized, SaidÑno doubt in-
spired by the new South Africa which
he had occasion to visitÑconcluded
that a two-state settlement was no
longer feasible, and could only func-
tion as a transitional phase towards a
unitary, democratic state encompass-
ing Israel and the occupied territories.
Unlike most of his predecessors and
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Edward W. Said played a unique role in the
contemporary Palestinian national movement.
It is difficult to imagine it being reproduced by
another individual Palestinian, a judgement
that reflects both SaidÕs extraordinary
qualities and the fundamental transformation
of the environment in which he operated
during the past three decades.
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Oslo, he consistently argued,
would provide only cosmetic
changes to the occupation, and
deliver a Middle Eastern version
of apartheid rather than self-
determination. 
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contemporaries in this respect, his vi-
sion was however devoid of crass na-
tionalism. He consistently advocated
the need for reconciliation based on
equality, whose preconditions he iden-
tified as Israeli recognition of its re-
sponsibility for the historic injustices
committed against the Palestinian
people, and Palestinian and Arab un-
derstanding of the legacy of Jewish
suffering culminating in the Nazi holo-
caust. The Politics of Dispossession
(1994), Peace and its Discontents ( 1 9 9 6 ) ,
and The End of the Peace Process: Oslo
and After (2000) collected the passion-
ate and prolific output of commentary
and advocacy produced by Said during
this period, each installment addition-
ally forming a direct and successful
challenge to an increasingly debilitat-
ing disease. Given that he continued
writing until his final days, a further
compendium is doubtlessly in the
m a k i n g .
Said and the Palestinian cause
Many have commented on the cosmopolitan and consciously pro-
gressive humanism that formed the core of SaidÕs being and politicsÑ
and the contradiction presented by his simultaneous embrace of the
nationalist struggle of the Palestinians. It was an irony Said both recog-
nized and rejected, and ultimately resolved by spirited opposition to
sectarianism of any sortÑmost obviously the concept of an exclusivist
Jewish state in the 21s t century Middle East, but unhesitatingly encom-
passing public denunciations of growing Palestinian religious extrem-
ism and indiscriminate attacks against Israeli civilians as well. Indeed,
his unrelenting assault on Israeli and US policies was consistently ac-
companied by withering criticism of the decrepit state of the contem-
porary Arab world.
As an activist for the Palestinian cause Said displayed those same
traits that characterized the other aspects of his life: a level of commit-
ment that translated into an extraordinary capacity for hard work; an
insatiable determination to acquire and impart knowledge; an open-
ness to and active sponsorship of innovative thought; selfless encour-
agement and promotion of new talent; and an incurable addiction to
travel, people, and gossip. A zest for life, in short, that seemed to be
lived beyond its known limitations. And above this all stood his sheer
eloquence and capacity for representation. To many these qualities
achieved their zenith in his After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives (1986), an
extended mediation on Palestinian identity and exile that was en-
hanced while being enriched by the accompanying photography of
Jean Mohr.
For Palestinians who could neither reconcile themselves to the existing
realities of the Oslo era, nor embrace the constricting alternatives on
offer in the Palestinian and wider Arab worlds, Said and his always de-
pendable output functioned as a moral and political compass. Yet he
also had an unforgiving attitude towards criticism, which however
slight never passed without response and often resulted in severed re-
lationships. Like ArafatÑwho by contrast remains largely impervious
to insult and condemnationÑSaid tended to view attacks on his work
and person (attacks he needless to say also rejected on their own
terms) as overt or concealed political assaults on the Palestinian cause
he so visibly represented. He thus felt obliged to always give at least as
good as he got, andÑentering any number of simultaneous battles
others would consider superfluous with unrestrained relish and zealÑ
typically came out ahead.
Given his extraordinary career and the breadth of his accomplish-
ments, it is perhaps tempting to assess the Palestinian aspect of SaidÕs
life in isolation from his intellectual, scholarly, and broader cultural
roles. To do so is however to neglect the organic and vital connections
between these seemingly separate personasÑconnections that not
only existed clearly in SaidÕs own mind (see his Representations of the
Intellectual, 1994), but are crucial to un-
derstanding the influence of his Pales-
tinian activism. His pioneering role in
the development of post-colonial the-
ory, for example, both informed the
manner in which he understood and
advocated Palestinian self-determina-
tion, and immeasurably enhanced his
ability to do so. Conversely, his experi-
ences as an Arab at CairoÕs Victoria Col-
lege and later as a Palestinian in the
West doubtlessly contributed to his
analysis of the relationship between
imperialism, scholarship, and cultureÑ
and his insistence that one must first of
all unlearn essential categories such as
East and West.
It would be no exaggeration to ob-
serve that national movements pro-
duce or recruit individuals of SaidÕs cal-
ibre only once if at all; individuals of in-
dependent global standing who per-
sonify and express the justice of their
cause in multiple environments with
moral clarity and political consistency,
world citizens whose impact within these varied environments derives
from their determination to appeal to a shared humanity and universal
valuesÑour fundamental equality as peoples and individual human
beingsÐ rather than to sympathy for a strange people in a foreign land.
Although Edward W. SaidÕs legacy will endure for many years to come,
he unfortunately cannot and will not be replaced.
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His pioneering role in
t h e development of post-colonial
theory É both informed the
manner in which he u n d e r s t o o d
and advocated Palestinian self-
determination, and
immeasurably enhanced
h i s ability to do so. 
Edward Said with Daniel Barenboim and Saleem Abboud-
Ashkar, Birzeit, January 1999.
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In a series of interviews with David Barsamian when Eqbal Ahmad was
asked to comment on Edward SaidÕs intellectual contributions, he
summed it up as follows: ÔI think the singular achievement of Said, as a
literary critic, beginning with O r i e n t a l i s m, has been to put imperialism
at the center of Western civilizationÉ. He put therefore the whole
issue of Western expansion, domination and imperialism as central
forces in defining the nature of civilization itself.Õ1 Reflecting, in turn,
on why he dedicated his book Culture and Imperialism to Eqbal Ahmad,
Edward Said wrote that Ôit was because in his activity, life and thinking
Eqbal embodied not just the politics of empire but that whole fabric of
experience expressed in human life itself, rather than in economic
rules and reductive formulas. What Eqbal understood about the expe-
rience of empire was the domination of empire in all its forms, but also
the creativity, originality, and vision created in resistance to it. Those
wordsÑÒcreativityÓ, ÒoriginalityÓ, ÒvisionÓÑwere central to his atti-
tudes on politics and history.Õ2 The relationship between these two
men was an important oneÑa Palestinian scholar extraordinaire and a
charismatic activist intellectual from PakistanÑfor they came to share
a profound understanding of the relationship between knowledge,
power and resistance, and leave us a legacy of challenges for drafting
an anti-imperialist politics.
End of colonialism
They were born around the same time (Ahmad in 1933/4 and Said in
1935) in two parts of the world which were under British colonial rule
(India and Palestine), and both experienced the violence of decolo-
nization as a formative experience of their childhoods. In a BBC docu-
mentary on his life,3 Ahmad traveled along the historic Grand Trunk
Road which once stretched the breadth of the Indian-subcontinent
from Calcutta to the threshold of Afghanistan. On the way he revisited
the village in Bihar where he grew up, recounting his fatherÕs murder
because of his pro-Congress leanings, the decision of his elder brothers
to migrate to Pakistan because of their pro-Muslim League leanings,
and his motherÕs refusal to leave their familial home. Torn asunder, the
Ômoment of arrivalÕ, independence from colonial rule in the Indian sub-
continent was constituted by the very experience of Partition. Almost
thirty million people were displaced in the violence that ensued, one of
the largest forced migrations of modern times, and Eqbal and his
brothers walked with the massive caravans of the uprooted along the
G.T. Road into what had become the state of Pakistan. 
Said also experienced a series of displacements as the state of Israel
was carved out of British Mandate Palestine. He moved from Jerusalem
to Egypt, and then, alone, to the United States while the rest of his fam-
ily went to Lebanon. After being diagnosed with cancer, Said wrote a
memoir, ÔOut of PlaceÕ (1999) in which he reflects on what the loss of
ÔplaceÕ meant to him and his family. However, it was not the personal
losses associated with displacement, but rather the profound and
shared dispossession of a people from both their land and from histo-
ry that moved him to write as an act of resistance. 
On hearing statements by the likes of Golda Meir who, in 1969, de-
clared that there are no Palestinians, Said felt compelled Ôto articulate a
history of loss and dispossession that had to be extricated, minute by
minute, word by word, inch by inch, from the very real history of IsraelÕs
establishment, existence and achievementsÉ This was the world of
power and representations, a world that came into being as a series of
decisions made by writers, politicians, philosophers to suggest or ad-
umbrate one reality and at the same time efface others.Õ4
The 1967 war drew Said into Palestinian politics. Ibrahim Abu-
Lughod asked Said to write an article on the war for Arab Affairs a n d
that article, ÔThe Arab PortrayedÕ, became the starting point for his
path-breaking book Orientalism ( 1 9 7 8 ) .5 The article so impressed
Ahmad that he asked Abu-Lughod to convey his appreciation to Said.
The two men met each other in 1968 at a meeting of Arabs in the Unit-
ed States where Ahmad was a keynote speaker. Ahmad had already
earned a reputation for fighting against French colonial rule with the
National Liberation Front in Algeria. He was also an eloquent civil
rights and anti-Vietnam war campaigner in the United States. In his ad-
dress Ahmad argued, as a veteran of guerilla warfare in Algeria, that
the success of an armed struggle lay not in its ability to Ôout-fightÕ the
adversary, but rather to Ôout-legitimizeÕ or morally isolate it. He thus
concluded that armed struggle would not work for the Palestinian
cause because it would simply reinforce the Israeli stateÕs proclaimed
legitimacy as a homeland for those who had suffered, for it would
allow Zionists to continue to portray Jews as victims of Arab violence
instead of confronting the dispossession and suffering of Palestinians.6
Although AhmadÕs advice against armed struggle disappointed most
Palestinians there, particularly as their hopes came to be tied to the
emergent PLOÕs armed struggle for liberation, Said was so impressed
that he introduced himself to Ahmed after the lecture. Of their initial
meeting Ahmad said, ÔI knew from his article that I was meeting some-
one who had a very fresh and original mind. Since then we have been
very close friendsÕ. 
C o m r a d e s - i n - a r m s
Through the ensuing years Said saw Ahmad as a comrade-in-arms,
and turned to him for advice and help in negotiating the challenges of
advocating the Palestinian right to national self-determination. When
in the late 1970s Said served as a member of the Palestinian National
Council, the Palestinian parliament in exile, he invited Ahmad to Beirut
to meet Yasir Arafat and other Palestinian leaders. He noted that
Ô[t]hose leaders sensed about Eqbal that he was a real friend in the
struggle and his sincerity and commitment could not be gainsaid, de-
spite the fact that he wasnÕt a nativeÕ.7 Ahmad notes that he repeated-
ly advised Arafat to engage in non-violent strategies of civil disobedi-
ence, of the Mohandas Gandhi or Martin Luther King kind, rather than
armed struggle. Although Arafat often took notes, his advice went un-
h e e d e d .8 Said too, in The Question of Palestine ( 1 9 7 9 ) , questioned the
PLOÕs use of violence, and later both became critics of the PLO and the
Oslo Accords. 
Politics and poetry 
For Ahmad, a poem by the communist Pakistani poet Faiz Ahmad
Faiz, ÔDawn of FreedomÕ, captured the bathos of decolonization. In
1980 Ahmad introduced Said to Faiz who was in exile in Beirut, and
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their oft-recalled evening of poetry recitation inspired SaidÕs essay,
ÔThe Mind of Winter: Reflections on Life in ExileÕ.9 In politics and poetry
the two men developed their critiques of power and expressed their
faith in peopleÕs capacity to resist through creativity. Yet, although
they shared a great deal, the two menÕs contributions differed enor-
mously in substance.
Said was a professor of English Litera-
ture at Columbia University and wrote
a large number of books in literary crit-
icism, music, the Middle East and
Palestine. Certainly the impact of O r i-
entalism has gone far beyond the study
of the Middle East, so much so that
some have claimed that he founded
the very field of Ôpost-colonial studiesÕ.
He also regularly wrote articles on con-
temporary politics as they pertained to
the representation of Islam, the Middle
East and Palestine. Although he also
participated in political discussions, his
pen was his most vital sword. In com-
parison, and although Ahmad was a
professor of politics at New Hampshire
College, he left his mark wherever he
went through his very personÑhis Ôsu-
pernally accurate analysisÕ,1 0 p e r c e p-
tiveness, compassion and oratoryÑ
and became a friend of peopleÕs strug-
gles in many different parts of the
world. Said described AhmadÕs contri-
butions as Ôessentially performative
achievements,Õ Ôstylists of the uttered word, pluri-lingual, generous
with ideas and stories.Õ1 1 On his retirement from New Hampshire Col-
lege, Said urged his friend to publish his ideas, telling him, Ôyou should-
nÕt leave your words scattered to the winds or even recorded on tape,
but they should be collected and published in several volumes for
everyone to read.Õ Unfortunately, Ahmad died on 11 May 1999, before
compiling such works. While Said leaves us a legacy of written words,
their friendship offers reminders of some of the challenges that lie
ahead. 
Pluralizing and humanizing
Ahmad conceded that Ô[i]n literary criticism and historical writing
there [we]re two times: before O r i e n t a l i s m and after O r i e n t a l i s mÕ, yet he
felt the workÕs impact, although centered on the Middle East, didnÕt
have enough influence on the study of Islam. He argued that the book
had had a far more decisive impact on histories of other parts of the
world, particularly on writings of colonial Western expansion. As far as
the study of Islam was concerned, the outcome was two-fold: there
were writings that had absorbed and deepened some of O r i e n t a l i s mÕ s
insights, but there were also established Orientalists like Bernard Lewis
and polemicists like Harold Bloom who continued to demonize Islam
and Muslims.1 2Certainly since post-11 September 2001 a large number
of books and articles have reproduced a threatening and monolithic
Islam for public and political consumption. As Joseph Massad pointed
out at O r i e n t a l i s mÕs Silver Jubilee meeting in New York, the conditions
for the production of an abstract ÔOrientÕ remain unchanged. Said, al-
though battling his own illness, repeatedly took the now best-selling
author Bernard Lewis and others to task, and argued that Ô[t]o under-
stand anything about human history, it is necessary to see it from the
point of view of those who made it, not to treat it as a packaged com-
modity or as an instrument of aggression. Why should the world of
Islam be any different?Õ1 3 With the passing of Said, this task of pluraliz-
ing and humanizing the diverse parts of the Muslim world now takes
on a certain urgency.
Further, Said reminded us through Joseph Conrad that the distinc-
tions between civilized London and Ôthe heart of darknessÕ quickly col-
lapsed in extreme situations, and that the heights of European civiliza-
tion could instantaneously fall into the most barbarous practices with-
out preparation or transition.1 4 Ahmad also quoted ConradÕs state-
ment, in a lecture entitled ÔCulture of ImperialismÕ that self-evidently
drew upon Said Õs work, that Ô[t]he conquest of the earth, which means
the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or
slightly flatter noses than ourselves is not a pretty thing when you look
into it too much.Õ Ahmad went on to argue that Ôan enlightened civi-
lizationÕ could engage in Ônot a pretty thingÕ only on the condition that
it did not Ôlook into it too muchÕ.1 5 This Ônot look[ing] into it too muchÕ
requires an abdication of rigorous en-
quiry, and the complicity of intellectu-
als, which in turn provides the founda-
tions of actual violence and aggres-
sion. It was with this awful awareness
of the implications of scholarship that
Ahmad proposed taking Karl MarxÕs
statement seriously, that the function
of knowledge is to comprehend in
order to changeÑÔthink critically and
take risksÕ to question the cultural, so-
cial and political norms that we live
w i t h .1 6
Said was often attacked by his detrac-
tors who argued that by focusing on
the complicity of Western knowledge
and power he provided an easy escape
for Muslims who could place all the
blame for their problems on Western
shoulders. However, Said wrote regu-
larly for the Egyptian Weekly A l - A h r a m
and the internet based Palestine Chron-
i c l e, and Ahmad for the Pakistani D a w n ,
in which they criticized the leaders and
their abuse of power in the Muslim
world and their repeated betrayal of
the aspirations and needs of ordinary
people. Particularly since the end of the Cold War,
a recurring theme of AhmadÕs lectures to Muslim
audiences was the failure of education in the
Muslim world in promoting creative and human-
ist thinking. ÔThis is the dark age of Muslim histo-
ryÕ, he wrote to his Pakistani readers, Ôthe age of
surrender and collaboration, punctuated by mad-
ness. The decline of our civilization began in the
eighteenth century when, in the intellectual em-
brace of orthodoxy, we skipped the age of en-
lightenment and the scientific revolution. In the
second half of the twentieth century, it has fall-
e n . Õ1 7 Rhetorical, scholarly, incisive, thoughtful,
they used their critical arsenal strategically in ad-
dressing different audiences, but remained clear
in delineating the power of the powerful and the
struggle of the disempowered. At the Silver Ju-
bilee of O r i e n t a l i s m, arguing against a simple
reading of the book as about the West versus
Others, Said emphasized that ÔAll great civiliza-
tions are plural civilizations. The terms ÒOrientÓ
and Òthe WestÓ have no ontological stability.Õ In a
time when such dichotomized abstractions are
gaining discursive hegemony in not just Europe
and the United States, but also in the increasingly
angry Muslim world, the challenge to speak to
multiple fronts becomes more and more difficult
and necessary. As Said reminded us, Ôthere is no
real Orient to argue for, only the gifts of people of
that region for the struggle to survive.Õ
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They were born around the same
time (Ahmad in 1933/4 and Said
in 1935) in two parts of the world
which were under British colonial
rule (India and Palestine), and
both experienced the violence of
decolonization as a formative
experience of their childhoods.
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Many of the people who have been arrested around the
world during the past two years suspected of being members
of al-Qa'ida or affiliated organizations, have taken pride in be-
longing to the so-called Salafi movement. The designation
may cause some confusion in view of the fact that the term
ÔSalafiÕ is also known, in older academic parlance, to denote a
school of thought associated with ÔmodernistÕ reformers such
as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) and Muhammad
Abduh (1849-1905). These reformers, if ever mentioned at all,
are likely to be shunned by the contemporary Salafist. Today,
ÔSalafismÕ is more often used in reference to a quite different
brand of Islamic thought and practice, a brand that is practi-
cally identical to what has otherwise been known as ÔWah-
habismÕ, i.e. the form of Sunni Islam that constitutes the Ôstate
religionÕ of Saudi Arabia. A second source of confusion is that
while the adherents of this variety of Salafism are united in
their respect for Ibn Hanbal (d. 855), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328)
and Muhammad Ibn abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), they have
come to disagree on important points and issues, particularly
on the issue of jihad. The Salafi ÔmovementÕ is comprised of
several more or less contradictory wings and tendencies,
even within the borders of Saudi Arabia. To put it simply, a
distinction should be made between a jihad-oriented wing
and other more ÔmoderateÕ wings. Al-Qa'ida and its support-
ers represent the former tendency, while various groups that advocate
order and stability instead of revolutionary jihadÑalthough they may
vary in their position towards the Saudi regimeÑmake up the latter ten-
d e n c y .
The differences and disagreements within Salafism have come to the
fore during the last two years and more acutely than ever after the suicide
attacks in Riyadh on 12 May 2003 which killed more than thirty people in-
cluding eight Americans, and the attack that devas-
tated the Muhaya compound in Riyadh on 9 No-
vember 2003. Deep rifts within Saudi society have
come to the surface. The May attack revealed, not
surprisingly, the existence of an active jihad-orient-
ed network within the borders of Saudi Arabia.
Many of those suspected of being involved were ar-
rested or killed in clashes with Saudi police and se-
curity forces during the summer. The campaign
also affected intellectuals who provided the ji-
hadists with ideological support, including some
rather prominent ulama. Two of the most well-
known among those arrested were sheikh Ali bin
Khudayr al-Khudayr (b. ca. 1955) and sheikh Nasir
bin Hamad al-Fahd (b. 1968), both disciples of the
late sheikh Hamoud bin Uqla al-Shuaybi, the most
famous and uncompromising supporter of Taliban
and al-Qa'ida in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia until
his death in January 2002. 
The campaign also had repercussions on the In-
ternet. Both al-Khudayr and al-Fahd had until May
2003 maintained their own personal websites
where their articles and f a t w as were available
(http://www.alkhoder.com and http://www.al-
f h d . c o m ) . Since May neither has functioned prop-
erly and has obviously not been updated.1 B u t
perhaps more important to the internet based al-
Qa'ida-supporters was when a hitherto unknown
man called Yusuf al-Ayyiri was shot dead in the
northern region of Hail after trying to escape from
a security checkpoint by car. The incident was re-
ported by international media where there was much speculation that
al-Ayyiri was carrying a letter from Usama bin Laden on his dead body.
Al-AyyiriÕs ÔmartyrdomÕ was widely discussed on Arabic mailing lists
(m u n t a d a y a t) on the internet.2 An audio recording of what amounts to
his Ôfamous last wordsÕ, speaking about the duty of jihad and comparing
the present-day situation with the era of the crusades and the Mongol
invasions of the 13t h century, was also available on some of these lists.3
The case in point is that Yusuf al-Ayyiri was subsequently identified as
the secret webmaster of ÔAlneda.comÕ or Markaz al-Dirasat wa al-Buhuth
a l - I s l a m i y y a (The Center for Islamic Studies and Research). If true, the in-
cident marks a turning point in the history of Ôal-Qa'idaÕ on the Web. The
website formerly known as ÔAlneda.comÕ has been oneÑif not the
mostÑsought-after of all the sites believed to be ÔaffiliatedÕ with al-Qa'i-
da. The original domain (http://www.alneda.com) was lost already in
July 2002 and it has sometimes been assumed that it disappeared. The
site, which constantly changed its web addresses, continued to func-
tion until May 2003. Its webmaster was able to keep the site alive by Ôhi-
jackingÕ subdirectories on other websites. However, the physical death
of Yusuf al-Ayyiri at the end of May coincided with what now seems to
have been the final Ôvirtual deathÕ of the website. One cannot be com-
pletely certain about the matter; disinformation and rumours are easily
planted and spread in the ongoing ÔnetwarÕ. The important thing so far
is that the website formerly known as ÔAlneda.comÕ has not resurfaced
since its disappearance in May. What happened in Saudi Arabia in the
aftermath of the bombings in May most certainly amounts to serious
losses for the jihad-oriented Salafi network in the Arabian Peninsula as
well as on the Internet. 
The more recent November attack as well as the clashes in Mecca
and other places between security forces and suspected militants prior
to this attack are evidence that the battle against terror in the land of
IslamÕs holiest places is not over.4
New Media
S a l a f i in Virtual and
Physical Reality
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M e d i a
Despite the more than one hundred US
channels available to them, Palestin-
ian-Americans in Chicago are choosing
to beam in their news via satellite. Over
the past few years, Arabic satellite net-
works have become increasingly popu-
lar among the Palestinian immigrant
population in the US and have even
been considered to be virtual portals
to daily life in the Middle East, keeping
immigrants updated with the latest
news broadcasts in the Palestinian territories and Israel. Moreover, the
satellite dish has become relatively affordable and is available through
most local satellite providers. A brief ethnographic survey carried out
in 2001 among the Palestinian-American community in Chicago
showed that there was a clear preference for Arabic satellite news
channels over American channels. The most popular satellite channel
among the community was the Al Jazeera news network for its contin-
uous coverage of the second i n t i f a d a and for the latest news on the
Middle East. Given these findings, how do Arabic satellite news chan-
nels such as Al Jazeera shape the way Palestinians in Chicago stay in-
formed on news in the Middle East? And are Arabic satellite news chan-
nels regarded as superior substitutes for mainstream American news
channels by Palestinians in Chicago? 
For many Arabs living in North America, Al Jazeera is an important
news source for issues in the Middle East and is tuned into regularly.
According to Al JazeeraÕs managing director, Jasim Al-Ali, the net-
workÕs list of 200,000 subscribers in 2002 in the United States and
Canada was growing by 2,500 weekly.1 For Palestinians in the United
States, Al Jazeera is one of many Arabic satellite channels that pro-
vides them with news on the current situation in Palestine and Israel.
In Chicago, where the number of Palestinian-Americans living in the
metropolitan area in the year 2000 totaled 5,6022 (17% of the total
Arab population in Chicago), the number of satellite subscribers is
also high. In opting for Arabic news sources, Palestinian-Americans
feel that they are able to avoid the disturbingly common misrepre-
sentations of Palestinians and of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that
are conveyed in mainstream American news broadcasts. And in effect,
these immigrants have created a protective ÔbubbleÕ to shield them-
selves from the distortions in the American media, relying solely on
satellite networks for accurate accounts of the i n t i f a d a. The abun-
dance of channels helps keep the Palestinian-American viewer tuned
in to the various perspectives and public opinions in the Arab world,
and offers a large selection. At the same time however, it is clear that
Arabic satellite networks alone offer a limited perspective and consti-
tute only one viewpoint on issues in the Middle East.
In the ethnographic survey of 2001, thirty interviews were held with
Palestinian-American families of varying religious groups and class
backgrounds in Chicago to assess their television habits and viewing
preferences. During this period, an effort was made to regularly moni-
tor the reliability of the alternative
media sources that were being com-
monly used by the Palestinian-Ameri-
can community (channels were moni-
tored as often as possible throughout
the course of the research). This per-
mitted the monitoring of specific pro-
grammes referred to by the intervie-
wees. The majority of Palestinian-
American families interviewed were
bilingual and were comfortable watch-
ing the news in both English and Arabic, but nonetheless preferred
watching the Arabic news channels. From the intervieweesÕ responses
it appeared that Palestinian-Americans occasionally watch American
television channels for entertainment purposes but rarely for the news.
They relied primarily on Al Jazeera for news on the Middle East and the
i n t i f a d a. They felt that Al Jazeera played a unique role in keeping the
community up to date with the intifada through its daily reports, and
liked the fact that the station also hosts heated talk shows and pro-
grammes that encourage international audience participation and in-
volvement by phone, fax or e-mail. The interviewees did indeed find it
necessary to refer to additional international news sources, in both
Arabic and English, to keep themselves updated on international news
broadcasts. The American news channels, such as CNN or Fox News,
were occasionally viewed but seldom regarded as reliable sources of
news. The interviewees felt that the American media was generally bi-
ased in favor of Israel and that it rarely offered a Palestinian perspec-
tive. They find it frustrating to watch the mainstream American news
and as a result turn to Arabic news channels for news that they feel ac-
curately portrays and reflects the views of Palestinians. 
For the Palestinian-American viewers in Chicago, having both western
and Arab news broadcasts available to them at the click of a button
appears to be greatly beneficial, but this is not the case. Palestinian-
Americans in Chicago are growing less tolerant of American main-
stream news, and are beginning to increasingly isolate themselves
and their political opinions from the surrounding mainstream. In
essence, these immigrants are refraining from publicly voicing their
disagreement with the interpretations of the American mainstream
on issues in the Middle East, thus preventing themselves from becom-
ing a collective voice capable of effecting any change. Until an Arab
perspective is regularly included in the mainstream American media,
Palestinian-Americans in Chicago will continue to exclude American
news channels from their daily television habits. Both Palestinian-
Americans and the American mainstream media need to make an ef-
fort to bridge the gap that exists between them
and to engender a much-needed environment
for more representative global communication.
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Many Palestinian-Americans in Chicago feel
that the American media rarely offer a
Palestinian perspective and turn to Arabic
news channels, most notably Al Jazeera, for
news that they feel accurately portrays and
reflects their views. Until an Arab perspective
is regularly included in the mainstream
American media, Palestinian-Americans will
continue to exclude American news channels
from their daily television habits.
Living in the
Satellite Bubble
P a l e s t i n i a n - A m e r i c a n s
i n Chicago 
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At first sight, the term Church seems
not universal, but rather specifically
Christian. ÔChurchÕ is, however, simply
the English translation of the Greek
word e k k leøs i a, a word which initially
meant Ôan assembly of the selectÕ, but
which was then also used to translate
the Hebrew qaøhaø l, meaning Ôthe con-
gregation of the faithfulÕ. Both the
Greek and the Hebrew terms are pre-
Christian, and the two senses of
Church that derive from them denote
two universal categories: the commu-
nity, and the institutional authority
within it.1 It is in institutional terms that Islam most differs from Chris-
tianity. An institution may be formal or informal, and while the overar-
ching institutions of Christianity are formal, those of Islam are informal.
Islam has evolved formal institutions only for the
performance of specific functions. The madrasa
(religious college) and the s h a r i ' a court, to take
two examples, are thus institutions within the re-
ligion of Islam, but not institutions of the religion.
Sunni Islam lacks any overarching, formal, corpo-
rate institution that might be identified as a
Church. Instead, there is the body of ulamaÑa
word current in non-specialist English, though
often misused. The ulama are not in any sense
priests, but rather scholars, akin to the New Testa-
mentÕs Ôdoctors of the law.Õ
Although Sunni ulama have no rigid hierarchi-
cal organization, we know thatÑas seen in other
contextsÑa class may still act effectively without
being organized into a rigid hierarchy. In fact, a
Marxist would see class as more important than
the institution or institutions of that class, and
even non-Marxists concede that such an ap-
proach has merits. For a class to act effectively
and to be an actual classÑrather than a potential
or virtual oneÑit must be conscious of its exis-
tence as such, and must be in agreement on its
common interests. The extent to which the ulama
have been in agreement on common interests
has varied from time to time and place to place,
but the ulama have almost always been aware of
their existence as a class. And the ulama class cer-
tainly constitutes the only possible Ôassembly of
the selectÕ of Islam. There are other important
groups, notably Sufi sheikhs, and there are formal
institutions, but, again, all these other groups and
institutions are within Islam, not of Islam. Two hundred years ago the
ulama held most of the religious authority in Islam, confirming the pos-
sible identification of the ulama as the Church of Islam. The situation
today, however, is very different.
Religious authority
Authority in any religious system may be analyzed according to its
many varieties. There is material authority (over physical assets), doc-
trinal authority, spiritual (or charismatic) authority, ritual authority, and
moral authority. The groups that produce knowledge have, de facto,
doctrinal authority. For Islam, the three most important varieties of au-
thority are material, doctrinal, and spiritual. Moral authority can be as-
sumed to flow from other varieties of authority. Ritual authority is of lit-
tle importance in Islam, contrary to
Christianity. The Christian Churches
have considerable ritual authority,
since in most cases many of the impor-
tant forms of Christian worship are im-
possible to perform without the pres-
ence of a priest or minister. In contrast,
there are almost no ritual actions in
Islam that cannot be carried out by any
sane adult Muslim.
Material authority in Islam might fall
into two categories of assets. On the
one hand, there are places of worship,
places of learning and instruction madrasas, and places of pilgrimage.
On the other hand, there is w a q f (endowed property), dedicated to
the maintenance of the first category of asset. The key to material au-
thority in Islam is control of w a q f. This control also grants a measure of
authority in other spheres. W a q f deeds for madrasas, for example,
often stipulated what should be taught and howÑan indirect exercise
of doctrinal authority. W a q f deeds for mosques normally contained
stipulations concerning the appointment of preachers and imams,
also an indirect exercise of doctrinal authority, and in a sense an exer-
cise of ritual authority. In theory, an imam has authority only over the
pace of the particular prayer that he has been chosen to lead, and this
theoretical point is observed still today, when prayers are performed
at a workplace or in a private house. In more general practice, howev-
er, once a single individual has been designated as the imam for a par-
ticular mosque, other varieties of authority begin to attach to him,
though these are hard to define and have never been recognized by
doctrine. Since donors who were rarely ulama originally determined
the contents of w a q f deeds, at a w a q fÕs establishment material au-
thority lay with the wealthy. However, once the donor was dead, re-
sponsibility for interpreting and implementing the original deeds
passed to the ulama, since the overseers (trustees) of w a q f were al-
most always of this rank. Small mosquesÑtypically in villagesÑfor
which there was often no w a q f, were generally controlled by the indi-
viduals who built the mosque, sometimes Sufi sheikhs, and then by
the local community or Sufi t a r i q a (brotherhood or order). Most mate-
rial authority, though, lay with the ulama, and no other body or group
rivalled this authority.
Doctrinal authority also lay mostly with the ulama. It can be safely as-
sumed that Islamic knowledge was produced only by the ulama, be-
cause there were few, if any, alternative producers of knowledge of
any sort. Major Sufi sheikhs were often also ulama and those who
were not, rarely produced written work. There were certain areas of in-
tellectual life that lay outside the ulamaÕs realm, but these were few
and far between. Charisma, however, was the accepted specialty of
the Sufi orders. Most Sufi sheikhs had at least hereditary charisma, and
great sheikhs were almost universally accepted as a w l i y a (saints). Spir-
itual authority, therefore, was not exclusively the dominion of the
ulama. But though the Sufi sheikhs had more spiritual authority than
the ulama, they never challenged the ulamaÕs material authority, and
generally accepted the authority of the ulama in doctrinal matters. If
any group in Islam could have rivalled the ulama, it was the Sufis,
butÑwith rare exceptionsÑSufism was integrated into a system over
which the ulama presided, not one which was in opposition to them.
Despite the complication presented by Sufism then, the location of re-
ligious authority two hundred years ago indicates that there was a
Church in Islam, and that that Church was the body of ulama. Today,
this is no longer the case.
Historical Approaches
Each religion constitutes a distinct system.
Failure to recognize this once led many
observers of Islam into error, and scholars
have therefore tended to move towards
purely Islamic categories. Universal
categories, however, are needed in order for
scholars to transcend boundaries between
scholarly disciplines and to communicate
effectively with the wider public. This is also
true with respect to issues such as ÔchurchÕ
and ÔmosqueÕ in current debates on authority
within Islam, and more precisely, on
institutional authority.
Is There a Church
i n I s l a m ?
Éthe most
i m p o r t a n t
producers of
religious knowledge
in the Sunni Arab
world today are the
media, the state,
and the ulama
probably in that
o r d e r .
Historical Approaches
Authority today
In the Sunni world, control of w a q f is now generally in the hands of
the state, this control having been assumed between 1826 and the
1960s as one of various measures aimed at producing strong, central-
ized states. With control of w a q f came the control of the mosques and
madrasas they supported. Turkey has a Ministry of Religious Affairs,
but most Arab countries simply have ministries of w a q f instead. State
control of places of learning and instruction arose partly as a result of
the state takeover of w a q f, and partly as a result of the stateÕs simulta-
neous foundation of new schools and colleges. Although not officially
religious institutions, state schools include religion in their curricula
and are thus institutions of religious significance, especially when it
comes to teaching doctrine, discussed below. By the early twentieth
century, the stateÕs institutions of learning had everywhere become
more important than those few still controlled by the ulama. Despite
these facts, the Arab Sunni stateÕs material authority is not absolute.
Countless small z a w i y as (prayer places) and private mosques still re-
main outside of state control. These mosques are in private hands, al-
beit not in the hands of the ulama. In the West, mosques are mostly
private, controlled by local mosque associations. Some, remarkably,
are controlled by statesÑand not by Western states, but by states in
the Islamic world such as Turkey and Morocco. Very few mosques,
however, are controlled by ulama.
The location of doctrinal authority two centuries ago was clear, since
no group other than the ulama could have possibly held it. Today,
however, there are as many milieus in the Islamic world in which
knowledge is produced as there are in the West. And the basic divi-
sions in these many milieus in the Islamic world are also little different
from those in the West, relating less to the production of knowledge
than to its marketing and distributionÑthat is, to preaching, teaching,
and the media. The most influential media are, of course, the mass
mediaÑprimarily television, but also radio and newspapers. The
mosque sermon (k h u t b a) should perhaps also be classed within the
mass media, as it too reaches a mass audience. The k h u t b a p r o f e s s i o n-
als today are ulama, as they have always been, though many k h u t b as in
private mosques are delivered by laymen, as has probably also always
been the case. But like the physical assets of Islam, the distribution of
Islamic knowledge is generally firmly under state control. Many news-
papers and nearly all radio and TV stations are owned by the state, and
ÔindependentÕ newspapers are usually subject to some form of state
censorship. Most mosques are also owned by the state, as are the
schools. This material authority over distribution has an influence over
production, but is not the same as having authority over production.
Only in schools, where the state not only sets and polices the curricu-
lum but also usually writes and prints the textbooks, is the state the ac-
tual producer of knowledge and therefore, the chief location of doctri-
nal authority. In other areas, the state shares doctrinal authority with
others, usually only setting the outer limits to discourse. A recent study
of textbooks used in Egyptian schools suggests an understanding of
Islam broadly in line with that of the state. Many Egyptians, however,
discard much of what they are taught at school. Dr. Gregory Starett
concluded that Ôthe textbook provides the liturgy for ritual dramatiza-
tion of the moral authority of the state.Õ2 This may be one reason why it
is ultimately rejected.
The mass media are now probably more important than schools as
channels for the dissemination of religious knowledge. Senior ulama
have some access to these media, but this access is affected by a vari-
ety of forces, including the state, the nature of the medium itself, and
the context in which the ulama appear. Ulama sometimes appear in
the media in their own right, but much more important are the occa-
sions on which they appear in the context of a major ÔstoryÕ. A national
debate on a topic such as circumcision, divorce, or suicide bombing
has a much higher profile than a Friday-noon mosque broadcast. And
in these cases, the voice of the ulama is just one voice among many,
just as the voice of Christian figures is one voice among many in a na-
tional debate in a Western country. To the extent that knowledge is
being produced, it is produced as much or even more by the debate it-
self than by any individual participant, and the media professionals
who manage the debate may ultimately be more important actors
than the ulama who participate in it.
On the whole, the most important producers of religious knowledge
in the Sunni Arab world today are the media, the state, and the
ulamaÑprobably in that order. The ulama are in no way dominant, and
certainly have no monopoly.
Just as doctrinal authority has passed out of the hands of the ulama, so
charisma has passed out of the hands of the Sufis. For those who still
follow Sufi sheikhs, charisma and spiritual authority are where they al-
ways were, but in general, the percentage of the Arab Muslim popula-
tion that follows Sufi sheikhs is far smaller today than it once was. The
reasons for the virtual disappearance of Sufism among educated urban
Arab Muslims fall beyond the scope of this article, but its result is that
the old association between Sufism and charisma is today broadly lim-
ited to rural areas. Consequently, charisma is less prominent in Arab
society as a whole than it once was, and pilgrimage sites are corre-
spondingly less important. Spiritual authority, though similarly less
prominent now than it was once, still exists. But this charisma is now
often attributed to figures who have doctrinal authority, especially to
religious media personalities.3 There are, of course, exceptions to these
general trends and patterns. The system in Saudi Arabia is quite differ-
ent; but then again, Saudi Arabia is an exception to the Arab norm in
many ways. An overview of the matter points to the fact that while
there was a Church in Islam two centuries ago, that Church has now
disintegrated. The same might be said on a similar basis of the Christ-
ian Churches in the West, thus indicating corre-
sponding patterns between the two. This corre-
spondence is not surprising given the fact that
the Islamic world today is part of a global civiliza-
t i o n .
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Contrary to what Tablighi Jama'at ac-
tivists insist, the movement does have a
political vision, and is, through the vari-
ous political roles that it plays, deeply
engaged in questions of power and au-
thority. While the movementÕs immedi-
ate focus has been on the reform of the
individual, this does not mean that the
TJ has nothing at all to do with politics. If
we shift our attention from the affairs of
the state and see politics in comprehen-
sive terms, as the dynamics of power in
society, the notion that anything can be
apolitical in a political world strikes one
as absurd. In this sense, the TJ can hard-
ly be said to be apolitical. 
IlyasÕs approach to politics
Maulana Ilyas was born in 1885 at Kandhla in northern India. In 1908,
he enrolled at the Dar-ul 'Ulum madrasa in Deoband, where he took an
oath of jihad against the British. Ilyas believed that the MuslimsÕ loss of
political power owed entirely to their having abandoned the path of
Islam. Muslims were promised that if they faithfully followed the exam-
ple of the Prophet they would Ôdominate over non-believersÕ and
would be Ôdestined to be the masters of everything on this earthÕ. ÔPo-
litical powerÕ, Ilyas declared, Ôcan never beÕ the
objective of a Muslim. However, Ôwalking in the
path of the ProphetÕ, he said, Ôif we attain political
power then we should not shirk the responsibili-
tyÕ. Hence, political power was not to be shunned,
but neither was it to be directly pursued. Rather,
it would be granted as a blessing by God to the
Muslims once they became ÔtrueÕ believers, after
which the Islamic state would be established.
In this regard, Ilyas did not differ from Islamist
activists as to the final goal. Where he departed
from them was on the appropriate means of at-
taining an Islamic state in the specific Indian con-
text. In contrast to the Islamists, who called for
the capture of political power to establish Islamic
rule, Ilyas advocated working in a gradual man-
ner, encouraging the reform of individual Mus-
lims in the belief that ultimately an Islamic soci-
ety, crowned with an Islamic state, would be es-
t a b l i s h e d .
That the ultimate acquisition of political power in the future was of
central importance to IlyasÕs own vision of Islam is evident in the re-
ports of his association with the Islamic leaders of his time. While
Ilyas saw his movement as geared particularly towards ordinary Mus-
lims, he was not opposed to other contemporary movements strug-
gling for Muslim political power. He believed that the TJ and such
Muslim movements were complimentary to each other. ÔThere
should be no competition or rivalry between themÕ, Ilyas insisted.
This suggests that IlyasÕs understanding of individual reform and his
distance from matters related to the state can be read as reflecting an
underlying division of labourÑthe TJ focusing on the individual, and
other Muslim groups working in the political sphere. This point is ac-
knowledged by an Indian Muslim ' a l i m, who claims that the TJÕs
aloofness from overt political involvement is simply a temporary
Ôpious pragmatic policyÕ to enable it to promote ÔIslamic conscious-
nessÕ even in situations where governments may place Islamist
groups under strict control.2
TJ and politics after Ilyas
A distinct shift seems to have been wit-
nessed in the TJ after IlyasÕs death in
1944, a trend that became particularly
noticeable in the aftermath of the Par-
tition of India in 1947. In post-1947
India, with Muslims now a beleaguered
minority, the aggressive communal
politics of groups such as the Muslim
League were no longer a feasible op-
tion. Thus, the TJ began presenting it-
self as completely apoliticalÑin itself
probably a well thought out political
strategy to accommodate itself to the
new context. The TJ, under IlyasÕs son,
Muhammad Yusuf, believed that this
was the only way in which the move-
ment could carry on with its activities
without provoking the state and aggressive Hindu forces. Yet, the TJÕs
activities continued to have serious political implications. Indeed,
there was no way in which they could not, for the TJÕs concern with
Muslim identity and faith have had a crucial bearing on how Muslims
relate to the wider society. 
The adjustment to the reality of the absence of an Islamic political
order enabled Muslims active in the TJ to come to terms with the exis-
tence of non-Islamic regimes. For Indian Muslims this meant that they
could adjust to a system of non-Islamic rule, and to what was, at least
in theory, a secular political system, while hoping that by abiding by
the dictates of their faith, the day might dawn when God would grant
Muslims political power. 
The movementÕs growing aloofness from direct involvement in polit-
ical affairs in post-1947 India has helped the TJ flourish in an environ-
ment characterized by considerable anti-Muslim hostility. Thus, for in-
stance, in the period 1975Ð1977, when the Indian government de-
clared a state of emergency and banned several religious organiza-
tions, the TJ was spared and was allowed to carry on its activities un-
hindered. It is a mark of the politically quiescent theology of the TJ,
which is quite acceptable to the Indian state, that the TJ continues to
have its global headquarters in the very heart of Delhi. As the move-
ment has expanded to other countries where Muslims live as minori-
ties, the TJÕs disavowal of any political aims has enabled it to function
relatively free of state control. In this way, the TJ enabled its followers
to come to terms with the secular state by personalizing Islam, making
a de facto distinction between religion and politics. 
The TJ sees present-day Muslims living in a situation similar to that of
what it calls the ProphetÕs ÔMeccan periodÕ, when the ProphetÕs follow-
ers in Mecca were still learning about their faith. This is contrasted with
the later ÔMedinan periodÕ when the Prophet established an Islamic
state. In this way, while not denying the centrality of the Islamic state,
the TJ effectively postpones its establishment into the indefinite future,
when Muslims would become Ôso firm in their faith as to bring back to
life the days of the Companions of the Prophet in MedinaÕ. For the pre-
sent, however, it allows for Muslims to adjust themselves to a situation
of non-Islamic rule while remaining committed to their faith. This ac-
commodation to secularism is, however, ambiguous and not free from
tension. On the one hand, the TJÕs advocacy of global Muslim unity rep-
resents an implicit critique of the nation-state system. Likewise, its ef-
forts at building a sense of Muslim identity, bringing Muslims all over
the world together in a common mission, maintaining a strong sense of
separate cultural identity and superiority, and condemning the popular
culture that Muslims in local contexts share with others, has important
political consequences in religiously plural societies. On the other hand,
A c t i v i s m
The Tablighi Jama'at (TJ) is the largest Islamic
movement in the world today. Its founder,
Muhammad Ilyas, believed that Muslims had
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the politically quiescent nature of the
TJ has won for it sharp criticism in some
Muslim circles, who see this posture as
calculated to serve the political inter-
ests of what are described as the Ôene-
mies of IslamÕ. Some Muslims see the TJ
as a tool in the hands of Ôanti-IslamicÕ
forces by helping to de-politicize Mus-
lims by preaching otherworldliness and
disdain for power. 
In some cases the TJ has acted to
counter the influence of Islamist groups
and enable Muslims to come to adjust to
non-Islamic state structures, while in
others it has lent support to Islamist
groups, indirectly, by promoting an en-
vironment in which Islamist groups can
flourish, as well as more directly. In such
cases, participation in the TJ can be seen
as a critique of existing political systems.
It also represents an implicit questioning
of the legitimacy of corrupt ruling lites
with their Ôun-IslamicÕ ways. 
TJ and politics in Muslim
majority countries 
The diverse political roles that the TJ has played can be seen in the
dynamics of its relations with the state and with Islamist forces in sev-
eral Muslim countries. In Pakistan, where it has strong presence, the TJ
has been encouraged by the authorities as a counter to the Islamist Ja-
ma'at-i-Islami, which, with its campaign for an Islamic political order,
poses an increasingly powerful political challenge to ruling lites. On
the other hand, the TJ has helped promote commitment to an activist
vision of Islam conducive to the growth of Islamist movements. Thus,
for instance, in Bangladesh, following the suppression of pro-Pakistan
Islamist groups in the wake of the countryÕs liberation struggle, the TJ
helped keep ÔIslamic sentiment aliveÕ and Ôcreated conditions for the
underground Islamic leaders to appear on the surfaceÕ. Numerous Is-
lamist activists were able to escape state repression by joining the TJ.
Recognizing the supportive role that the TJ might play vis--vis Islamist
movements, one sympathizer writes that the TJ is silently preparing
Muslims all over the world for a goal that he sees it as sharing with Is-
lamist groupsÑto engage in the Ôlesser jihadÕ or physical warfare
against the Ôenemies of IslamÕ, if required, by training its activists to
sacrifice their money and time for missionary work. However, he says,
Ôif occasion arises and if the policy is changed ... Tabligh is the Islamic
movement which can call upon its dedicated followers not only to do-
nate their time and money but also their lives to the cause of IslamÕ.3
Similarly, another TJ supporter writes that the TJ has been Ômerely lay-
ing the groundwork for a much greater missionÕ, which includes physi-
cal jihad, if necessary, and the struggle for the establishment of an Is-
lamic polity. In both t a b l i g h and jihad, he says, one can Ôperceive a con-
gruence of aims and objectivesÕ, both being Ômanifestations of the
same impulseÕ.4
Several individuals originally associated with the TJ have been in-
spired by the movement to assume more assertive political positions in
other Islamist organizations. Some leading Islamist activists have had
their first exposure to Islamic revival in the TJ. These include Ghulam
'Azam, a m i r of BangladeshÕs Jama'at-i Islami, Rachid Ghannoushi of the
Tunisian Islamic Tendency Movement, and Farid Kassim of the Hizb ut-
Tahrir in Britain. Islamists, thus, enjoy an ambiguous relationship with
the TJ. While some condemn it for allegedly being apolitical and thus
helping the Ôenemies of IslamÕ, others welcome its role in promoting Is-
lamic awareness among Muslims and so helping the cause of Islamist
movements. Thus, for instance, some Muslims associated with the Tal-
iban in Afghanistan, which, like the TJ, has its roots in the Deobandi re-
formist tradition, see the TJ as playing a complimentary role. A pro-Tal-
iban website (http://www.almadinah.org) also supports the TJ. Such
coordination between militants and Tablighi preachers is not limited
to cyberspace. Reports speak of involvement in the work of the TJ of
the militant Pakistan-based Islamist Harkat ul-Mujahidin. A spokesman
of the latter claims that Ô[o]ur people are mostly impressed by the TJ.
Most of our workers come from the TJ.Õ5
In some Muslim countries, the TJ counts among its activists several
government officials, who play an important role in furthering the aims
of the movement and promoting a gradual Islamization of state struc-
tures and civil society. In this way, too, the TJ has served important po-
litical functions. Thus, in Bangladesh the TJ is active among the coun-
tryÕs armed forces. In Pakistan, Rafiq Tarar, a TJ activist, served as presi-
dent for a considerable period until he was deposed in June 2001.
Mufti Mahmud, k h a l i f a of the leading Tablighi ideologue, Muhammad
Zakariya, was elected chief minister of PakistanÕs Frontier Province,
playing a leading role in the agitation for the Ôprophetic systemÕ, which
led to the toppling of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Another senior TJ activist,
Javed Nasir, served as the head of PakistanÕs Inter-Services Intelligence,
being responsible for the formulation of PakistanÕs policy in the
Afghan war. The former prime minister of the country, Nawaz Sharif,
once arranged for Tariq Jamil, senior Tablighi leader, to address his
cabinet on Ôthe responsibilities of rulers in the light of Islamic teach-
ingsÕ. In his lecture, Jamil appealed to Sharif to Ôenforce an Islamic sys-
temÕ similar to that in Afghanistan under the Taliban. In this way, TJ ac-
tivists have not desisted from occupying important political posts and
using access to power to further the cause of their movement. 
As this survey suggests, the ways in which TJ activists have been im-
plicated in politics demands a reconsideration of Tablighi apolitical-
n e s s. A more nuanced understanding, that goes beyond the level of
verbal TJ discourse to reveal the political roles that it has played, shows
that the TJ might well be impelled by a long-term political agenda. 
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The gradual Islamization process and
the increasing accentuation of the Is-
lamic identity of Bangladesh has signif-
icantly facilitated the growth and de-
velopment of Jama'at-e-Islami (JI). Even
though Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the
first leader of Bangladesh known for
his secular moorings and commit-
ments, initially banned all religious
parties and groups, he was eventually
compelled to recognize the impor-
tance of religious identity and started
using Islamic symbolism. The entry of
the military into the political arena fol-
lowing the assassination of Mujib in
1975 furthered the Islamization
process which was a prime supporter of military rule since its conserv-
ative elements supported the religious agenda. As a result, in 1976 Is-
lamic parties were legalized and allowed to participate in local and na-
tional elections. The new constitution, introduced in 1977, replaced
secularism with Ôabsolute trust and faith in the almighty Allah.Õ Two
years later, Gen. Ziaur Rahman amended the preamble and introduced
a salutation to Allah. JI became the principal beneficiary of the de-sec-
ularization process. A statement by JIÕs current leader, Ameer Motiur
Rahman Nizami, aptly sums up the partyÕs political strategic outlook. In
his view, JIÕs aim Ôis to establish a modern and progressive Islamic wel-
fare state by mobilizing public opinion through constructive pro-
grammes and a systematic and peaceful movement.Õ1
Electoral politics 
Initially JI competed in the Jatiya Sangsad (Parliamentary) elections
as part of a joint platform with the Muslim League, and then in 1986,
having gained confidence, opted to participate in the elections on its
own and secured ten seats. By the time the first truly multiparty elec-
tions were held in 1991, the Islamization process was firmly in place,
and the rehabilitation of JI was complete since its previous opposition
to the liberation of East Pakistan in 1971 had ceased being a political li-
ability. In 1991 it secured 6 percent of the popular vote and eighteen
seats in the 300-member Jatiya Sangsad. Its strength dwindled to three
seats in 1996 but rose to seventeen seats five years later. 
Parliamentary elections do not alone portray the growing influence
of JI. The pressures of electoral arithmetic compelled both the secular-
ly oriented Awami League, led by MujibÕs daughter Hasina, and the
right wing Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Gen. ZiaÕs widow
Khaleda, to seek JIÕs support. In the bargain the Islamic party has
emerged as a major player in coalition-building. Its strength lies in its
ability to forge issue-based partnerships with diverse groups even
while retaining its Islamic credentials. JI is not averse to uniting in com-
mon cause with the two principal forces in Bangladesh and has actual-
ly capitalized on the mutual antagonism and animosity between Hasi-
na and Khaleda. 
Thus in some form or another, JI has been instrumental in the forma-
tion of all three governments since 1991. The alliance with JI largely en-
abled the BNP to secure absolute majority victories in 1991 and 2001.
Dissolution of this alliance proved costly in 1996 when the Awami
League secured the largest number of seats in the Jatiya Sangsad. Al-
though the BNP is seen as the natural
ally of JI, even the Awami League was
not averse to reaching tactical under-
standings with the Islamic group. At-
tempts by Hasina (1996-2001) with her
secular credentials, to co-opt JI during
the oppositionÕs boycott of parliament,
considerably enhanced the political
acceptability of JI. 
The Islamization of Bangladesh and
the growth of JI are manifestations of
the far-reaching changes taking place
in Bangladesh. Despite its vowed com-
mitment to secularism, for example,
the Awami has adopted a number of
overtly religious policies to win over
mainstream voters. During the recent elections, it promised in its man-
ifesto not to enact any legislation running contrary to the Qur'an and
pledged to establish a s h a r i ' a bench in the Supreme Court. JI, which
competed in the election as an ally of BNP, sought to regulate and in-
stitutionalize Ômosque-based education.Õ Other parties have also
adopted overtly religious standpoints and policies in their mani-
festoes. 
Contrary to initial expectations, the September 11 attacks in the US did
not neutralize the growing power of the Islamic parties in Bangladesh.
JI went on to secure more seats in Jatiya Sangsad than at any previous
time. If one includes the seats won by other religious parties in the
total, the Islamists secured thirty-three seats.2
Having managed to influenceÑand also to highly benefit fromÑthe
Islamization process, JI has opted for gradualism as its electoral strate-
gy. The party has recognized the difficulties of securing power in a per-
sonality-dominated society through the religious agenda alone. With a
long-term approach in mind it looks to students and women as its
prime constituents. The two portfolios that JI currently holds in the
BNP-led government underscore the rural focus of the party. While the
JI leader, Motiur Rahman Nizami, was the minister of agriculture, his
colleague Ali Ahsan Mohammad holds the social welfare portfolio. And
in a country that is almost entirely agro-based, the importance of an
agricultural portfolio is obvious, and likewise much of the Bangladeshi
population depends upon the state for its welfare. This perhaps ex-
plains NizamiÕs shunting out to a less significant industry portfolio dur-
ing the May 2003 cabinet reshuffling. 
Jama'at as an alternative 
Neither the BNP nor the Awami could afford to ignore JI in any future
coalition-making. By contributing to KhaledaÕs spectacular victory in 2001
JI has acquired significant leverage vis--vis the BNP. Therefore, the suc-
cess of any attempts by Hasina to unseat Khaleda, either at the next Jatiya
Sangsad elections or through the time-tested strategy of street protests,
would depend upon HasinaÕs ability to wean JI away from the BNP. In
short, both Khaleda and Hasina would be wise to enlist the support of JI
before facing the electorate, thereby further enhancing JIÕs bargaining
powers. 
Moreover, the power base of the countryÕs main protagonists also
favours JI. While the BNP is seen as an elitist party with an urban fol-
lowing, comprised mainly of professionals and the military, the
P o l i t i c s
As a coalition partner in the ruling coalition,
Jama'at-e-Islami (JI) occupies an important
place in Bangladeshi politics. The party has
come a long way since its opposition to the
liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, and has
gradually established itself as a key player in
national politics. Over the years, it has
adopted moderate right wing positions,
focused itself on social welfare activities,
consolidated its political base through skillful
manoeuvres, and forged successful electoral
alliances. In so doing, it has expanded its
influence and emerged as a key player in
determining the ruling composition in
Bangladeshi politics. 
Ascendance of
J a m a ' a t - e - I s l a m i
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P u b l i c a t i o n
The Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures (EWIC) is an interdis-
ciplinary, transhistorical, global project covering women and Islamic
cultures. EWIC entries span the period just before the rise of Islam to
the present. EWIC takes on cutting edge issues to stimulate new re-
search and advance the frontiers of knowledge and covers a broad
sweep of topics to inform a general audience. The goal of EWIC is to
survey numerous facets of womenÕs lives in areas such as society, econ-
omy, politics, religion, the arts, popular culture, sports, health, science
and environment where Islam has made significant contributions. 
With five Associate Editors (Afsaneh Najmabadi, Harvard University;
Julie Peteet, University of Louisville; Seteney Shami, Social Science Re-
search Council; Jacqueline Siapno, University of Melbourne; and Jane I.
Smith, Hartford Seminary) and a board of 41 International Advisory Ed-
itors, the EWIC project is a multiple year effort to bring together up-
wards of one thousand scholars world-wide to write critical essays on
women and Islamic cultures. EWIC has grown from the originally con-
ceived three volumes and 1,500,000 words to 4,000,000 words to be
published in a staggered fashion starting with Volume I in the fall of
2003. With research on women and Islamic cultures burgeoning, on-
line, CD and paperback versions are distinct possibilities. 
Guiding vision of EWIC
Encyclopedias aim to be authorities, often definitive authorities on
their subject matter, a notion the editors are also problemetizing. From
its first meeting in June 1999 the Editorial Board of EWIC shared an
acute appreciation of the situatedness and historicity of knowledge
production. At every step we reflected and evaluated the choices be-
fore us in terms of the impact our decisions would have on the kind of
ÔknowledgeÕ EWIC would present and represent. The Editors did not al-
ways agree on all issues, but we all recognized that the EWIC project
was an opportunity to define a field of knowledge. We choose the title
Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures because it conveys an ap-
proach to a civilizational history. By using the term ÔIslamic culturesÕ we
meant to veer away from the notion that EWIC would focus on reli-
gious texts (although it does cover them) and to direct attention to the
broad panoply of issues that are embraced within the arms of ÔcultureÕ. 
We were committed to deessentializing Islam. To do this, we needed
to contextualize, historicize and regionalize the experiences of women
and Islamic cultures. We designed entries which situated issues of rele-
vance to women within specific historical periods, political regimes
and localities. As the production of knowledge is conditioned by the
socio-political environments in which it is produced, this historical ap-
proach allowed us to identify critical changes in methodologies, re-
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AwamiÕs strength lies in the middle classes of rural Bangladesh, com-
prised of teachers, shopkeepers and other literates. The lower strata of
rural Bangladesh, which is largely comprised of agricultural labourers,
provide a fertile ground for JI and its Islamization campaign. The
m a d r a s a-based education system, which is dominant in the rural areas,
also works in favour of JI. In short, since much of the Bangladeshi pop-
ulation is rural, economically backward, and illiterate, neither the BNP
nor the Awami League would be able to stemÑlet alone reverseÑthe
growth of JI. 
The growth of JI is also facilitated by the absence of any ideological di-
vide between the Awami League and the BNP; both of these parties em-
brace extremely personalized ideologies centred completely on the
two leading ladies themselves. JI on the contrary, does not suffer from
any of these negative associations and instead enjoys the reputation of
being a clean, ideologically firm and corruption-free party. Because it is
cadre-based, JI is more disciplined than the mass-based Awami League
and BNP parties. As the most well organized and tightly knit party, as
well as possessing such a well defined and disciplined cadre, JI is able to
attract a wide section of support through a host of local networks and
social welfare programmes. Calculatedly, JI knowsÑand exploits the
factÑthat the goodwill and popularity it generates through various
welfare activities in the community will transform into political support
and electoral gains. This mass appeal enables JI to easily mobilize finan-
cial resources without resorting to corrupt prac-
tices. Given these circumstances, it is likely that JI
could prove to be a credible and corruption-free
alternative to the BNP and Awami League. 
Encyclopedia of Women
and Islamic Cultures
N o t e s
1 . Speech by Ameer Nizami in September
2003. Full text can be found at
http://www.jamaat-e-islami.org 
2 . The seats won by the religious parties are as
follows: JI 17; Islamic Oikye Jote (IOJ) 2; and
Islami Jatiya Oikya Front (IOJF) 14. The first
two parties competed in the 2001 elections
under the four-party alliance led by the BNP. 
Sreeradha Datta is an associate fellow at the Institute
f o r Defence Studies and Analyses, (IDSA), New Delhi, India.
The views of the author should not be attributed to any
institute or organization. 
E-mail: sreeradha@yahoo.com
sources and paradigms. EWIC worked to decenter the common ÔMiddle
EastÕ focus of research dealing with women and Islamic cultures by re-
cruiting editors, advisory editors, entries and authors from all over the
world. As news spread about the EWIC project, scholars and writers
began contacting us. The database has grown to over nine hundred
self-volunteered potential authors. 
The literature in the many fields encompassed by EWIC is rapidly ex-
panding. Research on women and Islamic cultures is theoretically and
empirically at the frontiers of many disciplines. At the same time the idea
of the ÔMuslim womanÕ or the Ôwoman and IslamÕ has come to have a po-
litical and historical salience, particularly in Western media and scholar-
ship, but also on a global scale, that is often fabricated for these women,
often out of cloth that is not of their weaving. The goal of EWIC is to cap-
ture knowledge in the frame of history, to historicize knowledge in the
context of place and to place knowledge at the service of those who may
be enriched by understanding its processes of production.
For further information about The Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures, and for
writers interested in contributing to future EWIC volumes and editions, please see
http://sjoseph.ucdavis.edu/ewic or the Brill website http://www.brill.nl/.
Suad Joseph is General Editor of EWIC, University of California, Davis
E-mail: sjoseph@ucdavis.edu 
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The marked diversity and heterogene-
ity of Islam in South Africa originate in
the history of migration. During differ-
ent historical periods, various ethnici-
ties bearing witness to Islam immigrat-
ed to the most southern part of Africa
either voluntarily or by force, thus
shaping the readings of Islam in the
country. The different phases of migra-
tion correspond to the regional con-
centration of Muslims of Indonesian or
Malay origin and cultural background
in the Western Cape, and Muslims of Indian or Indo-Pakistani origin and
culture in Natal and Transvaal. Despite increasing mobility, this concen-
tration is obvious even nowadays. Islam in Natal and Transvaal reflects
Indian and Indo-Pakistani features, whereas in the Western Cape it cor-
responds to a cultural synthesis combining elements of Southeast
Asian Islam with elements of both the indigenous and African cultures. 
The visibility of the Muslim community
in South Africa and its political and so-
cietal participation may be seen as a
post-apartheid phenomenon since nu-
merous ministerial offices and other
significant positions and professions
are held and practised by Muslims.
However, even since the nineteenth
century many Muslim institutions such
as mosques and Qur'anic schools (and
also modern Muslim schools and col-
leges) have been established in the
Western Cape, Natal, and Transvaal and contributed to the integration
of Muslims in South African society. Ironically the ideology of apartheid
reinforced the differences amongst the various groups and simultane-
ously gave the impulse for changes in organization and discourse. The
latter were initiated particularly from the mid-1970s on with the crisis
and gradual decline of the political system. Muslims then entered the
political arena, offering an Islam-motivated resistance to apartheid. 
After political liberation and the relatively peaceful transition from
apartheid to democracy, South AfricaÕs Muslims found themselves
needing to deal with several challenges in the context of a multi-cul-
tural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-religious society. The new
socio-political context is accompanied by a resurgence of differences
within and between the various Muslim communities, even more so
because alliances linked to the common struggle against the oppres-
sive system became obsolete. Post-apartheid South Africa requires
forms of contextualization concerning the readings of Islam that differ
from those of the last decades under apartheid. National interests
need to be brought into line with the demands of the different Muslim
communities, while at the same time mediating in the controversies
between them. The current debates with regard to Muslim Personal
Law, which needs to be modified according the demands of the con-
stitution (in terms of gender equality notably) in order to be imple-
mented, are but one example that illustrates the tensions between
the different communities. They reveal the fragility of the achieve-
ments concerning progressive and contextualized readings of Islam
during the struggle for democracy. A deeper understanding of con-
temporary developments must take into consideration the complex
structures and fundamental changes in discourse during the last peri-
od of the apartheid system as well as the underlying dynamics both
within and between the Muslim communities and with the broader
society. 
Muslim communities under apartheid 
Apartheid divided the entire society, artificially segregating groups ac-
cording to ÔracialÕ classification while referring to already existing eth-
nic and cultural differences. The specific hierarchy established by this
ideology either created cultural entities or fostered those prevailing for
the time being and made them permanent. Those originating from the
islands of Indonesia and Southeast Asia more generally were classified
as ÔColouredÕ, in contrast to those of Indian or Indo-Pakistani origin,
who were classified as ÔIndiansÕ or ÔAsiansÕ. On top of the social pyramid
were ÔWhitesÕ, followed by ÔIndiansÕ/ÕAsiansÕ, enjoying numerous privi-
leges in comparison with the ÔColouredÕ population, whose status was
in turn superior to that of ÔBlacksÕ.2 Unlike the latter, ÔColouredÕ and ÔIn-
dians/AsiansÕ had access to good education and therefore to socially
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to that of the Muslim world in general. Despite
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Africa (approximately 550000 Muslim
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respected professions in fields such as medicine, law, and business. Re-
ligious practices were not affected by apartheid. 
At a first glance, the differences between the communities of the
Western Cape and those of Natal and Transvaal seem to be cultural,
ethnic, and linguistic. However, on closer examination we find consid-
erable differences with regard to questions of theology and religious
practices. Both the cultural background and the historically rooted dif-
ferent social statuses shapedÑand continue to shapeÑthe corre-
sponding religious institutions, rituals, and symbols. 
Three hundred years of coexistence of ÔColouredÕ Muslims with other
communitiesÑboth religious and cultural onesÑled to the creation of
a unique culture with a particular cultural flexibility. The common lan-
guage, Afrikaans, strengthened the sense of belonging. The communi-
ties in the Cape province were also called ÔCape MalaysÕ, a term dating
back to an ethnic classification by the British in the early nineteenth
century and whose meaning, over the course of time, came to corre-
spond to an exclusive identity. ÔCape MalaysÕ were considered to be
peaceful and loyal, and were known for their religious parochialism
and their unquestioned acceptance of white dominance. This ÔMalay-
ismÕ was characterized as something that Ô[set] them apart, but also
above the other people of colour in their common environment. And
though they were subjected to the same forces of oppression they
were made to believe that they were the Òelite of the colouredÓ people.
This exclusivity and false superiority made it difficult for them to fuse
with the other sections of the oppressed, and to develop a common
united struggle against oppressionÕ (Davids 1985:6).
With regard to the communities of Indian or Indo-Pakistani origin a
fusion with elements of pre-existing local cultures never took place. On
the contrary, cultural particularism prevented processes of accultura-
tion. In comparison to the communities of the Western Cape, Indo-Pak-
istani communities were culturally rigid and fostered conservative po-
sitions regarding the relations to non-Muslim communities and the va-
riety of competing approaches to Islam existing in India that came
through migration to South Africa.3 In addition to the regional, cultur-
al, and linguistic differences that discouraged any exchange between
the communities, different approaches concerning religious practices
and theology contributed to deepening the rifts rather than overcom-
ing them. 
Nevertheless the established orthodoxy, i.e. the ulama, of all commu-
nities shared two attitudes: they generally were conservative and
showed little preparedness for change, and they declared considerable
loyalty to the government in power, being responsive to co-optation.
For many Muslims there was neither the need nor the capacity to
change the status quo or to initiate resistance against apartheid, even
more so because religious practice was not restricted. Almost all
ulamaÑand this is true for the Western Cape, Natal, and Transvaal
alikeÑwere complacent, silent, even apolitical with regard to the po-
litical landscape, especially in the course of the 1960s and 1970s.4
Muslim awakening 
The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a general trend towards an increas-
ing political consciousness and therefore a constantly growing resis-
tance movement against apartheid, especially after the Soweto upris-
ings of 1976. This also affected the Muslim communities and the orga-
nizations that had been established during the 1970s or had emerged
as offshoots and transformations of already existing organizations that
reshaped their aims and perspectives.5 In view of the extremely domi-
nant clergy and in the absence of an alternative leadership during their
formative years, the new organizations were moulded by the emer-
gence of a progressive counterpart to the traditional ulama. The mo-
nopoly of the latter in the area of interpretation and the religious
parochialism was called into question. Thus the organizations started
as purely religio-cultural movements that were trying to reformulate a
Muslim identity that differed from the ulamaÕs version. This process of
emancipation of the established religious leadership seemed to lay the
foundation that was necessary to examine the possibility and the na-
ture of a cultural, social, and political commitment for Muslims within
the broader South African context. The coincidence of such internal
development with the unfolding struggle in general and the social cri-
sis of the 1980s created a climate in which practical action and political
commitment became absolutely imperative. The organizations under-
went a shift of paradigm that can be described as a process consisting
of three phases: the propagation of Islam as a way of life, i.e. a purely
religio-cultural approach; the replacement of the latter by the ideology
of Islamism, the approach being transformed into one shaped by the
particular socio-political context of the country; and finally the devel-
opment of a particular hermeneutics of resistance against oppressive
systems like apartheid ideology. Muslim organizations entered the po-
litical scene while contributing to the anti-apartheid struggle motivat-
ed by a contextualized approach of Islam. 
Post-apartheid challenges
Political liberation raised new questions with regard to the identity
of South African Muslims. The unifying elements in the course of the
common struggle against apartheid do not persist any longer. On the
contrary, the relative unanimity during the last two decades of
apartheid was not sustainable enough to continue in a different socio-
political context. On the one hand, many of the former active organi-
zations nowadays are paper tigers rather than contributors to societal
debates. On the other hand, numerous leaders
standing for a progressive and contextualized
reading of Islam either left the organizations and
took other responsibilities or left the country. This
explains why rather conservative groups and or-
ganizations, such as the ulama umbrella organi-
zations Muslim Judicial Council in the Western
Cape, Jami'at ul-Ulema Natal, and Jami'at ul-
Ulema Transvaal, could regain considerable influ-
ence. 
Taking into consideration that progressive the-
ology is a very recent phenomenon in South
Africa and particularly linked to the socio-political
context of apartheid, it should not be surprising
that with the political transformation and the so-
cietal and social uncertainties, conservative and
traditional forces, i.e. the established ulama,
resurge. This is even more so because they enjoy
a certain social consolidation for historical rea-
sons and had established a solid infrastructure in
contrast to their progressive counterpart. What is
striking is that they also enjoy considerable sup-
port from the government, e.g. concerning the
implementation of Muslim Personal Law, despite
massive protestations. The ANC preferred to co-
operate with conservative groups and ulama
bodies than with what was the new lite of politi-
cal leaders and thinkers. 
South Africa is an important example of the un-
deniable impact of socio-political circumstances
on the renewal of Islam in the context of contem-
porary societies, both in the course of apartheid
and in the post-apartheid past, present, and fu-
ture. The challenges of a contextualized Islam still
c o n t i n u e .
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1 . Haferburg 2000:33, referring to the 1996
Census Database.
2 . Although it seems to be problematic to use
these apartheid terms, it is important to
mention that they have not been
substituted by other terms. On the contrary,
South Africans appropriated them while
changing their racist connotations. See also
Erasmus 2001.
3 . For further details on the different
approaches see Gnther 2002a. 
4 . The reactions concerning the death in
detention of the activist Imam Haron in 1969
provide but one example of the complacent
attitude of the ulama and their influence on
the community. See Gnther 2002b.
5 . Like the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM),
founded in 1970; the Muslim Students
Association (MSA), founded in 1974; Qibla,
founded in 1980Õ and Call of Islam, founded
in 1984. The latter is an offshoot of the MYM
for reasons of dissent concerning the
political commitment and the issue of
affiliation to non-Muslim anti-apartheid
organizations. Qibla is not an offshoot of a
former organization, despite its having
recruited many members from both the
MYM and the MSA.
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Progressive Islam encompasses a num-
ber of themes: striving to realize a just
and pluralistic society through a criti-
cal engagement with Islam, a relent-
less pursuit of social justice, an empha-
sis on gender equality as a foundation
of human rights, and a vision of reli-
gious and ethnic pluralism. 
Muslim libera(c)tion:
Progressive Muslims perceive them-
selves as the advocates of human be-
ings all over the world who, through
no fault of their own, live in situations
of perpetual poverty, pollution, op-
pression, and marginalization. Their
task is to give voice to the voiceless,
power to the powerless, and confront
the Ôpowers that beÕ who disregard the
God-given human dignity of the m u s-
t a d ' a f u n all over this Earth. Muslim pro-
gressives draw on the strong tradition
of social justice from within Islam from
sources as diverse as the Qur'an and h a d i t h to more recent authorities
and spokespersons such as Shari'ati. Their methodological fluidity is
apparent in their pluralistic epistemology, which freely and openly
draws from sources outside of Islamic tradition which can serve as use-
ful tools in the global pursuit of justice. These external sources include
the liberation theology of Leonardo Boff, Gustavo Gutirrez, and Re-
becca S. Chopp, as well as the secular humanism
of Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, etc. Progressive
Muslims are likely to combine a Qur'anic call for
serving as Ôwitnesses for God in justiceÕ (Qur'an
42:15), with an Edward Said-ian call to Ôspeak
truth to the powers.Õ 
The question, asked by Peter Mandaville,2
whether progressive Muslims reflect or initiate
larger social processes of transformations, is a
non-starter as it is premised on an initial dichoto-
my between intellectual pursuit and activism that
progressives do not accept. Whereas many
(though not all) of the previous generations of
ÔliberalÕ Muslims were at times defined by a pure-
ly academic approach that reflected their elite
status, progressive Muslims fully realize that the
social injustices around them are reflected in,
connected to, and justified in terms of intellectu-
al discourses. They are, in this respect, fully indebted to the majestic
criticism of Edward Said. Progressive Muslims are concerned not sim-
ply with laying out a fantastic, beatific vision of social justice and
peace, but also with transforming hearts and societies alike. A progres-
sive commitment implies by necessity the willingness to remain en-
gaged with the issues of social justice as they unfold on the ground
level, in the lived realities of Muslim and non-Muslim communities. 
Progressive Muslims follow squarely in the footsteps of liberation the-
ologians such as Leonardo Boff, who deemed a purely conceptual criti-
cism of theology, devoid of any real commitment to the oppressed, as
Ôradically irrelevant.Õ3 Boff recognized that liberao ( l i b e r a t i o n ) links the
concepts l i b e r (free) and a   o ( a c t i o n ) :4 There is no liberation without
action. In drawing on both Boff as well as Rebecca Chopp, I have before
stated that: ÔVision and activism are both necessary. Activism without
vision is doomed from the start. Vision without activism quickly be-
comes irrelevant.Õ5 This informed social
activism is visible in many progressive
Muslim organizations and movements
ranging from the work of Chandra
Muzaffar with the International Move-
ment for a Just World in Malaysia,6 t h e
efforts of Farid Esack with HIV-positive
Muslims in South Africa,7 to the work of
the recent Nobel Peace Prize Winner,
Shirin Ebadi8 with groups such as the
Iranian ChildrenÕs Rights Society.9 It is
thus not the case that only certain Ôsu-
perstarsÕ among progressive Muslims
occupy themselves with activist ap-
proaches. One only need spend some
time talking with the many individuals
who are active in the various progres-
sive Muslim organizations to witness
the astonishing array of peace and so-
cial justice movements, grassroots or-
ganizations, human rights efforts, etc.,
that they are involved in.
Progressive Islam as an Islamic humanism 
At the heart of a progressive Muslim interpretation is a simple yet rad-
ical idea: every human individual, female or male, Muslim or non-Mus-
lim, rich or poor, northerner or southerner, has exactly the same intrin-
sic worth. The essential value of human life is God-given, and is in no
way connected to culture, geography, or privilege. A progressive Mus-
lim is one who is committed to the strangely controversial idea that the
true measure of a human beingÕs worth is a personÕs character, and not
the oil under their soil or their particular flag. A progressive Muslim
agenda is concerned with the ramifications of the premise that all mem-
bers of the human race have this same intrinsic worth because each of
us has the breath of God breathed into our being: wa nafakhtu fihi min
r u h i . (Qur'an 15:29 and 38:72). This identification with the full humanity
of all human beings amounts to nothing short of an Islamic Humanism.
An increasing number of those who advocate such a humanistic
framework within the context of Islam have self-labelled themselves
progressive Muslims. ÔProgressiveÕ refers to a relentless striving to-
wards a universal notion of justice in which no single communityÕs
prosperity, righteousness, and dignity come at the expense of anoth-
erÕs. Adherents of progressive Islam conceive of a way of being Muslim
that engages and affirms the humanity of all human beings, that ac-
tively holds all of us responsible for a fair and just distribution of our
God-given natural resources, and that seeks to live in harmony with
the natural world.
Engaging tradition
Progressive Muslims insist on a serious engagement with the full
spectrum of Islamic thought and practices. There can be no progres-
sive Muslim movement that does not engage the very ÔstuffÕ (textual
and material sources) of the Islamic tradition, even if some wish to de-
bate what ÔstuffÕ this should be and how it ought to be interpreted. Pro-
gressives generally maintain that it is imperative to work through the
inherited traditions of thought and practice. In particular cases, they
might conclude that certain pre-existing interpretations fail to offer us
sufficient guidance today. However, they can only faithfully claim that
position afterÑand not beforeÑa serious engagement with the tradi-
tion. To move beyond problematic past and present interpretations of
Islam, progressive Muslims have to pass critically through them and ex-
perience them first-hand.
A c t i v i s m
The various understandings of Islam which fall
under the rubric of ÔprogressiveÕ are both
continuations of, and radical departures from,
the hundred and fifty year old tradition of
liberal Islam.1 Liberal advocates of Islam
generally display an uncritical, almost
devotional identification with modernity, and
often (but do not always) by-pass discussions
of colonialism and imperialism. Progressive
advocates of Islam, on the other hand, are
almost uniformly critical of colonialism, both
of its nineteenth century manifestation and its
current variety. Progressive Muslims espouse
a critical and non-apologetic Ômultiple
critiqueÕ with respect to both Islam and
modernity. They are undoubtedly post-
modern in the sense of their critical approach
to modernity. That double engagement with
the varieties of Islam and modernity, plus an
emphasis on concrete social action and
transformation, is the defining characteristic
of progressive Islam today.
What is 
Progressive Islam?
Gender equality is
a measuring stick for
t h e broader concerns
o f social justice and
p l u r a l i s m .
A c t i v i s m
Justice lies at the heart of Islamic social
ethics. Time and again the Qur'an talks
about providing for the marginalized
members of society: the poor, the or-
phaned, the downtrodden, the wayfar-
ing, the hungry, etc. Progressive Mus-
lims believe that it is time to ÔtranslateÕ
the social ideals in the Qur'an and Is-
lamic teachings into a way of action
that those committed to social justice
today can relate to and understand.
For all Muslims, there is the vibrant
memory of the Prophet repeatedly
talking about a real believer as one
whose neighbour does not go to bed
hungry. Progressives hold that in
todayÕs global village it is time to con-
sider all of humanity as our neighbor.
The time has come for Muslims who
wish to be true believers to be respon-
sible for the well-being and dignity of
all human beings.
Progressive Muslims begin with a
simple yet radical stance: that the Mus-
lim community as a whole cannot
achieve justice unless justice is guaran-
teed for Muslim women. In short, there
can be no progressive interpretation of Islam without gender justice.
Gender justice is crucial, indispensable, and essential. In the long run,
any progressive Muslim interpretation will be judged based on the
amount of change in gender equality it is able to produce in small and
large communities. Gender equality is a measuring stick for the broad-
er concerns of social justice and pluralism. As Shirin Ebadi has stated, it
is imperative to conceive of womenÕs rights as human rights. Progres-
sive Muslims strive for pluralism both inside and outside of the u m m a.
They seek to open up a wider spectrum of interpretations and prac-
tices considered Muslim, and epistemologically follow a pluralistic ap-
proach to the pursuit of knowledge and truth. In their interactions with
other religious and ethnic communities, they seek to transcend the ar-
cane notions of ÔtoleranceÕ, and instead strive for a profound engage-
ment through both existing commonalities and differences.
Is this an ÔIslamic ReformationÕ?
Progressive Muslims are often asked whether their project consti-
tutes an ÔIslamic reformation.Õ The answer is both yes and no. It is un-
deniably true that there are serious economic, social, and political is-
sues in the Muslim world that need urgent remedying. Much of the
Muslim world is bound to a deeply disturbing economic structure in
which it provides natural resources for the global market, while at the
same time remaining dependent on Western labour, technological
know-how, and staple goods. This deplorable economic situation is ex-
acerbated in many parts of the modern Muslim world by atrocious
human rights situations, crumbling educational systems, and worn-out
economies. Most progressive Muslims would readily support the re-
form of all those institutions. However, the term ÔreformationÕ carries
considerably more baggage than that. In speaking of the ÔIslamic refor-
mationÕ, many people have in mind the Protestant Reformation. It is
this understanding that leaves many progressive Muslims feeling un-
easy, for theirs is not a project of developing a ÔProtestantÕ Islam dis-
tinct from a ÔCatholicÕ Islam. Most insist that they are not looking to cre-
ate a further split within the Muslim community so much as to heal this
split and to urge it along. 
A global phenomenon or an American Islam?
It would be a clear mistake to somehow reduce the emergence of
progressive Islam to being a new ÔAmerican Islam.Õ Progressive Mus-
lims are found everywhere in the global Muslim umma. When it comes
to actually implementing a progressive understanding of Islam in Mus-
lim communities, particular communities in Iran, Malaysia, and South
Africa are l e a d i n g, not following, the United States. Many American
Muslim communitiesÑand much of the leadership represented by
groups such as the Islamic Circle of North America,1 0the Islamic Society
of North America,11 and the Council on American-Islamic Relations1 2Ñ
are far too uncritical of Salafi and Wahhabi tendencies that progres-
sives oppose. Lastly, almost all progressive Muslims are profoundly
skeptical of nationalism, whether American, Arab, Iranian, or other-
wise. As such, they instinctively and deliberately reject the appropria-
tion of this fluid global movement by those who espouse it in order to
transform it into an ÔAmerican IslamÕ commodity to be exported all
over the world. The progressivesÕ firm critique of neo-colonialism is
also a way to avoid their appropriation by the United StatesÕ adminis-
tration, which has used the language of reforming Islam to justify its in-
vasion of Muslim countries such as Iraq.
Progressive Muslim Networks 
Perhaps the most exciting part of the new emerging global Muslim
progressive identity is that progressives everywhere are seeking one
another out, reading each otherÕs work, collaborating with one anoth-
erÕs organizations. This is a fruitful process of cross-pollination. One
can point to the impact that Shari'ati has had on South African Mus-
lims, or the impact the Palestinian struggle has had on South East Asian
progressives. Much of this contact is taking place via e-mail. We are
clearly in the initial stages of this formulation, and
it is an exciting process which has the promise of
ushering in a real paradigm shift in the relation-
ship of Muslims to both Islam and modernity. 
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While it would be incorrect to say that
scholarly interest in Iran has waned
since the Islamic Revolution, due to
real and perceived logistical difficulties
in conducting long-term field research,
studies have been limited in terms of
topics and approaches. 
Much of the early scholarship ad-
dressed macro-level research ques-
tions regarding the causes of the Revo-
lution, elite politics and the ideological
bases for post-revolutionary develop-
ments; the principle sources for these
analyses were newspapers, official proclamations, memories and na-
tional statistics. With the gradual opening of Iranian society in the sec-
ond decade after the Revolution, several research centers and net-
works have been established. Scholarly interest in Iran has also gradu-
ally shifted from examining the causes of the Revolution to investigat-
ing its consequences, and scholars are increasingly conducting re-
search based on archival analysis, in-depth interviewing, participant
observation and survey analysis.1
The emerging narratives highlight the
disparities between state rhetoric, offi-
cial policies and actual social reality.
These studies have begun to map a new
configuration of social and political
forces that weave together continuities
and ruptures with the Pahlavi era. It is
an important moment for the academic
community to self-consciously ponder
how and why extensive and fine-tuned
field research can contribute to our un-
derstanding of both contemporary Iran
and social dynamics more broadly. 
Field research should play a particularly privileged role in our study of
contemporary Iran. Conducting empirically grounded research will
help us formulate pertinent research questions, investigate assump-
tions about Iranian society and lead to the re-conceptualization of an-
alytical constructs. Finally, field research can allow us to assess and an-
alyze the extent to which the Islamic Revolution was a s o c i a l r e v o l u-
tion; that is, how changes in the state altered patterns of social rela-
tions. I present these arguments by making reference to research I car-
ried out on the Tehran Bazaar.
Empirically based field research is not always an integral part of re-
search design. For instance, most political scientists derive research
questions from theory in the pursuit of theory testing. Hence, there is a
tendency to view field research as simply a mode of data collection to
measure concepts and variables, test hypotheses and lend credence to
theoretical perspectives. However, given that in Iranian and Middle
Eastern studies more broadly we continue to have little information on
how societies and polities are organized and develop, there exists a
need to systematically generate an empirical base of knowledge which
can enhance concept formation. If our goal is to better understand
Iran, then field research should be as much an epistemological tool as
a methodological one.
Field research as research formulation
I came to appreciate the salience of field research while conducing
comparative research on the social structure of the Tehran Bazaar and
the central bazaars (a s w a q) in Cairo in the post-World War II era. I be-
lieved that contrasting these cases would illuminate the reasons why
the Tehran Bazaar has enjoyed a central role in IranÕs economy and a
number of social movements, while its counterpart in Cairo has had a
far less prominent role.
While conducting preliminary research in Tehran it became quickly
apparent that since the Revolution the BazaarÕs basic institutions, in-
ternal relations and position in the political economy had radically
changed. For instance, promissory notes, which through the 1970s
were a critical instrument of exchange and a means of tying together
various levels of the value chain, had become almost completely obso-
lete and were replaced by cash and checks. Also, the literature from the
pre-revolutionary era claimed that b a z a a r is actively attended religious
events in the Bazaar and religious meetings (or h a y a ts) that were based
on guild membership.2 However, two decades after the Revolution,
many b a z a a r is explained that if they did attend communal religious
events, they were ones in their neighborhoods outside central Tehran
and not necessarily connected to the Bazaar. Finally, and most funda-
mentally in many senses, the interlocking and long-term networks of
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importers, wholesalers, brokers and retailers that prevailed through
much of the twentieth century are currently almost non-existent; they
have been replaced by fragmented clientalistic ties to the regime and
more precarious smuggling networks. In short, our understanding of
the Tehran Bazaar must be sensitive to historical variations, or more
specifically, changes that have occurred since the Islamic Revolution.
Thus, I reformulated my research question to ask how and why the
structure of the Bazaar and state-bazaar relations changed over the
last four decades.
As my research evolved it became apparent that changes in the
Bazaar were not simply related to incremental changes in the socioe-
conomic fabric (e.g. urbanization, industrialization, or improved trans-
portation), but were created and mediated by the interaction between
state policies and the b a z a a r isÕ negotiation of these policies. Thus, we
arrive at an empirical puzzle: why did the organizational structure of
the Tehran Bazaar persist under the anti-traditional Pahlavi regime and
radically alter under the Islamic Republic that sought to preserve it? It
was only through conducting initial field research that I was able to de-
velop this central research question. Had I not visited Iran it is unlikely
that I would have understood that the BazaarÕs organization and posi-
tion in the political economy had undergone transformations. The sec-
ondary literature made little or no reference to the transformation of
bazaars, and prominent figures in the Islamic Republic had identified
the b a z a a r is as a revolutionary group and ally, with the Bazaar repre-
sented as an ÔauthenticÕ and ÔIslamicÕ institution that was to be pre-
served. Yet my exploratory field research generated and framed the re-
search questions by identifying outcomes and processes that contra-
dicted these expectations and claims.
Even the most rudimentary field research can uncover new ques-
tions and challenge accepted notions. For example, most Iran experts
describe the R e s a l a t daily newspaper and Shoma weekly as the voice of
the ultra conservative factions (such as the Islamic Coalition Associa-
tion and Society of the Islamic Associations of TehranÕs Guilds and
Bazaar) that allegedly represent and receive support from the
b a z a a r is .3 Yet there is little evidence of actual b a z a a r i readership of
these papers. If one walks through the Bazaar and pays attention to the
newspapers present in their stores, it becomes evident that they al-
most unanimously read H a m s h a h r i and I r a n, the two most mainstream
and commonly read newspapers in Tehran. Moreover, when inter-
viewed, b a z a a r is rarely, if ever, made reference to R e s a l a t. To lend
some credibility to these observations I asked the newspaper peddlers
in the Bazaar what newspapers sold the most copies. Without excep-
tion peddlers responded that H a m s h a h r i and I r a n were the best sellers
and some even said that they stopped carrying other broadsheets.
Next, I investigated the newspaper kiosks surrounding the Bazaar that
have a wide selection of papers ranging from the continually changing
collection of reformist papers to arch conservative papers, such as
Jam-e Jam, R e s a l a t, and the afternoon K a y h a n. I noticed that at the end
of the day their heaping stacks of H a m s h a h r i and I r a n were generally
sold out, and the reformist selections were well on their way to being
sold out. Meanwhile, a large number of issues of Resalat and other con-
servative papers, in small supply to begin with, remained unsold. 
The point here is that there is plenty of ÔdataÕ available if one is will-
ing to use some creative, even if imprecise measurement and data col-
lection techniques. Researchers will almost inevitably have to adjust
their conceptions and develop new questions once they start gather-
ing even the most cursory data. In terms of the Bazaar, the evidence of
newspaper readership, along with other observations, indicated signif-
icant disparities between state-recognized associations that are said to
represent Ôthe bazaarÕ or Ôthe b a z a a r isÕ and the practices and senti-
ments of traders within the historic marketplace. 
Field research and concept formation
Close range field research (e.g. archival analysis, in-depth interview-
ing and participant observation) tends to highlight complexities of so-
cial life by illustrating inconsistencies in human behavior, the preva-
lence of subjective categories, discrepancies between institutional de-
signs and actual outcomes, or the simultaneous nature of change and
continuity. In the context of the Tehran Bazaar, the above discussions
suggest that our concept of the Bazaar must account for temporal shifts
and scrutinize the view of the Bazaar as a single corporate entity.
To account for these issues exposed during research, I have built on
scholarship in new economic sociology that views networks as the basic
building block of organizations.4 I propose that bazaars should be stud-
ied as bounded spaces containing a series of socially embedded net-
works that are the mechanism for the exchange of specific commodi-
ties, credit and information about market conditions and potential
transaction partners. Economic relations that are in various degrees em-
bedded in religious, familial and ethnic relations capture a dynamic
process that continually produces and structures the culture of ex-
change relations. Consequently, what is termed as the bazaarÕs Ôtradi-
tionalismÕ, ÔinformalityÕ, and ÔmentalityÕ is not a product of internalized,
essential, and unvarying structures, or a functional response to meet
economic necessity, but a logic that emerges out of patterns of rela-
tions enforcing and molding actions. Moreover, these networks them-
selves are subject to transformation as the political economy changes. 
The process of conducting initial field research forced me to critically
evaluate the literature and re-conceptualize long held notions of the
Bazaar. I then turned to secondary sources to address unasked ques-
tions and refine existing categories used to analyze Iranian society.
Thus, field research was the critical first step in interrogating existing
modes of thought. 
The Islamic revolution as a Ônatural experimentÕ
Once we begin to study Iran from a more empirically grounded per-
spective, we can systematically explore the Islamic Revolution and ask
whether it constitutes a social revolution. If the Revolution is treated as
an exogenous shock, the Iranian case lends itself to interesting studies
of change and continuity in order to explicitly investigate the conse-
quences of the Revolution. The change in regimes acts as a sort of Ônat-
ural experimentÕ through which we can access the impact of changes in
state institutions on society. By carefully and systematically comparing
Iranian society before and after the Revolution we can assess the rele-
vance of continuities such as IranÕs position in the world economy, or
the continued lack of liberal individual rights and absence of institu-
tionalized parties. For example, while the main components of Ômod-
ernizationÕ, such as urbanization, industrialization, and expansion of ed-
ucation, all existed since the 1940s, it was only after the Islamic Revolu-
tion that a radical transformation of the BazaarÕs networks can be de-
tected. Also, comparisons across the revolutionary epoch can be bol-
stered by comparisons across cases within Iranian society. A whole host
of creative comparative projects can be devised to study variations
across cities, regions, ethnicities or economic sectors. Through evaluat-
ing the change in regime we can consider the relevance of socioeco-
nomic, ideological and political factors in precipitating transformations.
It is incumbent upon researchers to spend time in Iran to identify dis-
similarities and appropriate comparisons, and field research must play a
fundamental role in project design as much as in deriving findings.
In order to encourage research projects that tackle new issues, devel-
op more powerful concepts and uncover new sources, the academic
community must encourage early and regular visits to Iran. Unfortu-
nately at this time there is little institutional and financial support for
exploratory research. I would encourage research institutions to direct
their limited funds to sponsor students in their first few years of study to
make even brief visits to Iran to meet researchers,
interview people, peruse archives and review dis-
sertations and journals published in Iran in order
to simultaneously diversify their research sources
and lines of enquiry. Exploratory and preparatory
research is a crucial, although often slighted, com-
ponent of the preliminary stage of social inquiry, a
stage that is particularly lacking in much North
American and European scholarship on Iran. It is
time to consciously support and privilege re-
search projects that are constructed through, as
well as by, field research; they will go a long way in
enriching our understanding of Iran and social
processes more generally.
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Public reasoning has had a long tradi-
tion in Islamic jurisprudence, both
Sunni and Shiah, and has inspired
modern Islamic reform since the nine-
teenth century. Until recently, howev-
er, the concept of the public sphere, a
key concept in social thought and so-
cial science, has been elaborated pri-
marily on the basis of the European
and American experiences, and has
consequently been criticized for not
adequately representing the complexi-
ty and nuances of developments else-
where. By focusing on the role of the
public sphere in Muslim majority soci-
eties, we developed a project to ex-
plore how conceptualizations of the
public sphere can be enhanced by encompassing the evolution of non-
Western societies in which religion plays an important role.
Secularism and the public sphere
Most conceptions of the public sphere, including that of Habermas,
consider secularly oriented rationality to be the normative terrain on
which public life flourishes. Therefore, it was critical to explore the dif-
ferent means through which social practices inspired by Islam, includ-
ing Sufi disciplines and collective rituals, interact and sometimes clash
with different forms of secularism as incorporated in the ideologies
and practices of most states within Muslim majority societies or where
Muslim minorities live. In the various contexts where a public sphere
emerges, it is marked by the opening up of circles of reciprocity and
mutual obligations. Important factors in this development include how
state authority gets legitimized, the emergence of new middle classes
that support and challenge this authority, and changes in the social
prestige of groups that have traditionally controlled the production of
religious knowledge and institutions, including the ulama and the
waqf. The approach developed at the summer institute suggested
ways to avoid predefining the conditions for the emergence of the
public sphere (for example, on the basis of explicit or implicit notions
of secularization), and opted instead to focus on various accounts of
the practices, discourses, and debates not only of the ulama and their
direct challengers, but of a vast spectrum of social actors. 
Who speaks for Islam?
Such historically known and contemporary debates thus became our
heuristic device. Disputes about what ÔgoodÕ or ÔtrueÕ Islam entails, in-
cluding collective and individual obligations, throw into relief compet-
ing claims to speak both for and to the public. Most importantly, these
controversies demonstrate that in spite of the authoritarian shell of
most states, the public sphere in the Muslim majority world is not
monolithic, and its boundariesÑif not its topicsÑare probably more
contested than those in Western societies. Novel authorities or speakers
emerge in the space between the state and more traditional religious
authorities, and thus come to represent alternative points of power.
The summer institute dealt at length with the issue of religious authori-
ty, showing how it is connected to the construction and public display
of religious identities. For example, the participation of Sufis in public
religious debate, as in Syria, combines modern forms of presenting reli-
gious arguments with belonging to a hierarchical and personalized reli-
gious framework. This is made possible by a textual rhetoric organized
around doctrinal arguments partly disconnected from their performa-
tive dimensions. Participants cautioned against a simplistic polarization
between ÔofficialÕ and ÔpopularÕ Islam.
Even in places where there is a state-
sponsored Islamic ideology, as in Pak-
istan and Iran, individuals, groups and
communities often appropriate this
ideology to reinforce their position in
public contentions.
Consumption and
c o m m o d i f i c a t i o n
One working group explored consump-
tion and commodification as possible
Ôpathways into the publicÕ, but without
reifying religion or implying that there
are particular Islamic patterns of con-
sumption. Participants also questioned
the assumption that consumption
should necessarily be seen as a way of forming and expressing identities
or that identities become more flexible and negotiable through con-
sumption and commodification. Religious and cultural identities often
restrict and shape religious and consumptive patterns. Among the is-
sues that some participants selected for future co-operative work were
entertainment (including some religious events and practices and the
popularity of Ôreligious celebritiesÕ), exclusion and resistance (such as
consumer boycotts), the limits of participation (the economic, political,
and cultural shaping of aesthetic preferences and sumptuary laws), so-
cial and economic networks tied to religious ÔnodesÕ (e.g. hajj-organizing
business enterprises), and the cultural and economic politics of religious
space. These approaches show the role of consumption and goods in
shaping discursive and non-discursive public participation, and resituate
the notion of the public firmly in the realm of social practice. 
The widening scope of public Islam 
It is important for present and future research to incorporate histori-
cal and contextual accounts of shifting notions and practices of public
life and social exchange, rather than to assume, as has often been the
case, that there is a single ideal form of the public sphere for all con-
texts and times. In other words, the idea of the public is culturally em-
bedded. The way a sense of the public is built into social interactions
varies considerably depending on context, and on notions of personal-
ity, responsibility, and justice. In the context of the contemporary state,
modern techniques of authority, persuasion, and control must be
taken into account. The notion of public Islam thus joins several
streams of discussion, many of which are included in the edited vol-
ume Public Islam and the Common Good (Leiden: Brill, in press), based
on contributions from the summer institute.
ÔPublic IslamÕ refers to the highly diverse invocations of Islam as ideas
and practices that religious scholars, self-ascribed religious authorities,
secular intellectuals, Sufi orders, mothers, students, workers, engi-
neers, consumers, and many others make in civic debate and public
life. In this public capacity, Islam plays a considerable role in configur-
ing the politics and social life of large parts of the globe. This role is
thus not only a template for ideas and practices but is also a way of en-
visioning alternative political realities and, increasingly, a way of acting
on both global and local stages, thereby reconfiguring the established
boundaries of civil and social life. 
P r o j e c t
A summer institute on Public Spheres and
Muslim Identities took place in Berlin in July
2001 and at Dartmouth College, Hanover,
N.H., in August 2002. It was funded by the
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (Bonn)
and administered by the Wissenschaftskolleg
zu Berlin, on behalf of an international
consortium of institutes for advanced study in
Europe and the United States. The projects
engendered by the summer institute
facilitated discussions on theory and method
across disciplinary lines, geographical
regions, and historical periods. A follow-up
meeting of two of the instituteÕs working
groups convened in Florence in
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In the aftermath of ÔSeptember 11Õ, much
commentary was directed at the al-
leged clash between Islam and the
West. As a long-time ally of the United
States and a figure-head of Islamic pol-
itics, Saudi Arabia was caught in the
middle. As fifteen of the nineteen hi-
jackers were of Saudi origin, and with
accusations of Saudi co-responsibility
for the direction radicalized Islam had
taken, the royal family was placed in
the awkward situation of being called
to account for the behaviour of a few
Saudi citizens who were in fact simultaneously targeting the Al Saud
themselves. Indeed, after 9/11 Saudi Arabia came to be seen, in some
quarters, not so much as a victim but rather as a source of the problem.
At the same time existing issues of concern relating to Saudi ArabiaÕs
economy, its Ôsocial contractÕ, and its place in the region and the world,
were further highlighted. 
Combining the roles of perhaps the worldÕs key oil exporter, the
guardian of the holiest places of Islam, and a crucial ally of the West in
the Gulf, Saudi Arabia has acquired a high international profile involv-
ing inevitable tensions. Yet its internal affairs remain opaque to most
outside observers. Moreover, the tensions between the KingdomÕs
roles at the regional and global levels in a changing international sys-
tem intertwine with the dilemmas being faced at the domestic level.
There is a need, therefore, to address these interlocking issues system-
atically, by drawing on the insights of a variety of Saudi and specialist
outside observers. The workshop (and the associated book project) will
attempt to do just that. This is particu-
larly timely since many Saudis them-
selvesÑboth among the leadership
and elsewhereÑare currently increas-
ingly debating and acting on these
q u e s t i o n s .
The workshop (Leiden/Amsterdam, 20-
22 February 2004) will bring together
scholars and practitioners from Eu-
rope, the US and the Middle EastÑin-
cluding Saudi Arabia. In two days of
open discussions among commenta-
tors from a variety of perspectives, contemporary trends in Saudi poli-
tics, society, economy and international relations will be examined, ex-
ploring their roots as well as likely future developments. The focus will
be at once domestic and internationalÑseeing regional and global de-
velopments through the Saudi lens, while examining Saudi develop-
ments in the light of ÔSeptember 11,Õ the Iraq crisis, and changing glob-
al politics. Emphatically not an exercise in either accusation or in justi-
fication, the multiplicity of perspectives and areas of expertise brought
to bear on these questions should allow a balanced understanding to
emerge of Saudi ArabiaÕs dynamics, challenges, and responses. 
More information can be obtained from Paul Aarts, Senior Lecturer in International
Relations and Middle East Politics at the University of Amsterdam, p.w.h.aarts@uva.nl or
Gerd Nonneman, Reader in International Relations and Middle East Politcs at Lancaster
University, g.nonneman@lancaster.ac.uk.
The workshop Saudi Arabia between 9/11,
t h e Iraq Crisis & the Future will take place in
Leiden and Amsterdam from 20 to 22
February 2004. It is organized by Paul A a r t s
(University of Amsterdam) and Gerd
Nonneman (Lancaster University, UK).
T h e project is sponsored by the ISIM,
t h e NetherlandsÕ Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Lancaster University and benefits from
close support by the European University
InstituteÕs Robert Schuman Centre
( P r o f . Giacomo Luciani). 
Saudi Arabia between 9/11,
t h e Iraq Crisis & the Future
I S I M/Info Pages
I S I M  E V E N T SI S I M  F E L L O W S H I P S
The ISIM invites applications and research proposals for
its various programmes. Applications from candidates in
anthropology, sociology, religious studies, cultural
studies and political science will be considered.
Applicants should be competent in academic English.
The ISIM fellowships and their respective application
deadlines are as follows:
Ð Ph.D. fellowships
(1 March 2004 and 1 September 2004)
Ð Post-doctoral fellowships
(1 March 2004 and 1 September 2004)
Ð Visiting fellowships
(1 March 2004 and 1 September 2004)
Ð Sabbatical fellowships
(1 March 2004 and 1 September 2004)
For more information on the various fellowships
and for application forms,
please consult www.isim.nl.
ISIM and Felix Meritis Lecture and
Debate Series, 2003Ð2004:
T h e Multicultural City: Images and
S t r u c t u r e s .
The series aims to explore the irreducible
variety of multiculturality as if in a city walk.
Main themes include building, living, and
consuming, but also demonstrating,
protesting, and debating. 
Dates: 22 January, 19 February, 18 March,
2 2 April and 20 May 2004
Venue: Felix Meritis, Keizersgracht 324,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
W o r k s h o p :
The Islamic Community of Milli Grsü
i n Europe Today: 
Some Possible Avenues for
C o m m o n R e s e a r c h
Organizers: Martin van Bruinessen (ISIM),
Gerdien Jonker
Date: 9 January 2004
Venue: Leiden, The Netherlands
C o n f e r e n c e :
The Role of Religion in the Socio-
Cultural Transformation of West Africa
African Association for the Study of Religions
(AASR) Conference and International
Association for the History of Religions
Regional Conference
Organizers: Elom Dovlo, Abdelkader Tayob
(ISIM), Matthews A. Ojo 
Date: 5-8 February 2004
Venue: Legon, Ghana
W o r k s h o p :
Saudi Arabia between 9/11, the Iraq
Crisis & the Future
Organizers: Paul Aarts, University of
Amsterdam, Gerd Nonneman, Lancaster
U n i v e r s i t y
Sponsors: ISIM, the Dutch Foreign Ministry and
the University of Lancaster (UK)
Date: 20-22 February 2004
Venue: Leiden / Amsterdam, The Netherlands
For more information
on these and other ISIM Events
please consult the ISIM website
or contact the ISIM Secretariat:
Tel: +31 71 527 7905
Fax: +31 71 527 7906
E-mail: info@isim.nl
w w w . i s i m . n l
Another theme that will be addressed
by the conference is the nature and
role of voluntary organizations (NGOs)
in the development and articulation of
religions: a comparison of youth orga-
nizations, womenÕs movements, self-
help schemes that have developed,
sometimes as a direct outcome of sec-
ularization, or the collapse of the state.
What is the texture of religion under
the impact of NGOs, local and interna-
tional, and other voluntary organizations?
West Africa has also been affected by international developments. It
has contributed to and been affected by globalization. How have West
African religious developments been influenced by global and regional
networks: West African based trading networks, human rights organiza-
tions, Islamic and Christian networks, geo-political interests, criminal syn-
dicates, etc? Case studies or comparative studies can highlight and reflect
on the globalizing effects on religions and religious developments.
More information can be obtained from the three co-organizers: Elom Dovlo at
edovlo@ug.edu.gh in Ghana, Abdelkader Tayob at a.tayob@let.kun.nl in the Netherlands,
or Matthews A. Ojo at matthews_ojo@yahoo.com in Nigeria.
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A regional conference for religious
scholars of the subregion of West Africa
will explore the relationship between
social and cultural institutions and reli-
gious practices in contemporary West
African societies. The ongoing wars,
civil disturbances and turmoil in West
African nations provide a unique op-
portunity to investigate the role of reli-
gion in the social and cultural transfor-
mation of the region. The conference
will offer a multidimensional analysis of these issues and thereby revi-
talize the discussion of the place of religion in the social and cultural de-
velopment of Africa.
Religion and the state have had a checkered relationship since inde-
pendence. In one respect, the separation between religion and state
has been the dominant discourse. At the same time, the state has tried
to control religious discourse or to guide it in one way or another. For
example, it has often been involved in the application of customary
law and Islamic law. The conference will try to ask questions about all
aspects of state relations (legal, constitutional and political) with reli-
gious institutions. What does religion tell us about the state in West
Africa, and vice versa? 
I S I M/Info Pages
The three-day conference of the African
Association for the Study of Religions (AASR)
will be held from February 5-8 2004, and
hosted by the Department for the Study of
Religions, University of Ghana, at Legon. It will
be an important forerunner of the next
International Association for the History of
Religions (IAHR) Congress planned for March
24-30 2005, in Tokyo. The conference is
sponsored by the IAHR and the ISIM. 
The Role of Religion in the
S o c i o-Cultural Transformation
of West Africa
I S I M  P O S T - D O C T O R A L  F E L L O W S H I P S
The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the
Modern World (ISIM) invites applications for ISIM post-
doctoral fellowships. The fellowships are available to
scholars who have recently (within 5 years) obtained a
Ph.D. degree in anthropology, sociology, religious
studies, cultural studies and political science. 
The ISIM conducts and promotes interdisciplinary
research on contemporary social, political, cultural, and
intellectual trends and movements in Muslim societies
and communities. The ISIM welcomes research proposals
which are informed particularly by a social science
perspective and fit in with the research profile of the ISIM
in general, or related to the specific research programs of
the ISIM Professors, in particular. The current ISIM
research programs and projects include: Islam, Civil
Society, and the Public Sphere; Muslim Cultural Politics;
Debating Family Dynamics and Gender; Islamic Family
Law in Everyday Life; the Cultural politics of Domestic
Labor; the Politics of Representation in the Muslim
Societies; The Production of Islamic Knowledge in
Western Europe; Islam and the Public Sphere in Africa;
Religion, Culture and Identity in a Democratic South
Africa; and Socio-Religious Movements and Change in
Muslim Societies.
ISIM post-doctoral fellowships are awarded twice per
year. The deadlines for applications are 1 March and 1
September of each year. 
ISIM post-doctoral fellowships at a glance:
¥ granted for a period of up to two years
¥ monthly stipend 
¥ office space, a personal computer, telephone on the
premises of the ISIM in Leiden
¥ travel expenses to and from the country in which
fieldwork will be carried out
¥ research facilities including library and photocopy
privileges, normal stationery and office material
Post-doctoral Fellows are stationed in the historic city of
Leiden with convenient links to the coast, the airport,
and major European cities. Fellows have full access to
fine libraries, research centers, and the facilities of the
participating Universities in the ISIM: University of
Amsterdam, Leiden University, University of Nijmegen
and Utrecht University. 
For details on ISIM post-doctoral fellowships and to
download an application form, please refer to the ISIM
web site (www.isim.nl) under the link ÔFellowshipsÕ or
contact the ISIM office at:
ISIM, P.O. Box 11089
2301 EB Leiden, The Netherlands
Tel:+31-(0)71-527 7905
Fax:+31-(0)71-527 7906
E-mail: info@isim.nl
Web site: http://www.isim.nl
The ISIM welcomes the following
new fellows:
Ph.D. Fellows
Ð Alexandre Caeiro, M.A.:
ÔThe Construction of Islamic
Authority in Western Europe: an
Analysis of the Production and
Consumption of FatwasÕ
Ð Yuniyanti Chuzaifah, M.A.:
ÔIndonesian Migrant Domestic
Workers in the Gulf:
Transnational Relations, the
Dynamics of Religion, and t h e
Construction of IdentitiesÕ
Post-doctoral Fellows
Ð Dr Roel Meijer:
ÔIslam and Violence; The National
and Transnational Islamist
Debate on the Legitimacy and
Strategic Value of ViolenceÕ.
Visiting Fellow
Ð Dr Morad Saghafi:
ÔA Century of Political
Involvement: IranÕs Islamic
Movement RevisitedÕ
N E W  F E L L O W S
I S I M/Info Pages
Changes in the ISIM
D i r e c t o r a t e
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The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the
Modern World (ISIM) invites applications for ISIM Ph.D.
fellowships. ISIM Ph.D. fellowships are available to
candidates with an M.A. degree or equivalent in
anthropology, sociology, religious studies, cultural
studies and political science. The medium of instruction
is English, and PhD degrees are granted from one of the
four participating Universities in the ISIM: University of
Amsterdam, University of Nijmegen, Leiden University,
and Utrecht University.
The ISIM conducts and promotes interdisciplinary
research on contemporary social, political, cultural, and
intellectual trends and movements in Muslim societies
and communities. The ISIM welcomes research proposals
which are informed particularly by a social science
perspective and fit in with the research profile of the ISIM
in general, or related to the specific research programs of
the ISIM Professors, in particular. The current ISIM
research programs and projects include: Islam, Civil
Society, and the Public Sphere; Muslim Cultural Politics;
Debating Family Dynamics and Gender; Islamic Family
Law in Everyday Life; the Cultural politics of Domestic
Labor; the Politics of Representation in the Muslim
Societies; The Production of Islamic Knowledge in
Western Europe; Islam and the Public Sphere in Africa;
Religion, Culture and Identity in a Democratic South
Africa; and Socio-Religious Movements and Change in
Muslim Societies.
ISIM Ph.D. fellowships are awarded twice per year. The
deadlines for applications are 1 March and 1 September
of each year.
ISIM Ph.D. fellowships at a glance:
¥ tenable for a period of up to four years
¥ monthly stipend
¥ office space, a personal computer, telephone on
t h e premises of the ISIM in Leiden
¥ travel expenses for fieldwork
¥ no tuition fees
PhD Fellows are located in the historic city of Leiden with
easy convenient links to the coast, airport, and major
European cities. Fellows have full access to fine libraries,
research centers, and the facilities of the participating
U n i v e r s i t i e s .
For details on ISIM Ph.D. fellowships and to download
a n application form, please refer to the ISIM web site
(www.isim.nl) under the link ÔFellowshipsÕ or contact
t h e ISIM Office at:
ISIM, P.O. Box 11089
2301 EB Leiden, The Netherlands
Tel: +31-(0)71-527 7905
Fax: +31-(0)71-527 7906
E-mail: info@isim.nl
Web site: http://www.isim.nl
I S I M  P U B L I C A T I O N S
The following ISIM publications are available in hard copy.
Please use the order form on the ISIM website.
Publications in the ISIM Papers Series include:
Ð Islam, Islamists, and the Electoral Principle in the Middle East (ISIM Papers 1)
by James Piscatori
Ð Thinking about Secularism and Law in Egypt (ISIM Papers 2)
by Talal Asad
Ð Shar'ia, State, and Social Norms in France and Indonesia (ISIM Papers 3)
by John R. Bowen
Ð ÔTraditionalistÕ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs (ISIM Papers 4) 
by Barbara D. Metcalf
Special ISIM Publications include:
Ð Muslim JuristsÕ Quest for the Normative Basis of S h a r ' i a
(ISIM Inaugural Lecture) 
by Muhammad Khalid Masud
Ð New Voices of Islam
by Farish A. Noor (Interviews with Muslim Intellectuals)
Debate on Arab Human
Development Reports
Prof. Dr Peter van der Veer, chair of
Comparative Religion at the University
of Amsterdam, stepped down as co-
Director of the ISIM, a function that he
had fulfilled since February 2001. In col-
laboration with Professor Dr Muham-
mad Khalid Masud (ISIMÕs first Academ-
ic Director, see ISIM Newsletter 12,
p. 14-19), Van der Veer focused his ac-
tivities on institutional development of
the ISIM, including the expansion of re-
lations with the ISIM participating uni-
versities and with other national and in-
ternational institutions. He headed the
search for the ISIM Chair at the Universi-
ty of Nijmegen and that for the new
Academic Director and ISIM Chair at Lei-
den University. Furthermore, Van der
Veer enhanced the visibility of the ISIM
in the Netherlands by engaging in pub-
lic debates. At present Van der Veer is
an ISIM sabbatical fellow. 
In conjunction with the appointment of
Prof. Dr Asef Bayat as Academic Director
of the ISIM (see ISIM Newsletter 12, p. 1)
Dr Dick Douwes was appointed Execu-
tive Director of the ISIM. Dick Douwes
has been involved in the ISIM from its
foundation and was in charge of Acade-
mic Affairs and the ISIM Newsletter.
Dick Douwes is lecturer in Middle East-
ern History at the University of
Nijmegen. 
In cooperation with the Prince Claus
Fund, the ISIM organized a debate en-
titled ÔBridging the DeficitsÕ on the
2002 and 2003 Arab Human Develop-
ment Reports on 9 December 2003 in
Amsterdam. The keynote speech was
delivered by the main author of the re-
ports, Nader Fergany (Director
Almishkat Centre for Research and
Training, Egypt). Asef Bayat (Academic
Director of the ISIM) and Sadik al-Azm
(Philosopher and Human Rights Ac-
tivist, Member of the Prince Claus
Awards Committee, Syria) opened the
debate. The meeting was chaired by
Paul Aarts, Senior Lecturer, Interna-
tional Relations, Universiteit van Ams-
terdam. The event was organized on
the occasion of the granting of a 2003
Prince Claus Award to the Arab Human
Development Report 2002 (see
h t t p : / / w w w . p r i n c e c l a u s f u n d . n l ) .
5t h I S I M
A n n u a l
L e c t u r e
On 8 December 2003, the fifth ISIM An-
nual Lecture was delivered by Prof. Dr
Abdulaziz Sachedina, University of Vir-
ginia, Charlottesville. Professor
SachedinaÕs lecture was entitled ÔReli-
gion in the Public Square: Islam and
DemocracyÕ. He spoke about the role
of religion in the development of de-
mocratic institutions in light of the
American interventions in Afghanistan
and Iraq. With these interventions, de-
bates have as yet to tackle the role of
religious convictions and values in the
development of emerging democratic
institutions to guarantee basic free-
doms and rights. The major stumbling
block to democratization, Sachedina
argued, appears to be the way the role
of religious values is defined in devel-
oping an inclusive sense of citizenship
without insisting upon doctrinal/theo-
logical uniformity. 
The text of the lecture will be made
available on the ISIM Website and
published in the ISIM Paper series.
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The ISIM project ÔRights at Home: An Approach to the Internalization of
Human Rights in Family Relations in Islamic CommunitiesÕ organized
four Capacity Building Workshops in Yemen and Tanzania in the sum-
mer of 2003. In close cooperation with the local counterparts, the
Yemeni Forum for Civil Society and the Tanzanian Sahiba P S i s t e r s
Foundation a total of 150 participants were invited to come to San'a
(21Ð24 July), Taiz (26Ð29 July), Aden (31 JulyÐ4 August) and Mwanza
(9Ð17 August) respectively to enhance their knowledge and practical
implementation of human rights issues within the local family. 
The men and women who participated in the workshops represent-
ed very diverse regions and socio-economic strata. They had been se-
lected for the training on the basis of two criteria: their impact on local
family life based on their social or religious position, professional or
other activities, and their open-mindedness to reforms. 
Y e m e n
In Yemen participants were representatives of governmental and
non-governmental organizations (NGOÕs) dealing with the human
rights of women and children, as well as teachers, social workers, psy-
chologists, tribal leaders, imams, preachers (w u ' a z), advisers in reli-
gious issues (m u r s h i d u n), politicians, lawyers, writers, journalists and
others involved in the public media. 
The workshops began with a discussion on human rights according
to international standards. Local trainer Abdelkarim Kassim remarked
that many Muslims consider the issue of human rights an issue that
can be disregarded because of its assumed Western origin. The exam-
ple of the former ruler of Yemen, Imam Yahya, who as the Yemeni rep-
resentative in the United Nations, recognized the Declaration of
Human Rights even before the United States, shows that they are mis-
taken. The Imam was convinced that human rights were inherent to
his own Islamic religion and culture. A foundation can be found in the
Qur'an and the h a d i t h, an interpretation that is confirmed by great
Muslim thinkers like Ibn Rushd, al-Farabi and al-Ghazali, to name but a
few. Against this background the actual situation of neglect and viola-
tion of human rights in the Islamic world can to a large extent be ex-
plained by political, not by religious causes. 
The actual situation in Yemen gives a similar impression. The rights
of women and children seem well described in the Yemeni legislation,
but are not implemented in actual practice. It was remarkable that,
despite the very different backgrounds of the participants to the
workshops, people agreed widely upon the obstacles for the actual
implementation of human rights of women and children. Most of the
activists held the view that the causes of the problems should be as-
cribed to the prevailing culture rather than to religion. Traditional so-
ciety offers many ways to discriminate between the sexes, and to de-
preciate the position of both women and children. The impact of tra-
dition and custom is often stronger in Yemen than religious prescrip-
tions. 
Confusion arose during the discussions about the differences be-
tween what Islam prescribes and what traditions says. Both Islam and
tradition can be characterized by diversity. On the one hand, partici-
pants said that some Yemeni traditions actually enhance the cause of
rights of women and children. An example of a tribe in Ma'rib in which
women hold very strong positions was received with laughter among
all present. On the other hand, trainer Abdullahi an-Na'im (former Di-
rector, Rights at Home) stressed that the very existence of the four
schools of Islamic law (m a d h h a b Õ s) shows that within Islam there has
always been room for discussion and other opinions. The fact that
many Muslims have no knowledge of the diversity of thought within
Islam causes them to miss opportunities to learn and profit from di-
vergent ideas.
Next to tradition and Ôreligious illiteracyÕ (ummiya diniya), the partic-
ipants mentioned several other factors, like the poor economic condi-
tions, poverty and unemployment, widespread illiteracy, especially
among women, that negatively influence the condition of human
rights in Yemen. 
When it finally came to finding solutions for all the above men-
tioned problems, it was remarkable that the majority of the partici-
pants argued that it is mainly the responsibility of the Yemeni govern-
ment to solve them. It is exactly this idea that the training hoped to
change: the participants should be convinced that they, as Ôadvocates
of changeÕ must make the difference themselves. In fact, during the
training they were becoming more and more aware that, for example,
the Yemeni legislation already offers many possibilities and solutions
for the violation of womenÕs and childrenÕs rights, but that in practice
lobbying from the people and strong local organizations are needed
to actually implement this legislation. 
The workshop trainer Laila al-Zwaini (primary consultant, Rights at
Home) was enthusiastically received when she presented the mar-
riage contract as a strategy for the enhancement of human rights
within the family. Examples from elsewhere in the Islamic past and
present showed that it is allowed to include additional stipulations or
conditions in the marriage contract. The official marriage contract
that is used in Yemen nowadays was analyzed in separate working
groups, with a proposal to develop new models of the contract. The
participants came up with models that all contained conditions that
better secured respect of human rights within the family such as: wit-
nesses should confirm the mutual consent of the couple concerned so
that the chance of a forced marriage is reduced, women may stipulate
the right to study or work after marriage, and the right to divorce.
While an improved marriage contract can provide a basis for more
equal relations between spouses, the organizational structure of
Yemeni family life also needs critical analysis. Trainer Suaad al-Qadasi
(The WomenÕs Forum for Research and Training) pointed out how this
structure determines how parents treat their children, and how many
choices are made without consulting them. Girls rather than boys are
assigned tasks in the household, and boys rather than girls are en-
abled to follow higher education. Similar structures with huge impact
on the development of both sexes can be found in schools. In general,
adults donÕt listen very well to children, and they are often treated
with violence or neglect. 
The Minister of Human Rights, Ms Amat al-Alim al-Susuwa, who held
the opening address of the workshop in San'a, stated that improve-
ments in the human rightsÕ situation in Yemen can only to some ex-
tent be the result of initiatives of the government or cooperation pro-
jects. Changes should start with the people themselves, within their
own consciousness, within their families and communities. Human
rights start at home, and come about through loving and respectful
interactions between husband, wife and children. 
Tanzania 
After Yemen the Rights at Home project team went to Mwanza in
Tanzania. Mwanza was chosen as the location for the workshop be-
cause of its peripheral position and its vigorous Muslim community.
I S I M/Rights at Home
Capacity Building
W o r k s h o p s
in Yemen & Tanzania
The geographical concept that underlies the Rights at Home Project is
the cultural sphere of the Indian Ocean, with a special interest in ne-
glected areas. Moreover, local NGOÕs play a key role in providing the
people of Mwanza with social security. It was due to their help that the
workshop could successfully be held.
Some sixty Tanzanian professionals working in the public service and
with NGOÕs, coming from the coast, the interior as well as from the is-
lands Zanzibar and Pemba, took part in the seminar. Although many
trainers were Tanzanians, the tutors from abroad also made a great
contribution. Among the staff were Abdullahi an-Na'im, Muhammad
Khalid Masud (the former Academic Director of ISIM), Yasmin Busran-
Lao (al-Mujadila Development Foundation, the Philippines), Abdulkad-
er Tayob (ISIM), Zainah Anwar and Pia Zain (Sisters in Islam, Malaysia).
By sharing their experiences of living in very different locations it be-
came self-evident that there doesnÕt exist only one comprehensive Is-
lamic lifestyle. Various trainers refuted the idea that Islam is frozen in
time and does not permit up-to-date interpretations; or that a state or
another institution has the exclusive right of interpretation. Khalid
Masud put this aptly when he explored the notion of s h a r i ' a w h i c h
when translated literally means a path or road. He argued that some
think that once they introduce s h a r i ' a they can unroll their mats and sit
on the road. But the road needs maintenance and a destination other-
wise it will fall into ruin through neglect and it will lead to nowhere.
One of the major goals (m a q a s i d) of s h a r i ' a is respect for human rights. 
The cases that were presented during the workshop exemplified the
problems that social activists in Tanzania are dealing with. Salma
Maoulidi (Sahiba P Sisters Foundation) presented the case of a woman
in her forties who was trained as a nurse but was not allowed by her
husband to work after marriage. When she became infected with HIV
her husband divorced her. Without hearing from the woman the reli-
gious establishment granted the divorce with a small compensation,
leaving her destitute. 
Another case that caused a lot of concern was the Husna case t h a t
participants encountered during the course of a field study. A young
girl was seriously injured after she was raped by a m a d r a s a t e a c h e r .
The influential social position of the suspect prevented him from being
put on trial. Another case was taken from the host town Mwanza and
used for a role play exercise during the course ÔDevelopment of advo-
cacy skillsÕ facilitated by a local human rights organization, Kivulini. The
case involved Hawa, the second wife of Juma, who was pregnant and
the mother of two children. She was expelled
by Juma from the house after he found out she
was HIV positive. The magistrate court ruled
that the husband had to pay her a mainte-
nance fee, however he lodged an appeal
against the ruling. As the court proceedings
dragged on HawaÕs health condition weak-
ened while Juma married another woman. 
The nine days in Mwanza which are further de-
scribed in Salma MaoulidiÕs text (see page 58)
were characterized by ideological and practice
challenges as participants tried to make mean-
ing of the Ônew truthsÕ revealed in the work-
shop. Many weathered the challenge by re-
maining open-minded and dialoguing. This
often demanded long working days, which
participants braved with extreme show of
commitment and it is this dedication that made the workshop an en-
joyable and valuable learning experience for both trainees and train-
e r s .
The next phase of the Rights at Home project will bring 45 participants
from Yemen, Tanzania and Southeast Asia in a joint Advanced Training
scheduled in Spring 2004. One of the objectives will be the further
translation of the theoretical underpinnings of human rights in prac-
tice based on Islamic f i q h and tradition.
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T r a i n i n g
workshop in
Tanzania where
s i m u l t a n e o u s
translation was
p r o v i d e d .
The following personnel changes
occurred in the Rights at Home project
team. For health reasons Abdullahi an-
Na'im (Emory University, Atlanta)
stepped back as Project Director.
Abdulkader Tayob (ISIM Chair of the
University of Nijmegen) succeeds him
in this position. Ebrahim Moosa (Duke
University, Durham), Cassandra Balchin
(Women Living under Muslim Laws,
WLUML, London), Muhammad Khalid
Masud (Islamabad), Abdullahi an-Na'im
and Nasr Abu Zayd (former resource
person of the project, University for
Humanistics, Utrecht) now act as
external advisors for Rights at Home.
More information about the project can be found on the project section of the ISIM
w e b s i t e .
This report was prepared by:
Maritte van Beek, Administrative Coordinator of the Rights at Home project. 
Salma Maoulidi, Executive Director of Sahiba P Sisters Foundation.
Paul Schrijver, former Project Assistant of Rights at Home
Faisal al-Sufi, former co-editor of al-Qistas, the journal of Forum for Civil Society.
I S I M/Rights at Home
S A L MA  M A OU LI D I
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S a h i b a P Sisters Foundation, an activist organization foremost preoc-
cupied with Muslim womenÕs realities, was invited to participate in the
Rights at Home Project in early 2002. Initially there was a level of ap-
prehension about working with an institution that was primarily an
academic institution, with academics who mastered theories but may
not have hands on experience with complex situations on the ground.
Also worrisome was the prospect of putting too much energy in em-
pirical issues and methodological frameworks rather than on develop-
ing flexible responses to the needs of people on the ground. But the
idea of working towards societal transformation using local knowledge
and capacities was attractive to Sahiba. Indeed the Rights at Home ap-
proach filled a gap in local advocacy strategies since it went beyond
idealistic notions of social justice and rights. Rather, Rights at Home
promised to demystify and authenticate juridical positions and inter-
pretations that were impacting the Islamic community in the area of
family relations. More importantly, it resolved to do this from within Is-
lamic laws and traditions. Muslim communities are overwhelmingly
concerned that human rights arguments are substantiated by ÔIslamicÕ
texts so as to legitimize engagement or non-engagement with it.
The initial sounding board meetings with various stakeholders were
held in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar in May 2002. They aimed at un-
earthing issues for advocacy in Tanzania where rights issues are invari-
ably discussed within a context of political repression and perceived or
real marginalization. Most participants perceived their religion as
being under attack from not only the West, but also some Muslims who
have been co-opted into un-Islamic ideologies, and wanted to protect
the purity and beauty of their religion. 
Such suspicions did not negate the sense of appreciation for Rights at
Home. Certainly, Rights at Home provided a space to air views and to
critically examine the situation, something local religious gatherings fail
to do. The initial meeting represented a beginning to challenging the
comfort zone about what it means to be Muslim and to reflect what it
means in actual practice. Additionally, the presence of a female scholar
was eye rising just as was the presence of non-bearded turban-tying
scholars. 
Hence, already with this seemingly routine stage of the project, the
waves for a rights revolution had begun to be formed and gained mo-
mentum this August with the advocacy training for some 60 advocates
of change in Mwanza. Indeed, more ripples were created in Mwanza,
some of which may collect into a significant mass while others may dis-
sipate in obscurity. Either way, we cannot miss the ruffles in the land-
scape Mwanza created.
The training was located in a real setting, devoid of the luxuries that a
four star venue would avail. In Mwanza the focus was on real people
and real issues, not on impersonal rhetoric which an unfamiliar setting
often emphasizes. The participation was also unique. Perhaps for the
first time, different levels of human rights advocates and gatekeepers
from both the government and non-governmental sector were brought
together in one setting to dialogue on aspects of human rights viola-
tions and advocacy in Muslim families and communities. Moreover,
non- Muslims were invited to the workshop. This is a departure from the
initial approach of only involving Muslims since in reality non- Muslims
are part of the social groups that may be called upon to support local
initiatives aimed to promote human rights values in families and com-
munities. In actual fact, many already do so in the legal arena providing
legal aid services to Muslim women and men. Rights at Home enabled
them to interact with the Muslim community on an equal basis, not only
as victims. It also demystified the sharia for them. Thus, faced with in-
creased religious tension, the training in Mwanza facilitated the begin-
nings of an interfaith collaboration beyond the institutional: rather it in-
volved the personal with the professional as was evidenced in the case
of Husna (see Beek Van, p. 56). And these were the minor victories, mile-
stones of sorts as Sahiba tries to bring greater visibility to the plight of
Muslim women. This cannot be effectively done without challenging
power dynamics not only at the family level, but also at the ideological
and institutional level. In Mwanza we facilitated a process with Muslim
women claiming sole responsibility in challenging power centers and
power relations impacting on their status.
It is common knowledge that Islamic institutions, as religious rhetoric
and space, are largely male. Women are hardly present in such forums,
just as they are absent from authoritative legal sources. Thus, women
lack both a voice and visibility in religious discourse and spaces. This
was not to be at the training, which involved men and women in almost
equal numbers. The active participation of women more than refuted
claims shared by Muslim men and non-Muslims alike that Muslim
women are passive spectators in community affairs and more so in is-
sues that affect them. They dominated the discussions. Thus, here too,
the relationship was being renegotiated. Muslim men who are consid-
ered authorities in religious matters no longer enjoyed exclusive right
to religious discourse. They found themselves in the company of equal-
ly informed women, who in most instances showed a sharper ability to
analyze and question not only the theory but also the practice, the ob-
vious and the obscured. 
Indubitably, the men were stunned by the level of participation and
the challenge the women posed and it may have dawned on them that
they no longer hold exclusive rights to text interpretations. Some may
have even realized that the training went beyond the dicta of human
rights for it challenged the values their positions and practice espoused.
Necessarily this demanded a renegotiation of the benefits and privi-
leges they enjoyed as individuals or as parts of institutions because of
the continued tolerance to the status quo. This renegotiation was al-
most immediate. The defensive posture of some of the participants in
Mwanza was to be expected as they sought to justify the status quo by
hazy reference to Qur'anic injunctions which was repeatedly chal-
lenged by not only professors Muhammad Khalid Masud, Abdulkader
Tayob and Abdullahi An-Na'im, but also by fellow participants who
were uncompromising in excusing human rights violations on account
of divine ruling without contextualizing the particular edict.
Likewise, Zainah Anwar from Sisters in Islam and Yasmin Buran Lao
from Mujadillah through her lively presentation, shared their own
struggles to assert themselves in their communities. Our colleague Pia
also generated discussion by addressing on the array of possibilities
present in doing advocacy work. 
SahibaÕs local network experienced some tension in renegotiating
power among the membership and with the religious establishment. Un-
happy with the outcome of the training, some participants from Mwanza
acting with the local religious establishment decided to smear the un-
precedented initiative by invoking on people a sense of guilt and fear.
They accused Sahiba and her collaborators of turning the Qur'an Ôupside
downÕ and questioning the basis of Islamic reasoning and way of life.
They went on to denounce those who attended the training and wanted,
in particular, the women from Mwanza to publicly condemn Sahiba. But
the women, no longer easily intimidated, stood firm. They refused to at-
tribute to Sahiba or to the training what they clearly saw as political con-
coction. They acknowledged the empowering aspect of the training and
they resolved to pull away from a body they saw as undemocratic and
stagnant. Instead, they formed a new group called Jitambue (be aware/
conscious) and intensified collaboration with local partners acquainted
during the training more in tune with their vision of social justice. Indeed
a social revolution is underway among womenÕs groups in Tanzania, a
revolution that is a natural consequence of revolutionary activist ap-
proaches as they are of a deep conviction in the potential of the human
spirit to reclaim their dignity. The challenge for Sahiba and others is to
nurture these processes to their natural conclusion. 
I S I M/Rights at Home
Small Ripples 
in Tanzania
Salma Maoulidi is
Executive Director,
S a h i b a P S i s t e r s
F o u n d a t i o n .
S h e wishes to
acknowledge Ayesha
Yahya, Ayesha Juma
and Abubakar Karsan,
all from Mwanza, for
their input towards
writing this article.
E-mail: Sahiba_Sisters
@ y a h o o g r o u p s . c o m
I S I M/ W o r k s h o p
The purpose of the workshop was to
bring together social scientists and his-
torians to study how people tell stories
in and about law in Muslim societies.
One of the main concerns was to under-
stand how experts, the parties con-
cerned and the public at large construct
Ôthe truthÕ in law. For instance, the ver-
sion of a story that is accepted by both
parties in a settlement, rather than re-
flecting what happened in actuality,
may more productively be seen as a
compromise between the parties con-
cerned. Different genres of legal docu-
ments such as f a t w as, letters to saints,
marriage contracts, court records, w a q f
deeds, and police, newspaper, radio and human rights reports were ex-
tensively discussed. There was particular attention to the ways in which
various genres of legal texts can only be understood by contextualizing
them in particular historical moments and locations.
The contributions dealing with Ôstories in the lawÕ focused on the mul-
tiple ways texts (whether oral, written, or a combination of both) are
produced. Some texts are highly complex, such as ÔtranslationsÕ from
oral to written forms. There is a need for more scholarly attention to
the impact of those involved in the production of particular texts, such
as scribes, judges, and professional witnesses, as well as the ways in
which these legal specialists allow for or exclude particular voices. In
this regard, it is important to not only trace the training trajectories
and positioning in the legal system of text producers, but also to un-
derstand how the public at large turns to them in order to ÔtranslateÕ
their cases in terms that make sense within the legal system. Amalia
Zomeo addressed these phenomena through a discussion of the
process of f a t w a-giving, whereas Brinkley Messick, Khaled Fahmy and
Rudolph Peters focused on the production of court records and legal
judgments. Baudouin Dupret gave an ethnographerÕs report of how
the records of the police and the public prosecutor come into being in
present-day Egypt. Emad Adly analyzed the letters written to Imam Al-
Shafi'i as requests for retribution, formulated as s h a k w as (ÔcomplaintsÕ).
Annelies Moors and Lon Buskens looked at the ways in which mar-
riage contracts were written down in Palestine and Morocco, respec-
t i v e l y .
Turning from the producers of texts to their readers and audiences,
one central question focused on the intended publics of these texts,
especially of Ôstories about the lawÕ. Whereas some documents are only
meant to be consulted in specific circumstances by a highly restricted
number of people, other texts are intended for a specialized or general
public. This calls for an investigation of how particular publics are ad-
dressed in texts and the impact of the use of various media. Subse-
quently, workshop participants raised the question of how differently
positioned publics interpret particular texts (such as newspaper arti-
cles), and how publicityÑin its various forms Ðworks in specific set-
tings (such as in human rights issues). Barbara Drieskens and Anna
Wuerth analyzed the way contemporary Egyptian newspapers writers
report about respectively healers who deal with djinns, about police
abuse, and how different parts of the public react to these stories.
Dorothea Schulz focused on the pro-
duction of a radio report on domestic
violence in urban Mali. Lynn Welchman
reflected on her role as an observer in
the courts of Tunis to report on human
rights issues. Marie-Claire Foblets and
Mustapha El Karouni discussed how
Belgian judges evaluate and use legal
documents from Morocco in order to
establish an authoritative version of
the truth. Michael Gilsenan presented
his research on Arab communities in
Southeast-Asia in which the institution
of the w a q f constructed as a family
trust played an important role in those
communities. In all these cases the use
of publicity proved to be of vital importance, sometimes resulting in an
extra-judicial settlement.
Theoretical and methodological issues discussed include the role of
ethnographers and historians as tellers of stories and the extent to
which legal documents can be used as sources for social history. Only
by considering these sources in their appropriate contexts (such as var-
ious legal systems, political systems, social and cultural notions) and by
analyzing the processes of their production and consumption, can we
understand their various meanings. In that sense legal history is a pre-
condition for social history.
L  O N  B US KE N S &
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From 24 to 26 October 2003 an international
workshop was held in Cairo under the title
ÔWhat Happened: Telling Stories about Law in
Muslim SocietiesÕ. Representing the third
event in the ISIM programme on the
anthropology of Islamic law, the workshop
was organized with the Centre dÕtudes et
d e Documentation conomique, Juridique et
Sociale (CEDEJ), the Institut Franais
dÕArchologie Orientale (IFAO), and the
Dutch-Flemish Institute in Cairo (NVIC),
a l l based in Cairo. The convenors were
Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, Lon Buskens,
Barbara Drieskens, Baudouin Dupret,
a n d Annelies Moors. 
What Happened: T e l l i n g
Stories about Law
i n Muslim Societies
Ð E. Adly: ÔLe saint, le cheikh et la femme
adultre: courrier du coeur adress a
lÕimam al-Shafi'i au Caire.Õ
Ð L. Buskens: ÔTales According to the Book:
Professional Witnesses as Cultural Brokers
in Morocco.Õ
Ð B. Drieskens: ÔWhat to do with Djinns in
Stories about Law?Õ
Ð B. Dupret: ÔThe Categories of Morality:
Homosexuality between Perversion and
D e b a u c h e r y . Õ
Ð K. Fahmy: ÔA Murder Case in upper
E g y p t . Õ
Ð M.C. Foblets And M. Karouni: Ô M o b i l e
Muslims. Judges in Europe Confronted
with the Thorny Question ÔWhich Law
A p p l i e s ? Õ
Ð M. Gilsenan: ÔA Trust in the Family,
a n Interest in Kinship: English Law,
Mohammedan Intentions and Arab
Genealogies in Colonial Singapore.Õ
Ð B. Messick: ÔLegal Narratives from S h a r i ' a
C o u r t s . Õ
Ð A. Moors: ÔMarriage Contracts:
Registrating a Token Dower, Constructing
Multiple Modernities.Õ 
Ð R. Peters: ÔThe Violent Schoolmaster:
T h e ÔNormalizationÕ of the Dossier of
a Nineteenth Century Egyptian Legal
C a s e . Õ
Ð D. Schultz: ÔPublicizing Propriety, ÒTelling
The TruthÓ. Extra-Court Constructions of
Legal Storiesin Urban Mali.Õ
Ð L. Welchman: ÔTrying Times in Tunis:
Notes From a Purposeful Observer.Õ
Ð A. Wuerth: ÔProsecuting Police Abuse in
E g y p t . Õ
Ð A. Zomeno: ÔThe Story in the Fatwa and
the Fatwa as History.Õ
P A P E R S  P R E S E N T E D
The conveners hope to publish revised versions of the papers as an edited volume.
Lon Buskens (Leiden University/Utrecht University) &
Annelies Moors (ISIM/University of Amsterdam)
A N N E LI E S  MO O RS
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The geographic mobility of domestic
workers is certainly not new. However,
contemporary globalization has dra-
matically stimulated and facilitated the
international migration of domestic
workers. In many areas of the world,
paid domestic labour is a growth sec-
tor in which new groups of women are
becoming involved. Increasing eco-
nomic inequalities on a global scale,
shifts in family relations and household
composition, as well as the changing
patterns and evaluations of womenÕs
employment and domestic work, are
increasingly drawing migrant women
into this field of employment.
Although at first glace domestic
workers (especially if female) may be seen as relegated to the private,
domestic sphere, there are good reasons to address their presence Ôin
the publicÕ. For if the house is the private sphere of the employer, it is
simultaneously the work setting of the domestic worker. This in itself
invites revisiting the private-public dichotomy and is precisely the kind
of issue that the project is concerned with. The project addresses the
publicness of migrant domestic labour through three sets of questions.
Historical trajectories
The first and most general field of research addresses how the histor-
ical trajectories of migrant domestic work relate to the development of
specific notions of the public-private nexus in the Middle East. Using
the empirical question, Ôwho is the domestic worker replacing?Õ as its
point of departure, the project investigates how the labour and family
relations of earlier categories of domestics (such as domestic slaves
and Ôadopted daughtersÕ) differ from those employed under condi-
tions of contemporary globalization (such as migrant contract labour
and systems of sponsorship). These transformations are investigated
within the context of the development of the nation-state as well as
the growing importance of transnational relations that tie in with
changes in family relations and household composition, and, more
generally, with the development of new notions of publicness. This
raises such questions as, how different is the privateÐpublic nexus in
the case of earlier forms of domestic work from that of present-day em-
ployment? What has been the impact of particular forms of nation-
state formation and concepts of citizenship? And what sorts of legal
regimes and concepts (varying from Islamic law to international
human rights) are at stake? 
Public Space
Second, this project deals with the transformations of public space
and the ways in which (migrant) domestic workers are included or ex-
cluded in this process. Access to public space is an obvious area of con-
testation between employers and domestic workers, with the former
often supported through state regulations. In such discussions, the im-
pact of systems of gender-segregation
is also a critical factor to consider. In
what ways are migrant domestic work-
ers visible in public spaces and how is
their visibility in public spaces as-
sessed? Are migrant domestic workers
able to participate in hetero-social
public spaces or do they have access to
gender-segregated public spaces? And
what sorts of positions are they able to
take up within such gendered public
spaces? Are migrant domestic workers
able to (or perhaps forced to) produce
Ôtheir ownÕ public spaces, and on what
identity markers (such as nationality,
language, or religion) are these areas
of interaction based? This historical
perspective raises the issue of how such visibility in public spaces com-
pares with that of earlier forms of domestic labour. 
Public debates
The third field of investigation addresses public debates on (migrant)
domestic workers (such as the impact of Asian domestics on the social-
ization of children in terms of language and religion) and the ways in
which these are mass mediated. In contrast to the notion of Ôthe publicÕ
in the sense of a bounded space of face-to-face interaction and dia-
logue, the development of the mass media has engendered a qualita-
tive change in the conditions for participating in Ôpublic debateÕ. In in-
vestigating public debates about migrant domestic work, the central
questions are not simply, who are the participants (state institutions,
politico-religious movements, associations of/for migrant domestic
workers, human rights organizations, womenÕs groups and so on),
which issues are at stake, and what styles of argumentation have been
employed, but especially, who has the authority and the defining
power to frame these debates. The fact that such debates are mass me-
diated further raises questions about how different genres have repre-
sented migrant domestic workers, and what media and forms of repre-
sentation migrant domestic workers themselves have employed.
These questions will be discussed in the course of five seminars in Is-
tanbul, Dubai, Beirut and Amman, where participants in this project
have been involved in empirical research on migrant domestic labour,
with a concluding session to be held in one of the participating coun-
tries. 
I S I M/ P r o j e c t
The Social Science Research CouncilÕs
Programme on the Middle East & North Africa
has selected the project ÔMigrant Domestic
Workers in the Middle East: Becoming Visible
in the Public Sphere?Õ to receive an
International Collaborative Research Grant to
support the joint research by Ray Jureidini
(American University Beirut), Annelies Moors
(ISIM/University of Amsterdam), Ferhunde
zbay, (Bogÿ azii University, Istanbul) and
Rima Sabban (Dubai University College) for
the period 1 July 2003 to 31 December 2004.
This research project is linked to the ISIM
research programme, Migrant Domestic Work:
Transnational Spaces, Families, and Identities
(see www.isim.nl).
Migrant Domestic
Workers 
Becoming Visible in
t h e Public Sphere?
Annelies Moors is an anthropologist and holds the ISIM chair at the University of
A m s t e r d a m .
I S I M/ W o r k s h o p
Starting from the theoretical framework
of ÔintertextualityÕ, the aim of the work-
shop ÔTextuality, Intertextuality: Interac-
tive Cultural Practices in Judaism and
IslamÕ was to strive to transcend conven-
tionally accepted identity boundaries in
order to replace linear and hierarchical
paradigms of influence with a model of
mutual interaction that allows for a
more nuanced analysis of the dynamics of textual and intertextual prac-
tices. Scholars from various countries and different disciplines were invit-
ed for the interactive reading and discussion of texts. These texts, basical-
ly rooted in the Torah and the Qur'an, were extended to later related
texts, exegetical, theological, and philosophical as well as literary texts. 
In the first session ÔBetween Initiation and RecitationÕ Galit Hasan-
Rokem and Nasr Abu Zayd presented two sets of texts related to the
usage of the root ÔQrÕ and its derivations in the Bible and the Qur'an.
The basic issue was how to correlate the meanings that the word cov-
eys in various Biblical contexts, such as Ôto callÕ, Ôto communicateÕ, Ôto
nameÕ to ÔinvokeÕ or Ôto convokeÕ with the same root in the Qur'an; the
imperative form iqraÕ presents the actual enunciation of MuhammadÕs
prophet-hood by invoking the name of his Lord. During the discussion
Abu Zayd presented his newly developed conviction that to deal with
the Qu'ran as only a text is reductionist since oral ÔrecitationÕ, not Ôread-
ingÕ from the m u s h a f, is the prevailing practice among Muslims, not to
mention that Qur'anic verses get appropriated and re-appropriated as
verbal quotations on a daily basis. 
The second session was devoted to the ÔRisks and Chances of Narrative
InterpretationÕ thus moving from the foundational text to exegesis.
Dina Stein and Nicolai Sinai presented two types of exegetical texts.
The first text belongs to the Babylonian Talmud, while the second is
taken from Muqatil and al-TabariÕs t a f s i rs. The relation between the
canonized text and its interpretation was the focus of the discussion in
this session. It became obvious during the discussion that the Babylon-
ian Talmud is to a great extent a narrative structure while the canon-
ized text enjoys a superior position in Islamic exegesis due to the doc-
trine of i ' j a z. The question about the ÔoriginalÕ meaning and the Ôcon-
structedÕ exegetical narrative turned the discussion back to what con-
stitutes the original canonized text: is it so fixed and stable with its own
boundaries, or is it reconstructed by later narratives? Does the com-
mentator over-mystify the text or sometimes tries to demystify it?
With such open questions the third session ÔBack to the Bare TextÕ prob-
lematized the definition of the text. Sarah Stroumsa presented a text in
which Sa'adyal Fayyumi refutes the Karaite use of logical reasoning,
q i y a s, thus directing the discussion to compare and seek the influence
between the two traditions. Claiming the independence of the text, or
the concept of a bare text, implied an extension of its domain by inte-
grating tradition, the sayings of the Fathers in Judaism and both the
s u n n a and ijmaÕ in Islam. Khalid Masud presented a text from Al-Mawdu-
diÕs t a f s i r of the verses 41-54 of s u r a 5 in which he emphasized the
boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims, not only in terms of re-
ligious practice but also in social interaction. Claiming the returning back
to the bare text, or Ôtextual mentalityÕ, as Galit puts it, seems to be a com-
mon practice shared by both the literalists and the modernists. But is
bare text void of tradition, whether canonized or not, meaningful? 
The fourth session ÔPhilosophical and Mystical ContactsÕ shifted the
discussion to the issue of intertextuality beyond the canonized texts
and their exegesis. Sabine Schmidtke presented an Arabic text written
in Hebrew letters by the Jewish author
Yusuf al-Basir. In this text the author
elaborates his refutation of the Mu'-
tazili Abu Ôl-Husayn al-BasriÕs treatise
Tasaffuh al-Adilla (examining the evi-
dences) and raised questions about
whom this text addressed, why it was
written in Hebrew letters, and whether
it is possible to identify the author as a
Jew or Muslim? The mystical text of al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi Badw al-Sha'n
(The Beginning of the Matter) presented by Sara Sviri developed the
discussion towards the shared cultural symbols that are employed in
the mystical literature in the two traditions. Again, the question of lin-
ear and hierarchical paradigms of influence was eliminated in favor of
shared cultural background. 
The fifth session, ÔPoetry in Andalusia, Andalusia in PoetryÕ, made it
possible to reconsider the issue of influence. Haviva Ishay presented
two poetry texts, one in Hebrew by Samuel Hanagid and the other in
Arabic by ÔUrwa bin Hazm where the influence and the competition are
obvious. Was the competition to prove that Hebrew is as sacred as Ara-
bic? Was the differentiation between religious and non-religious poet-
ry in the Hebrew tradition directed toward eliminating the Arabic in-
fluence? Again, the text of the Palestinian Poet Mahmud Darwish pre-
sented by Abdul-Rahman al-Shaikh emphasized the notion of the
shared symbols; Andalusia is the symbol of loss shared by Jews and
Muslims though the meaning conveyed is not the same. 
N A S R  A B U Z A Y D
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ISIM and The Working Group Modernity and
Islam of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin
collaborated for the third workshop of the
project ÔJewish and Islamic Hermeneutics as
Historical CritiqueÕ. The latest workshop was
held in Leiden from 23-26 October 2003 under
the title, ÔTextuality, Intertextuality: Interactive
Cultural Practices in Judaism and IslamÕ. 
(Inter)textuality: I n t e r-
active Cultural Practices
Ð Nasr H. Abu Zayd (Humanistic University, Utrecht)
Ð Abdul-Rahim Al-Shaikh (AKMI Wissenschafts-kolleg zu Berlin)
Ð Khalil Athamina (Birzeit University)
Ð Daniel Boyarin (University of California)
Ð Almut Bruckstein (Humboldt-Universitt zu Berlin)
Ð Islam Dayeh (Leiden University)
Ð Judith Frishman (Katholieke Theologische Universiteit, Utrecht)
Ð Galit Hasan-Rokem (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Ð Haviva Ishay (Ben Gurion University of the Negev)
Ð Navid Kermani (Independent Researcher)
Ð Georges Khalil (AKMI Wissenschafts-kolleg zu Berlin)
Ð Sjoerd van Koningsveld (Leiden University)
Ð Ali Mabrook (University of Cape Town)
Ð Michael Marx (Freie Universitt Berlin)
Ð Muhammad Khalid Masud (International Islamic University)
Ð Angelika Neuwirth (Freie Universitt Berlin)
Ð Marcel Poorthuis (Katholieke Theologische Universiteit, Utrecht)
Ð Sabine Schmidtke (Freie Universitt Berlin)
Ð Nicolai Sinai (Freie Universitt Berlin)
Ð Dina Stein (Graduate Theological Union)
Ð Sarah Stroumsa (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Ð Sara Sviri (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Ð Abdulkader Tayob (ISIM / University of Nijmegen)
Ð Stefan Wild (Universitt Bonn / Wissenschafts-kolleg zu B e r l i n )
P A R T I C I P A N T S
For more information about the project including detailed information
about the previous two workshops please see:
http://www.wikoberlin.de/kolleg/projekte/AKMI/ hermeneutik?hpl=2
Nasr Abu Zayd holds the Chair of Humanism and Islam
a tt h e University of Humanistics, Utrecht
E-mail: n.abu-zayd@uvh.nl
M A R T IN  V A N  B R UIN E S S E N
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The Islamic resurgence, the onset of
which may be traced back to the 1967
Middle East war and which has re-
ceived a strong impetus from the Iran-
ian revolution, has not only brought a
wide range of Islamist and neo-funda-
mentalist movements into the public
sphere of the Muslim world, but also
appears to have occasioned a revival of
Sufism and related devotional move-
ments. In countries as far apart as
Turkey and Indonesia, ÔclassicalÕ Sufi orders such as the Naqshbandiyya
and the Qadiriyya remain influential and appear even to find new ad-
herents in circles that previously appeared highly secularized. Besides,
various religious movements that are not Sufi orders in the strict sense
but share certain characteristics with them and have distinctive devo-
tional and disciplining practices have been experiencing significant
growth. As examples one may mention the Nurcu movement of
Turkey, MalaysiaÕs Darul Arqam (surviving despite an official ban), and
the Tablighi Jama'at, which is of Indian origin but presently one of the
most truly transnational religious movements. 
Many individual believers who do not themselves follow a specific spir-
itual discipline, moreover, have taken an intellectual interest in the mysti-
cal tradition of Islam, which they believe to be more open, inclusive and
tolerant of difference, and which they contrast favourably with Ôfunda-
mentalistÕ versions of their religion. Discussion circles, journals and books
disseminate Sufi ideas to larger audiences than ever before. Sufi groups
cover the entire spectrum from the strictly shari'a-oriented to the latitudi-
narian, from Muslim puritan to perennialist. There is no strict boundary
separating Sufi groups from New Age-type movementsÑwhich raises
questions of conceptualization as well as sociological explanation. 
These and related issues were discussed at the conference ÔSufism and
the ÔModernÕÕ in Bogor, Indonesia on 4-6 September 2003. Some of the
papers discussed ÔclassicalÕ Sufi orders in modern contexts: the Naqsh-
bandiyya in Republican Turkey (Brian Silverstein), Pakistan and England
(Pnina Werbner), the Khalwatiyya in MubarakÕs Egypt (Rachida Chih),
the Mouridiyya in Senegal (Leonardo Villaln), the Ne'matollahiyya i n
post-revolutionary Iran (Matthijs van den Bos), and the Qadiriyya
wa'n-Naqshbandiyya in Indonesia (Sri Mulyati, Asep Usman Ismail).
Others dealt more specifically with the social, political and economic
roles played by saints and Sufi sheikhs
in Gambia (Benjamin Soares) and In-
donesia (Martin van Bruinessen),
where apparently traditional roles ap-
pear to be highly functional in modern
contexts. Reformist Sufism was the
subject of papers concerning the
da'wa of Tablighi Jama'at among the
lower-caste Meos in Mewat, North-
West India (Yoginder Sikand) and the
thought of Sa'id Nursi, the progenitor
of the Nurcu movement (Redha Ameur). That Sufism and puritan re-
form have not always been such polar opposites as has often been
claimed was shown in an analysis of Syrian Naqshbandi and Muslim
Brotherhood authors (Itzchak Weismann). Contemporary Sufi and
Salafi journals in Indonesia (analyzed by Michael Laffan) have indu-
bitably different concerns but ignore rather than oppose one another.
From Casablanca to Jakarta, it is among the highly educated that we
find an eager interest in ÔspiritualÕ matters that may accommodate Su-
fism with other religious traditions and disciplines such as Zen and
yoga in the Moroccan case (Patrick Haenni on Morocco), k e b a t i n a n,
perennialism and New Age in Jakarta (Julia Howell, Ahmad Syafi'i
Mufid and Adlin Sila). The relationship of Sufi movements with the
state is in theory problematical, but surprising accommodations
occur. Neither the secular Republic of Turkey nor the Islamic Republic
of Iran look favourably upon Sufism, but in both countries Sufi orders
have found ways to accommodate with the state. In Turkey, where all
orders are formally banned, Naqshbandis have remained influential
by transforming their organization (from t a r i k a t to c e m a a t and v a k i f)
and practices (from traditional m e r l e s to seminar). The relationship be-
tween Sufi orders and the Islamic regime has been complicated but
never overtly antagonistic. Elsewhere, Sufis have often been close to
the centres of economic and political power. The highest-ranking offi-
cial ulama of Egypt, as shown by Rachida Chih, tend to be affiliated
with the Khalwatiyya order. Living saints, from Indonesia to Senegal
and Gambia, are favourite companions of the rich and powerful and
have considerable influence in the political process. 
The ÔclassicalÕ orders had always been transnational in the sense that
their networks spread across language and state boundaries. Many
Sufi teachers attracted disciples from places far apart, who later estab-
lished branches of the masterÕs order in their regions of origin. Howev-
er, direct contact and communication between different clusters in
these networks were rare. The massive movement of people across
state boundaries and the emergence of new diasporas have resulted in
new patterns of transnational relations. Perhaps the most spectacular
example is that of the Mouride movement, which besides being a
major factor in the political and economic life of Senegal is at the same
time a remarkably successful network of migr communities all over
the world, in which trade and religious practices are intimately con-
nected. Although spread across Europe and North America, the net-
work consists exclusively of Senegalese Mourides. In this respect, it is
similar to the networks of South Asian Naqshbandis in Manchester
studied by Pnina Werbner, which remain Urdu-speaking and oriented
towards Pakistan (mostly Punjab and NWFP). Somewhat similar, both
the Malaysian Darul Arqam movement and the Indonesian sheikh
Abah AnomÕs Qadiriyya wa'n-Naqshbandiyya successfully expanded
across state borders but never beyond Malay-speaking communities.
The Tablighi Jama'at and Sheikh NazimÕs Haqqaniyya Naqshbandiyya
have become have gone a step further in shedding their vernacular
roots and drawing followers of highly diverse origins. These global
movements find their counterparts in others, especially prominent in
Indonesia, that celebrate their local character.
I S I M/ C o n f e r e n c e
The conference ÔSufism and the ÔModernÕ in
IslamÕ was held in Bogor, Indonesia, on 4-6
September 2003 and was a collaborative
effort of the ISIM, Griffith University
(Brisbane, Australia) and the Centre for the
Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of JakartaÕs
State Islamic University. The aim of the
conference was to explore current
developments in Sufism and related
movements over the globe.
Sufism and the
Ô M o d e r n Õ in Islam
Martin van Bruinessen
holds the ISIM Chair at
Utrecht University.
Ð Redha Ameur (University of Melbourne, Institute of Asian Studies)
Ð Azyumardi Azra (PPIMÐUIN, Jakarta)
Ð Matthijs van den Bos ( I S I M )
Ð Rachida Chih (IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence)
Ð Patrick Haenni (CEDEJ, Cairo)
Ð Julia Howell (Griffith University) 
Ð Michael Laffan (IIAS, Leiden)
Ð Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid (IIAS, Leiden / Department of Religious Affairs, Jakarta)
Ð Sri Mulyati (State Islamic University, Jakarta)
Ð Yoginder Sikand ( I S I M )
Ð M. Adlin Sila (Department of Religious Affairs, Jakarta) 
Ð Brian Silverstein (University of California, Los Angeles)
Ð Benjamin Soares (African Studies Centre, Leiden)
Ð Leonardo Villaln (University of Florida)
Ð John O. Voll (Center for Muslim Christian Understanding, Washington DC)
Ð Itzchak Weismann (University of Haifa)
Ð Pnina Werbner (Keele University)
Ð Martin van Bruinessen ( I S I M )
P A R T I C I P A N T S
I S I M/ R o u n d t a b l e
The ISIM roundtable on the politics of
veiling practices came on the heels of
the expulsion of two French school
girls, Lila and Alma Levy, because of
their decision to wear a headscarf that
covered their ears, hairline and neck,
followed by a photographic coverage
in the Dutch V o l k s k r a n t Magazine of
three young women in the Nether-
lands wearing a complete face veil, in
addition to Europe-wide unease and
debate on forming a policy regarding
practices of veiling in public institutions. Given this heightened con-
text, all presentersÑsometimes drawing upon their research and com-
parative reflections from Muslim states and societiesÑfocused primar-
ily on the debate in Europe. 
The presentations made by Annelies Moors and Linda Herrera fo-
cused on legal and educational debates concerning the (in)compatibil-
ity of face covering with notions of liberalism. Mayanthi Fernando, cur-
rently engaged in research on the Islamic revival in France, contextual-
ized the French ruling on the Levy sisters, while Saba Mahmood pre-
sented her rethinking of embodied practices (such as veiling) amongst
women in the d a ' w a movement in Egypt to raise issues for considera-
tion in the European context. Drawing largely on Fernando and Mah-
moodÕs presentations, (see p.16 for an elaboration of the presentations
by Moors and Herrera) I want to delineate three questions that
emerged for rethinking the debate.
1) Can we understand the ÔproblemÕ posed by veiling practices in Euro-
pean liberal democracies as one emerging because of the secular char-
acter of the state, built upon a separation of state and church, a divide
of public/secular and private/religious domains? Often in the media
the contentions are represented in such a framework, and the Levy sis-
ters were banned from school on the basis of a 1989 Conseil dÕtat rul-
ing that their headscarves constituted religious insignia that was Ôos-
tentatiousÕ and ÔproselytizingÕ, and thus disruptive of the public/secu-
lar and private/religious divide. Fernando historicized the l a  c i t  p r i n c i-
ple concerning the religious neutrality of the French state, arguing that
the 1905 law, the basis for l a  c i t  , followed a series of compromises be-
tween the French state and the Catholic Church. As most Muslim im-
migrants arrived in France after 1905, they were excluded from the
kind of state concessions given to the Catholic Church. FernandoÕs de-
scription of the imbricated relationship between the ÔsecularÕ state and
ÔreligionÕ is certainly not unique to France. Mahmood pointed out that
Muslims are repeatedly singled out in liberal discourse for not respect-
ing the separation of public/secular and private/religious domains, al-
though the very articulation of public and private is built on history
and relationships of power in Western liberal democracies, and in gen-
eral remains porous to this day. Thus, in order to rethink the debate on
the veil, why it emerges as a ÔproblemÕ at all, it is necessary to histori-
cally and critically understand this framing of state and society as well. 
2) What are the gendered dimensions of this debate that challenge
both feminist and liberal ideologies? All presenters emphasized that it
has gone largely unremarked in the debates that legal rulings restrict-
ing veiling practices specifically harm women, for they then get exclud-
ed from education and employment. The veil has become so en-
trenched as a sign of Muslim womenÕs oppression and subjugation to
patriarchy that the very European feminists who have over the last
decades critiqued the objectification of womenÕs bodies for national
symbolism and capitalist consumption, fail to question this view of the
veil. It is after all no coincidence that it is womenÕs bodies that have be-
come the site of contestation over the
place of Muslims in European society.
One of the consequences of framing
the veil as oppressive is that liberals
also have been reluctant to support
Muslim womenÕs right to veil as a mat-
ter of freedom of religious expression.
Constructed as subordinated, imposed
religious beliefs, women who veil are
therefore considered incapable of inde-
pendent and rational thinking neces-
sary to the making of a citizen-subject. 
While Mahmood challenged the table to think outside the subordina-
tion/liberation framing of the veil, Fernando and Moors emphasized
that it is patronizing to tell articulate and intelligent young women
who have chosen to wear the veil that they are being oppressed, that it
is being imposed upon them. This also makes it imperative to under-
stand the decision of women who have chosen to wear some form of
the veil in different ways.
3) Should religious subjectivity be analyzed in the same way as racial,
ethnic or national identity? This is in some respects the most challeng-
ing question. Mahmood argued that although it was common to pre-
sent functional and symbolic reasons for espousing the veil, such rea-
sons were inadequate in explaining the meaning they had for women
themselves in Islamic revival movements like the one she had studied
in Egypt. When interpreted as a mere symbol of Muslim identity, the
veil could be viewed as a dispensible practice, and not crucial to reli-
gious beliefs. In ethnic/national identity different symbols can embody
an identity, such that a sari could be worn interchangeably with anoth-
er dressÑbut the veil was not necessarily such an interchangeable
symbol. Instead, she suggested that it be understood as not merely an
expression of identity but rather an embodied practice meant to real-
ize a virtuous life and interiority, and therefore both a necessary end
and means to the making of religious subjectivity. Fernando drew
upon MahmoodÕs proposition that we understand religious subjectivi-
ty in a fundamentally different way than identity politics to explain
why French Muslims do not see any conflict between being a Muslim
and a French citizen. Because identifying oneself as a Muslim is gener-
ally perceived as identifying with a subnational or post-national identi-
ty, it is considered dangerous to the cohesion of the nation as the fore-
most horizon of belonging. But if religiosity could be understood and
conceived as different from and enmeshed in complicated ways with
national identity, then the expression of Muslim beliefs in Europe
could have a different social and political meaning in the debate at
l a r g e .
Finally, underwriting much of the debate on veils has been the fear
of radical Islam, and a growing equation of Islam with the oppression
of women on the one hand and terrorism on the other hand. Rethink-
ing the debate on veiling is one means of confronting this fear in an in-
creasingly shared world.4
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The ISIM roundtable Veiled Politics
( 3 0 October 2003) aimed at rethinking the
politics of veiling practices in the Islamic
world and in Europe. The roundtable included
presentations by Annelies Moors (ISIM),
L i n d a Herrera (Population Council, Cairo),
Saba Mahmood (University of California,
Berkeley and ISIM Visiting Fellow),
a n d Mayanthi Fernando (University
o f Chicago). The convenor was Vazira
F a z i l a-Yacoobali (ISIM).1
Veiled Politics
Rethinking the Debate on H i j a b
Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali is a post-doctoral fellow at ISIM
E-mail: v.zamindar@isim.nl
N o t e s
1 . I would like to thank Anouk de Koning,
Marina de Regt, and M. Amer for keeping
notes of the discussion. 
2 . Volkskrant Magazine, 25 October 2003.
3 . See for instance, The Economist, 25 October
2003, p.26.
4 . For a reading list on the subject, please
consult the ISIM website.
E d i t o rÕs Pick
Formations of the Secular
Christianity, Islam, Modernity
by Talal Asad
Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2 0 0 3
Opening with the provocative query
Ô[w]hat might an anthopology of the
secular look like?Õ Talal Asad explores
the concepts, practices and political
formations of secularism, with
emphasis on the major historical shifts
that have shaped secular sensibilities
and attitudes in the modern West and
Middle East. 
La voile et la bannire
LÕavant-garde fministe au Pakistan
by Christle Debedant
Paris: CNRS ditions, 2003
Christle Debedant approaches
PakistanÕs society through the prism of
women activism in particular and
women issues in general. Her study is
based on a vast experience of the
field, on interviews and on the analysis
of academic and activist literature.
I t offers an innovative perspective on
the development of women
movements, which have beenÑas
well as Pakistan itselfÐ caricaturised
too often.
Muslims in the Enlarged Europe
Religion and Society
by Brigitte Marchal, Stefano Allievi,
Felice Dassetto & J¿rgen Nielsen
( E d i t o r s )
Leiden: Brill, 2003
This volume describes the main
characteristics of contemporary
European Islam. The process of the
development of Islam in Europe is
analyzed through religious instruction
in educational systems, organizational
structures and the forms of political
participation by Muslims. In addition
to a description of the relationship
between European states and Islam in
judicial terms, the different types of
the integration of Islam in European
society is studied by looking at the
media, the relations between
religions, economic and international
dimensions, and the manner in which
views have changed following the
events of September 11. 
Your Cradle is Green
The Islamic Foundation and the Call to
Islam in ChildrenÕs Literature 
by Torsten Janson
Lund: Almqvist & Wiksell
International, 2003
How is d a ' w a mediated in picture
books? How is Islamic revivalism
converted into crash courses in
ÔCultural AwarenessÕ? This study deals
with the Islamic Foundation, and
focuses its 25 years of publication of
Islamic-English childrenÕs literature. In
order to analyse the implications of
such new modalities, it surveys the
discursive order of d a ' w a in history. 
Feeding Desire
Fatness, Beauty and Sexuality among a
Saharan People
by Rebecca Popenoe
London: Routledge, 2004
Based on fieldwork in an Arab village
in Niger, Feeding Desire analyzes the
meanings of womenÕs fatness as
constituted by desire, kinship,
concepts of health, Islam, and the
crucial social need to manage
sexuality. By demonstrating how a
particular beauty ideal can only be
understood within wider social
structures and cultural logics, the
book implicitly provides a new way of
thinking about the ideal of slimness in
late Western capitalism.
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Public Islam and the Common
G o o d
by Armando Salvatore & 
Dale F. Eickelman (Editors)
Leiden: Brill, 2003
'Public Islam' refers to the diverse
invocations and struggles over Islamic
ideas and practices that increasingly
influence the politics and social life of
large parts of the globe. This book
explores the public role of Islam in
contemporary world politics.
It shows how competing Islamic ideas
and practices create alternative
political and social realities in the
Muslim majority regions of the Arab
Middle East, Iran, South Asia, Africa,
and elsewhere in ways that differ from
the emergence of the public sphere in
E u r o p e .
Performing Arts
Waanzee is a story situated in a Dutch
Calvinistic community during the First
World War. Why did you bring in actors
from Morocco?
The inspiration was The Battle for God
by Karen Armstrong. It concerns funda-
mentalism in the monotheistic reli-
gions. When I read the book by Haas-
noot, I thought: ÒThis is the story that I
want to tell about fundamentalism in
general!Ó An aspect that all these reli-
gions share is that charismatic individ-
uals can appear on the scene in times
of hardship or rapid change; this may
end in upheaval, chaos, or even mad-
ness. This process is given a human
face in the play W a a n z e e! 
It could have been performed by
Dutch actors, but then the play might
have been strongly associated with
renowned Dutch playwright Heijer-
mans (1864-1924) who wrote fisher-
men dramas. With Moroccan actors the
play becomes something for today.
Falkenier is a charismatic figure who tries to convince his crew of his apoc-
alyptic vision. This theme reminds me of the tumult surrounding 11/9 and
Bin Laden. 
Bin Laden is timeless. A while ago I saw a documentary about
Afghanistan when the Taliban were still in power. The superintendent
of a football stadium that had been sponsored by Europe talked about
the executions that were carried out there: ÒIt is such a pleasure to see
the sinners punished! Let the Europeans sponsor our executions!Ò The
Calvinist Falkenier is just like that. His religion has become de-human-
ized. The essence of religion is mercy. With this play I want to show
what happens when people become merciless. It always ends in
t r a g e d y .
What type of public do you want to reach?
I am trying to reach both an Arabic-speaking and Dutch-speaking
public. I try to select topics that are interesting for both audiences. This
play has mainly attracted a Dutch-speaking public, maybe because
Waanzee is considered a ÔseriousÕ play in Moroccan circles. They prefer
something light. They want to laugh. But there is humor in the play.
The two youngestÑoriginally maleÑcrew members are played by two
actresses who provide comic relief. They side with Falkenier and do
this quite innocently until they become victims themselves. 
Waanzee! is not the first play in which you engage Moroccan actors. Earli-
er such productions included Henrik IbsenÕs play Nora. You also attempted
to stage the opera Aisha two years ago when it was suddenly cancelled,
seemingly following protests against portraying the Prophet and those
close to him.
Putting the Prophet on stage is something we never tried. Muham-
mad always said that believers must not worship him, but Allah. If we
forget that he was just a man, we are de-humanizing religion. My aim
was to tell this story through the opera A i s h a. According to Nasr Abu
Zaid it would have been possible to put on A i s h a in the 1950s in the
Arab world because at that time people were convinced that it would
contribute to modernity. 
I did not hide the fact that Abu Bakr, Fatima and Aisha would be on
stage. This did not cause us any difficulties when recruiting musicians,
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apart from the singer who was to play
the role of Abu Bakr who I decided not
to put on stage. The female singers did
not object to being on stage. 
Assia Djebar wrote the libretto. Both she
and Abu Zaid are controversial in the Is-
lamic world. Did you consult only these
two people?
We did consult others. Moreover, the
actors had already seen the script in
French. It was only when the Arabic
translation arrived that some began to
consider seriously what the play was
about. A week before rehearsals start-
ed Saida Baadi, one of the actresses,
expressed that she had grave doubts
about the play and suggested per-
forming from off-stage. But that was
impossible; Aisha belongs on the
stage, her story must be told and sung.
At about that time an article appeared
in the Moroccan press suggesting that
the play was a blasphemy. 
Saida Baadi told the Dutch journalists who contacted her about that ar-
ticle that Salman RushdieÕs fate would be ours. Meanwhile, the Dutch
press reported that the play was being cancelled because of threats. I
stated over and over again that we had not received a single threat. But,
of course, journalists only want to hear that there is an Islamic danger in
the Netherlands. Questions were even asked in Parliament! In actual
fact, the Moroccan newspaper article had stated that if the production
were to be continued a rumour would spread like that surrounding
Salman Rushdie. That is very different from getting actual death threats.
Why was the opera performed in Italy but not in the Netherlands?
In Italy the play was staged by non-Muslim actors in Italian. I wanted
to attract a more mixed public. It is important to address a mixed audi-
ence, in particular after 11/9. Perhaps, the increasing number of actors
in the Netherlands of Moroccan background have a role to play in real-
izing this endeavor.
The play W a a n z e e (Mad See) recently toured
through the Netherlands. Based on the novel
W a a n z e e by Robert Haasnoot, the play is
a reconstruction of events in a small Dutch
Protestant fishing community in 1915 and
centers around the character of Arend
Falkenier, a deeply religious man. Out at
open sea he seeks to convince the captain
and the crew that he received a divine
message revealing that the end of time had
come and that they were the only survivors
and should head for the Eternal City of
Jerusalem. To prove this prophecy he breaks
his compass and cuts off the sails, claiming
that God alone can lead them through him.
He has three reluctant fishermen killed.
A Norwegian freighter eventually finds the
vessel and returns the surviving crew to
safety. The stage version of Waanzee w a s
performed in Arabic with actors from
Morocco with supertitles in Dutch. 
B e l o w i s an interview with the playÕs
d i r e c t o r , Gerrit Timmers.
Waanzee! When Religion
Becomes Merciless
Scene from
W a a n z e e
For more information,
please contact
Onafhankelijk Toneel at: 
o t @ o t - r o t t e r d a m . n l .
Maria Soaad
Bouanani is an
i n d e p e n d e n t
journalist in
Ô sH e r t o g e n b o s c h ,
T h eN e t h e r l a n d s
R A N D A  S H A AT H
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A r t s
Under the Same Sky:
C a i r o
I lived for ten years on the 14th floor of a high-rise in Cairo. I was amazed
to discover the vast variety of life on the rooftops that lay beneath me. I
took photos, excited by the different scenes of daily life that I witnessed.
The people who live on the rooftops have a different and separate life
from the people who live in the buildings themselves; those residents as
well as the pedestrians on the street below have no idea what goes on
above them. My discovery led me to try and document this unique phe-
nomenon, one extra detail in the complexities of the city of 16 million
people. Some rooftop dwellers were hesitant to be photographed or to
speak of their experience. They feared being evicted and losing their
small place in the heart of the city. Others were embarrassed by the stig-
ma that assumed that people living on the roof were servants. I met
artists and writers who had transformed rooftops to studios and living
space and men and boys who escaped the din of the city to fly their pi-
geons. 
The lives of rooftop dwellers in Cairo today bear little relation to the
family roof activities of the 1920's. The roof is no longer an area of priva-
cy, rooftop dwellers today share bathrooms and public areas. No secrets
can be hidden. The ubiquitous satellite dishes bring a version of the world
far beyond the view. The rooftop has become a new kind of community.
s t
Under the Same Sky: Rooftops of Cairo 2 0 0 2 Ð 2 0 0 3
s
First day of war on Iraq. Cairo,
20 March 2003 
Under the Same Sky: Rooftops of Cairo
The book is part of the series of publications being
developed parallel to the project ÔContemporary Arab
RepresentationsÕ, initiated by Witte de With, center for
contemporary art, Rotterdam and Fundaci Antoni Tpies,
Barcelona. Publisher Arab/English edition:
Witte de With, Rotterdam, ISBN 9 0-7 3 3 6 2 - 6 0 1 .
For more information,
please contact 
Witte de With, 
center for contemporary art at:
i n f o @ w d w . n l
A r t s
Last Summer
in Baghdad
Last Summer
i n B a g h d a d ,
a s s e m b l a g e s
b y Q a s s i m
Alsaedy, 2003
The Dutch-Iraqi artist, Qassim Alsaedy
(Baghdad, 1949), is highly interested in
the traces of history left on ancient
walls. Now living in exile far from his
birthplace in the area of ancient
Mesopotamia, he is engaged in an artis-
tic dialogue that reaches beyond time
and space and which expresses his
deep connection with historyÑboth its
beauty and its sadness. In his paintings
and assemblages Alsaedy expresses his
sense of ancient and recent history. And
although he paints the burned fields of
Kurdistan (where he once lived and
worked as a peshmerga and artist hold-
ing exhibits in tents for refugees and
guerilla fighters), his paintings and
mixed media works always contain a
deep sense of hope. There is, in his
work, a slight thematic parallel with the
famous Dutch artist, Armando, who
painted the well known series of Ôguilty
landscapesÕ, which alluded to the eter-
nally doomed grounds of Auschwitz.
But there is one important difference
between the two artists. Armando,
through his art, displays a deep sense of
the tragedy of one specific place whose
traces will probably never heal. Qassim
Alsaedy, on the other hand, who saw
the burned and poisoned fields of Kur-
distan himself (among the worldÕs
guiltiest landscapes), always conveys
through his art the message that history
will eventually heal and redeem. Last
summer, Qassim Alsaedy visited Bagh-
dad after 25 years. His impressions of
this visit were shown at the fourth edi-
tion of the Biennale Internazionale dellÕ
Arte Contemporanea di Firenze, from 6
till 14 December, 2003.
For more information on Qassim Alsaedy,
p l e a s e contact Floris Schreve at:
f l o r i s s c h r e v e @ h o t m a i l . c o m
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Photo Commentary
Until recently the number of newly built mosques
in the Netherlands was marginal, but over the last
few years several larger mosques have been built
while others are in process. The architectural
styles of these new mosques have provoked
public debate about whether architects should fall
back on traditional designs typical of those in
Dutch MuslimsÕ countries of origin or whether
their designs should be more innovative and in
concert with the local environment. 
Mevlana Mosque
P H O T O :  H A N S  V A N  D E N  B O G A A R D ,  2 0 0 3
t Essalam Mosque
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The three cases
presented here concern
the major examples of
modern mosque
architecture in the
Netherlands and have
all been designed by
European non-Muslim
architects in close
consultation with
Dutch-Turkish mosque
foundations. 
Wester Mosque 
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